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Vol. 33
No. 3

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL
1955

VOL·33 NO·3 $1·50 A COPY

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL 1955

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Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed at 10 McGovern Ave., Lancaster, Pa. Editorial and Business Offices, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N. Y. Cable address, Foraffairs, New York. Subscriptions, $6.00 a year, post free to any address. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them.

Vol. 33, No. 3.

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 33 APRIL 1955 No. 3

THE ATOM BOMB AND NATO

By Paul-Henri Spaak

THE utilization of atomic energy for warlike purposes raises moral, political and military questions and requires the review and perhaps the revision of many traditionally accepted ideas. The first of these questions is whether the possible use of so horribly destructive a force does not rule out the very idea of war.

For years I have been irritated by the statement that because men have always fought they always will fight. When I was young this pessimistic fatalism conflicted with my hopes for a better world; my reaction was sentimental, a refusal to accept the idea of a society without progress, a future without hope. Today my reaction is just as sharp but quite different, grounded more in reason, I believe, and hence more justified.

The thesis of the inevitability of war stated in absolute terms strikes me as superficial in any case. The reason men have fought throughout history is because they hoped that by fighting and winning a war they would solve their problems. In our time, however, so-called victories no longer pay, and this will be even more true in times to come. No sensible person would say today that war solves problems or that problems are easier to solve after a war than they were before. The plain fact is that war no longer pays. But though it is a fact, it is still quite a new one and therefore deserves to be repeated and explained.

The Franco-German war of 1870 was the last war in Europe that brought some advantages to the victor. As the prize for their victory, the Germans received 5,000,000 gold francs and two provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, and from it they drew the impulse which by 1914 had made them the most powerful nation in Europe if not in the world.

By the time of the First World War the results of victory already were very different. That war made plain that the fate of nations is joint, not separate. Those who thought they had won

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found very soon that they had come to the aid of those who had lost. The United States in particular learnt how much its attempts to rescue Germany cost in loans that never were repaid and gifts that brought nothing in return. Before long the worries and difficulties of the defeated became those of the victors also.

Since the Second World War this process has been even more marked. It is paradoxical but a fact that the European country with the most prosperous and expanding economy today is the one that was severely beaten only ten years ago. And it is not only that the economic situation of the vanquished nation is superior to that of many of the victors, but also that its political situation is stronger both as regards stability and its own confidence in the future.

As to the Third World War, the war which might break out tomorrow, we must all be fully aware that it would see the use of atomic weapons. It may seem exaggerated to say that humanity would be entirely destroyed, but there can be no doubt that the cataclysm would be immense and the losses incalculable. Civilization would be thrown back generations, maybe centuries.

When I see two great nations confront each other, each employing every propaganda device to show that it possesses superiority in the atomic field, I admit that I find difficulty in working up much enthusiasm on any such basis. For one or the other has or soon will have enough bombs at its disposal to strike an absolutely mortal blow at its opponent. Which of them has a surplus thus does not seem to me very important.

Obviously, too, even if the aggressor makes a surprise attack he will not be safe from reprisals, since he could not obtain control over all the reserves of his enemy at one blow. Therefore it does not seem to me important whether this side is more vulnerable because its industry and population are more concentrated or that side because its enemy has better bases. Such things do not change the essential facts or the conclusion to be drawn from them, namely that even a war that ended in victory would have caused such destruction, would have so dislocated all the conditions of life and would create so many new and insoluble problems that it could not be anything but a fearful loss for everyone. This may be a simple way of reasoning, but it is not too simple. War, long accepted as cruel, is today stupid also. There is no reason and no excuse for anyone to make one. The number and efficiency of modern weapons may not make war completely in-

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conceivable, since the possibility that fools or desperados may head governments cannot be ruled out, but at least it becomes more and more unlikely.

It is for these reasons that I say, contrary to the opinion of many and also at some risk of being misunderstood, that in the present state of affairs I would hesitate to forbid the construction of atomic bombs. I believe that the terrible fear weighing on the world on their account is one of the most effective guarantees for peace. I am fully aware of the risks of such a policy; yet, everything considered, I believe that it is the right one. Of course the only wholly effective way to guarantee peace would be for everyone to disarm. But is disarmament possible today? Each nation would have to place absolute confidence in its potential opponent, for even with an efficient system for controlling the future manufacture of atomic bombs it would still be comparatively easy for one of the chief protagonists to hide some of its stocks or certain of its factories somewhere in its vast territory and thus retain a superiority. Since the moral basis essential for such a degree of confidence does not exist for a long time, we must resign ourselves to live in danger and accept the danger as, paradoxically, our possible hope for salvation.

I must also say that the proposal to humanize war has always struck me as hypocrisy. I have difficulty in seeing the difference from a moral and humane point of view between the use of a guided missile of great power which can kill tens and even hundreds of people without regard for age or sex, and which if used repeatedly will kill millions, and the use of an atomic bomb which achieves the same result at the first stroke. Does crime against humanity begin only at the moment when a certain number of innocent people are killed or at the moment when the first one is killed? I am really not worried in the least that Mr. Molotov accuses me of being a war criminal because I foresee the possible use of atomic weapons in case of a Third World War. What seems really criminal to me is the idea of having recourse to war whatever form it might take, and in this respect I feel that my conscience is as clean as Mr. Molotov's.

II

Nevertheless, the existence of atomic weapons and the prospect that eventually they will be used create a series of problems, and the most important and delicate of them is this: Who is to

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decide when they are to be used—the military or the politicians? The ministers of the Atlantic Pact countries have been faced with this question since the last meeting of NATO.

One does not have to be an expert to understand that atomic weapons have transformed traditional methods of warfare. We are not dealing with just a new weapon; we have to create a new strategy. In democratic countries the military are often accused of planning and organizing the right sort of army to win the last war. To be "behind a war" has cost us dear in the past and we must not make that mistake again.

The army of today and tomorrow should count, then, on using atomic weapons. This involves a series of practical consequences, the most formidable of which is indicated in the question whether an army organized to face atomic weapons remains organized also to face so-called conventional arms and methods. I believe the answer is in the negative if it is true that the best defense against the atom bomb lies in the dispersion of forces. In that case another consideration immediately comes to mind: the very preparation of defense against the atomic bomb forces us to prepare to use it ourselves, for if a war broke out our army would no longer be suitable for a war conceived in classic terms.

Thus from argument to argument, from answer to answer, we come to the main political question: Since the next war will be an atomic war, since it will break out by surprise, and since reprisals are a main element in the calculations, who is to have the power and responsibility of ordering the use of the first bomb? The military or the civilians, the generals or the governments? A formal answer was given at the last NATO meeting to the effect that none of the traditional rules is to be changed: the decision rests and must remain with the governments.

This is the right answer. It would be unwise, however, to ignore the fact that in actual practice it does not settle everything. Some hypotheses are left vague and unanswered. For although we in the West are beginning to possess a single efficient military organization, each of us so far has jealously kept a separate political organization. This, to my mind, is wrong. We are aware that we must defend ourselves together against eventual aggression and we have made notable progress in this respect in recent years, but we have not yet created the political mechanism which should and could crown our military organization. We are united to fight a war which may be forced upon us, but we remain divided

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in making the decisions which might save us from such a war or which we would have to make once it broke out.

Only a fool would dare predict with certainty how the Third World War might begin or the precise situations which we should prepare to deal with. Will it break out in Europe or Asia? Or with a direct attack on the United States? In an area covered or not covered by the Atlantic Treaty? There are many uncertainties and there is no political organization today to study and face up to them. If we wait to let ourselves be caught up in events, we risk a period of uncertainty, blunders and misunderstandings which could be fatal to our alliance and our cause.

Decisions can be taken in the Council of NATO only by unanimity; each of the diplomats who sits there must ask his own government for instructions before acting on any serious matter. A council of this sort cannot deal with an urgent situation. Evidently a serious gap exists and must be bridged. Is it not time for the Atlantic nations to understand that if it is good to coördinate their military preparations to win a war it would still be better to coördinate their diplomatic and political efforts in order to prevent a war? Our greatest weakness at the moment is to ignore the basic principle that an army is only the instrument of a policy. This problem should be taken up without delay. The Atlantic Alliance will be incomplete and fragile until we draw all the necessary conclusions from the situation in which we find ourselves. Let us not remain halted halfway on the road we have chosen.

As things are, do we not react in different ways to various dangers and particularly to the menace of the atom bomb? Interest in this question is much more keen in the United States than in Europe. I am always surprised to find how much talk there is about it in America and that it leaves Europeans comparatively indifferent. A psychological explanation may be that for the first time in their history Americans feel directly menaced. They feel that a Third World War would be their war, that they would no longer be intervening in the conflicts of others but would be fighting for their own existence. The oceans no longer protect them effectively. The weapon which may be used against them is terrible. They are weighing the dangers of a totally new situation.

To the European the problem is quite different. Twice within a quarter of a century his continent has been cruelly ruined. He has seen destroyed cities, fleeing populations, roaring fires, tum-

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bling houses, famine—every material and moral horror. Today he has developed a certain fatalism; it is hard for him to believe that it could be even more horrible the next time than it already has been twice. His memories are stronger, perhaps, than his imagination; the past obscures the future, and as a result he is somewhat more resigned regarding the menace of war and perhaps faces it with less resolution. He passionately wants peace, and though he doubtless is capable of defending his independence and liberties he would always refuse to have anything to do with a war of conquest and any preventive war.

I feel that in this essential respect most Europeans and Americans feel alike, and I think this common feeling should form the basis of a common policy.

The menace of the atom bomb points directly to the reinforcement of the Atlantic Alliance—in its aims but above all in its methods. The Atlantic Alliance must be given a political council. In Europe, I am for almost complete political integration within the framework of the Atlantic Pact. I would not dare go so far as that at once, but there are intermediary formulas to be found between the totally insufficient powers of the present Council of NATO and the renunciation of a part of the national sovereignty.

III

As I look back over what I have written, I am a little frightened at the inhuman logic of my reasoning and the audacity of my conclusions. I pause to consider them once more, to weigh the pros and cons for a last time. And still I feel that what I have set down is true and that it is useful for it to be said.

Around the atomic bomb is being built a whole strategy, a whole policy, perhaps even, in outline, a philosophy. Out of our very extremity may come wisdom, out of the frightening means of destruction may come the means of assuring peace. What men in the past have sought to make prevail by persuasion, by appealing to humane feelings, may in the end be achieved because the insensate machine inexorably imposes it. Technical progress may indirectly produce moral and social progress. If so, what an extraordinarily crooked road it would have been that led toward the good!

But this progress will take place, if it takes place at all, in a most dangerous atmosphere, an atmosphere of profound fear. Humanity's future will be hanging upon a maladroit gesture, an

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uncontrolled reflex, the act of a lunatic or a megalomaniac. Before we reach the goal much time will pass, many things will happen, many dangers will have to be avoided.

If war comes it may be atomic. It will not be for a province or for economic advantage; it will be a world war with civilization itself at stake. Yet we are trying to cope with this situation with our traditional form of political organization. Even our furthest flights of audacity have not as yet carried us beyond the stage of alliances. With difficulty we have succeeded in making some progress in military organization. For the rest, we advance to meet the future without having succeeded in breaking from the past. Truly our imagination is not in step with our era. The fact that the United States takes a different attitude from Europe toward recent events in the Far East simply underlines the risks we are running.

Let us end our timid efforts, which at best show vague goodwill more than a clear awareness of realities, and let us accept the consequences of the plain fact that the fate of all of us in the West is inextricably linked. The atom bomb leaves no room for neutrality or separate national policies. The West is condemned not only to wage war together but to create policy together. Let us continue the military efforts we have begun; but let us urgently set to work to improve our political relations, showing in this field also a sense and purpose of real solidarity.

The Atlantic Alliance is a great thing. It has the potentiality to guarantee world peace. But with its present imperfections it cannot survive. Either it will be complete or it will not be.

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND FORMOSA

By Arthur Dean

FORMOSA—symbol of the struggle between freedom and Communism in the Orient—poses a test of how far United States foreign policy can combine the ideals of freedom with the flexible realism required by the harsh facts of world politics.

Our friend and long-time ally, Chiang Kai-shek, presently holds Formosa (Taiwan); the Communists hold the mainland. We are unhappy that a great nation with the cultural traditions of China should be under the control of a totalitarian régime which does not share our belief in freedom. But for the present, at least, unless we wish to risk an all-out war, our desire to see the return of freedom to continental China cannot overcome the stark fact of the possession and control of the mainland by the Communists.

United States foreign policy seems to have three major alternative methods of dealing with Formosa. The first is to acquiesce in frightened demands (made, for example, by prominent members of the British Labor Party) that we abandon Formosa to the Communist Chinese. The second is to insist that the Communist rule of the mainland should be formally ignored, regardless of what the alternatives may be or what they hold in prospect for us. The third, an intermediate position, is to accept, albeit unhappily, that at the present time the Peking government controls continental China and that any prospect of stabilizing the Far East may of necessity entail that we negotiate with it.

The present American policy towards the two claimants for the title of "Republic of China" is based upon our long-time friendship for the Chinese people, the Japanese Peace Treaty, our Treaty of Defense with the Government of Nationalist China on Formosa, our policy of nonrecognition of the Red Chinese Government, and active opposition to attempts to replace the Nationalist Chinese representative at the United Nations (including his seat on the Security Council) with a delegate from Peking.

The history of our postwar policy toward Formosa began with the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943. President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek spoke for the three allies in these terms:

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It is their purpose . . . that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

In the Potsdam Proclamation of July 1945, President Chiang, President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill declared:

The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

However, when the Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed in 1951 (and neither the U.S.S.R. nor Red China signed, though the U.S.S.R. is now angling to come under its terms), the precise statement with respect to Formosa, in Article 2(a), was:

Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.

There was no specific cession of the island, which had been held by Japan since China ceded it in 1895, to any particular nation or government or to the United Nations, as such.

With the attack upon Korea in 1950, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to patrol the strait between the mainland and Formosa. That zone was "neutralized." In 1953, the United States announced that it would "unleash" Nationalist China and permit attacks from Formosa upon the mainland. The fleet, however, was to continue President Truman's policy of preventing Red China from attacking Nationalist-held territory. By now this policy appears to be somewhat modified by the limitations of the Treaty of Defense and by President Eisenhower's message to the Congress of January 24, 1955, and the Joint Resolution four days later.

For, implicit in the Administration's recent actions is acceptance of the proposition that the Nationalists will not be able to recapture the mainland, at least in the immediately foreseeable future. The remarkable unanimity with which Congress passed President Eisenhower's requested resolution affirming his authority to defend Formosa and the Pescadores, like the disturbed reaction in the Congress to the subsequent remarks of George Yeh, the Nationalist Foreign Minister, seemed to hinge in large measure on the general conviction of both the American people and their legislators that no aggressive action either would be taken or permitted by the United States.

Both the President and Secretary of State Dulles, in urging the Senate to give consent to the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, insisted on its defensive character. A

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United Nations cease-fire, which was backed by both the President and the Secretary of State, can hardly be consistent with a policy of invasion of the mainland by Chiang. As Mr. Dulles has said,

> . . . renunciation of force is one of the basic principles of the United Nations, and the United States had hoped, and I may say still hopes, that the United Nations may be able to effect a cessation of the present hostilities.

Any doubt of our present position should be dispelled by Admiral Radford's statement:

> Certainly we are not planning an invasion of the mainland. Of course we have, as you know, ground troops in the Western Pacific. They were not put there to invade someone's territory but to defend against Communist aggression.

Unless Red China starts an aggressive attack on Formosa, it seems apparent that the necessary coöperation of the United States for a Nationalist recovery of the mainland will not be forthcoming, and then it would be only a defensive measure. Without coöperation by the United States there can be no such recovery.

II

As for the first alternative, it is wrong to suppose, as some people do, that peace and international calm are to be won by delivering Formosa to the Chinese Communists and exiling Chiang Kai-shek. Besides being a virtual death sentence for hundreds of thousands of Nationalists who fled the mainland, this course has no prospect of appeasing the Communists. For if anything should be established from our past parleys with Communist countries, it is that gratuitous concessions induce further and more extravagant demands from them rather than mollifying their existing claims. This is fundamental.

Control of Formosa by the Nationalist Government is of immense importance to the free world, both physically and as a symbol. It forms a strategic part of the vast arc of islands—Aleutians, Japan, Ryukus (Okinawa), Formosa, the Philippines—which form the essential perimeter of America's defense in the Pacific. A break in this perimeter, while not likely to be fatal, would be a severe blow to our plan of defense in the Pacific area and an even greater blow than Dienbienphu to the morale of Asian peoples now oriented in favor of freedom. Formosa, which lies only 500 miles south of Japan and 100 miles north of the

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Philippines, was the jumping-off point for the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in World War II.

Furthermore, as Secretary of State Dulles said in his recent speech to the Foreign Policy Association, failure to live up to our commitment on Formosa would undermine the faith of free Asian peoples in the military and moral strength of the United States to restrain the forces that aim to destroy the liberty of free nations. We have made a commitment to defend Formosa and the Pescadores by our Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China. Our honor as a nation and our claim to be a champion of freedom rest on carrying out this solemn obligation. Even without it there would be an ethical duty owing by the West to help ensure a free and safe life for the men and women who have fled from the mainland to Formosa, including those Chinese prisoners from the Korean war who chose to go to Formosa instead of returning to their homes.

In addition, the fact that a non-Communist Republic of China exists provides a rallying point for the large Chinese colonies, numbering nearly 13,000,000 persons, who live outside the borders of China. Overseas Chinese are an integral part of the economic and commercial life of key Southeast Asian areas such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. These Chinese have not been absorbed by the native populations. For example, there are some 2,000,000 Chinese residents in Indonesia, of whom only 800,000 have accepted Indonesian nationality. This problem of nationality concerns Prime Minister Nehru sorely. The tendency of these people to look towards China as a guide in their attitudes and conduct is abetted by the Communist slogan, "a Chinese remains Chinese, wherever he may be domiciled." Maintenance of a free China government on Formosa gives them, at the very least, a choice of where they shall put their allegiance. If credence is to be given to reports that as many as 7,000,000 Chinese have been "liquidated" by the People's Republic, it is reasonable to hope that the allegiance of the overseas Chinese to that government will be small, even though a large percentage of students still go back to China to be educated, the nostalgic ties with the families and villages on the mainland are still strong, and many overseas Chinese contribute to the Chinese Communist cause as a sort of "insurance policy against future contingencies." An important measure of defense against Communist subversion in

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Southeast Asia is to preserve the non-Communist sympathies of the Chinese residents there.

Finally, the military strength of Chiang Kai-shek adds to the strength of the West. By reinforcing this vital part of our global defense it releases, to the extent it can be utilized, troops of other free nations for service in other crucial danger areas.

III

A second alternative policy is to insist bluntly that Communist China is an outlaw from the international community, that there can be no intercourse or bargaining with her at any time, that she shall be denied any participation in international organizations and that no concessions of any sort shall be made to her.

Panmunjom, Geneva, the subsequent French withdrawal from Northern Vietnam, the case of the eleven American airmen, the increasing demand for East-West trade and India's and Indonesia's insistence that the government of China is China's own domestic problem—these and many other things indicate that in practice the United States and the rest of the world cannot completely ignore the physical weight and psychological impact of Communist China. Nevertheless, there is a strong body of opinion in America which favors treating the Peking government as an "outlaw" and insists that any agreement with it would be "appeasement."

This view is frequently associated with the belief that Generalissimo Chiang could successfully invade the mainland if only we would give him the equipment. But such an invasion could have no prospect of success without very sizeable and continuing American military support. That would necessarily mean our participation in a war with Communist China and possibly with her ally, Soviet Russia. Persons who favor "unleashing" Chiang (now aged 67) never seem to visualize what would happen if he were unsuccessful and called for help, or the extent to which the policy they advocate would put the determination of our foreign policy into his hands. Curiously, many of those who do not trust our own President on foreign policy and have favored the Bricker Amendment would delegate power over our foreign policy to a foreign leader.

In fact, of course, the threat to "unleash" Chiang simply adds to a serious possibility of war which already exists. The Seventh

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Fleet and the U.S. Air Force are patrolling the Formosa straits; and the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu are included among the probably "related positions and territories . . . now in friendly hands" which the President has authority, with the support of Congress, to secure and protect. In view of these facts, and the categorical and daily renewed proclamations by the Communists of their intent to take both the offshore islands and Formosa itself, there is more than ample opportunity for the inadvertent misstep, the hot defense or hot pursuit, the major conflict.

What would such a war be like? The precise answer must, of course, be left to the military experts. But too grave a national issue is involved here for citizens to forswear reflection upon it or to fail to cross-examine the experts extensively. One serious possibility is that the Soviet Union will support China and that the war will become total. The new Soviet premier, Marshal Bulganin, referring to the Sino-Soviet mutual defense alliance, has declared: "China knows that it can look to us not only for sympathy but also for help. That help will be forthcoming when needed."

A more likely possibility is that Moscow would be willing to let Red China, helped with Russian matériel, absorb and dissipate the energies of the United States (and participating allies, if any). Would not Red China then have the capacity, helped by Russian arms, to force us to live under a war economy, to drain our resources, to withdraw our troops from Europe, Africa and our Arctic outposts, and to expend our blood, enthusiasm and moral leadership in the broad rice fields and steep mountains of China?

The Communists would be fighting on their own soil; we would have to maintain an air and sea supply line of 14,000 miles, vulnerable in part to submarines (of which the Russians have enough to lend a number to their ally) and costly to maintain. Troops, supplies and matériel which should be protecting the brittle frontiers between East and West in Europe would be required for a Far Eastern effort. Unless there is some short, quick way to knock out Red China, this might be a reënactment of Napoleon's 1812 adventure or the Wehrmacht's frustrating penetrations of Russia in World War II. France and Germany might become oriented to Moscow.

Some profess to believe that a landing by Chiang's army of 500,000 men would be a signal for an uprising on the mainland. But in view of the ruthless Communist controls there is little evi-

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dence to support the hope that such an uprising could be on a large enough scale to affect the war significantly. The lack of unity among the Nationalist armies during the pre-1950 civil conflict and the difference of opinion with respect to Korean military policy suggest that Nationalist sympathizers on the mainland could not organize successfully in the throes of an invasion.

A stalemate war in which the Western Powers chose only to harass the mainland by naval and air forces would be a clear invitation to the governors of mainland China to use their resources of manpower to invade the militarily weak and economically rich countries of Southeast Asia, stymie India, break the Korean Armistice, attack Japan and threaten her with annihilation if she permitted us to use our bases there to launch attacks.

Whether we should fight with atom or thermonuclear bombs presents special problems. The military efficacy of atomic weapons upon China cannot be fully appraised. Industrial facilities in Manchuria, railway communications, and troop or shipping concentrations would offer susceptible targets. But China is a country of 3,750,000 square miles; it is not centralized as Western nations are; and, as the Japanese found, it does not offer a solar plexus upon which to deliver a knockout blow. Further, even if Soviet Russia is not a participant in the war the Communist Chinese may borrow nuclear weapons from her and slip through our defenses for havoc-wreaking blows on the United States. Since the revelation by the Atomic Energy Commission that the 1954 Bikini explosion had a lethal fall-out zone of 7,000 square miles, we should have enough horse sense not to try to win a war with Red China "on the cheap." Our own Christian ideals as well as the opinion of our friends, which in many respects constitutes our strongest continuing weapon in the cold war, rebel at the thought that we might precipitate an atomic battle and the indiscriminate slaughter of human beings. We are not in a position to exercise our atomic strength without risking destroying civilization as we now know it.

So much for the possible military consequences of a policy of considering Red China an "outlaw." Turning to the political consequences, we find two chief arguments for the "outlaw" policy being urged. The first is that a stern refusal to acknowledge Red control of the mainland gives us propaganda and ethical advantages. The second is that, by preserving the Nationalist Government as the true Government of the Republic of China,

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the West avoids the probability of encountering two obstructive vetoes in the United Nations Security Council.

Propaganda and ethical advantages in the eyes of many large sections of world opinion would undoubtedly be lost if we acquiesced in a Red rape of Formosa. But refusing to acknowledge the existence of the Peking government is a different thing. A number of our important allies and important neutral countries formally recognize it. They believe—and it is a view long supported by textbook writers—that in international law formal recognition of a government is merely recognition of the fact of its effective control, of its intention to act as sovereign and of its ability to carry out its mandates. Moral approval is not involved.

The United States clearly should not—and will not—permit the free and friendly Chinese on Formosa to be attacked and taken by the Communists. But our intransigence in dealing with the Peking régime in the political field may be costing us a flexibility we badly need. It narrows our alternatives to one, and that one is likely to cause a serious deterioration in our relations with our allies and in our own political and strategic planning.

Japan, for example, badly needs trade if she is to survive economically and continue her present non-Communist political orientation. She feels that hope lies in markets on the Asian continent, and assiduous wooing by the U.S.S.R. is also having its effect. Japanese hopes of opening such markets—and perhaps retrieving the Soviet-held Habomai and Shikotan islands—are incompatible with an American policy which dogmatically ignores Peking's existence and insists on maintaining the blockade.

Those of our allies who recognize Peking are in the anomalous position of treating with the Nationalist Chinese in the United Nations and of abstaining when issues relating to the credentials of the Chinese delegate arise. Besides this, there is a rising sentiment in the United Nations that it is a forum for all countries, not just the "right" countries, and that we who used it in Korea are now restricting its influence. If this continues, the political thinking of the United States may not be sufficient to prevent a vote to seat the People's Government as the delegate from the Republic of China. Even assuming that we could and did exercise a veto (and there are those who say the question of which "China" has the seat is procedural and not substantive), this would be a major political defeat, shaking the unity of the West and damaging our ability to mobilize allies on more crucial issues.

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Let me be clear. I do not believe the United States should favor admitting Red China to the United Nations unless thereby we substantially advance American foreign policy and keep Formosa under Nationalist rule. To recognize the mainland régime and to admit it to the United Nations without a valid quid pro quo would tend to encourage the belief that a loaded pistol and a belligerent refusal to make concessions are the best way to be rewarded in international politics. But people must earn their daily bread, and the desire to see aggression punished wears thin if that is to be done at the cost of vital opportunities for trade. As things are going we face the inevitable defection of friends in the United Nations, and when that happens it may be too late to negotiate a cease-fire. Our strategic position may be ebbing away; we risk losing both our position and our prestige without obtaining any balancing concessions.

Since one veto is effective, the addition of another Communist veto in the Security Council (assuming the U.S.S.R. and Communist China work together) should not, as a practical matter, have any really substantial effect upon the present efficiency of Communist diplomacy in the United Nations. The Security Council has been unable to function effectively on matters such as the 11 American fliers without the presence of a People's Government representative. This may lead to negotiations outside the United Nations, thereby diminishing its influence. The flat refusal of Communist China to take part in cease-fire talks over Formosa caused the Security Council meekly to suspend all action on the matter. And in areas other than the Far East, Communist interests are protected by the U.S.S.R.'s veto. It is even arguable that the influence of Communist China over the minds and fears of neutralists will be weakened if it is in the United Nations. The voice of Peking may sound less strong in the vocal forum of 42nd Street, where it is subject to rebuttal, than it does trumpeted unchallenged across the Pacific.

If Communist China is to be admitted to the United Nations there of course must be at the same time a general reorganization of admission policies so that Japan, Spain, Italy, West Germany and other long-excluded applicants may become members —perhaps, even, a reorganization of the functions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

I am not one of those who suggest that Red China be seated in the United Nations without our achieving thereby some effective

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basis for a lasting peace, simply because we must recognize "facts" or because she demands it and we must appease her. But neither do I go along with those who say that no workable policy with her is possible. That is not the way to formulate effective policy. What I do suggest is that unless we are prepared to embark on all-out war or to see our position deteriorate, our foreign policy may simply have to accommodate to a hard fact that seems unlikely to change in the near future, and that with careful planning the consequences of it could conceivably be less cataclysmic than the Cassandras predict.

Rather than urge a particular policy, I wish to point out that flexibility and ability to "roll with the punches" are required in any dealings with the Communists. Our own intransigence may be paralyzing our thinking and may give the Communists a weapon. What I have chosen to call the "outlaw" policy reduces the manœuvrability which we sorely need when faced with such an opponent. Flexibility does not mean a series of servile offerings of concessions. The Communist gluttons are not likely to be appeased. It does mean that we must be free to strike bargains and reach agreements where value received equals value given. Dogmatic positions cost opportunities. And in international negotiations opportunities are wealth.

IV

The British have suggested a third alternative—"two Chinas." The thought behind this seems to be that an acceptance of the present *de facto* status of the two territorial areas of Formosa and mainland China will lessen the chances of another war without victory (perhaps even a World War III) by attempting to convince the "two Chinas" to forget their designs upon each other's territories. The British idea is to have both "Chinas" in the United Nations and to stabilize the situation in the Far East in conformity with approximately the current physical territorial division. This may in part explain Red China's desire to obtain the maximum improvement in her physical condition before an effective cease-fire.

Assuming that an over-all effective peace plan could be negotiated, it is not beyond legal ingenuity to work out an arrangement which would not entail depriving our Nationalist friends of their overseas possessions and their right to protect Chinese citizens abroad.

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It is said that by reshuffling its position on Formosa and opening the possibility of negotiation with Peking in return for a quid pro quo the United States runs the risk of losing "face." That would not be true of what many people in Europe would think, nor of large sections of opinion in Asia. In any case, must we go to war, with all it entails, because we do not like events and are not versatile enough to meet them as they occur? We may actually avoid worse defeats later by foreseeing future difficulties now and accommodating ourselves to them while we may still turn them to our own account—or at least minimize the disadvantages to us. A gradual defection of allies or a vote to install the Communist Government in the United Nations over our determined opposition would very seriously damage our leadership in the free world and our future diplomatic strength.

Certainly any "two China" arrangement is contingent upon working out an effective cease-fire arrangement ensuring peace. For example, we might offer to persuade Chiang to temper his immediate warlike ambitions on the continent in return for a promise by Peking to respect the integrity of Formosa, Laos and Cambodia and South Vietnam and to forego attempted coups elsewhere. By this, the United States might consolidate rather than disperse the unity of the free world and gain rather than lose respect. Of course, it would be denounced as "appeasement" and a "Munich." But are the situations parallel? The global nature of the West's defense commitments makes it impractical to weaken our defense ring in Europe and the Middle East so that the bulk of our forces can be massed near a small coastal island to protect the "right" to try to invade mainland China.

The offer to negotiate might be rejected. Indeed, the attempt to formulate a cease-fire has already been rejected once. The Communists have consistently refused to attend the meeting of the Security Council while the Nationalist Chinese continue to sit there. This has been so even though Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai must surely have thought they could exact some sort of advantageous arrangement. The Communists have reason to think that they will win all their points by standing pat and talking tough.

An unaccepted offer of itself would not change the physical possession of territories or existing military positions. Our ability to protect Formosa successfully is hardly in doubt according to Admiral Radford:

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. . . I continue to be amazed at the credulity of so many people in accepting the theme of Chinese Communist strength. It is indeed an amazing paradox that an offensive posture can be maintained and initiative achieved with no real substance to back it up.

The principal effects would be psychological.

Chief loss to the West would be the blow to the morale of Chiang Kai-shek's troops, of the Nationalist Chinese and of the South Koreans. The Generalissimo's hope to liberate his oppressed countrymen would be fairly definitively smothered, for if he and his people could not adjust themselves to the rôle of developing the resources of Formosa it might pave the way for a successful Red China attack.

A concomitant of this is that any aspirations which the relatively few native Formosans may have held for their own independence would be dimmed. For them, of course, this solution would be no more onerous than if Chiang held the mainland and ruled Formosa from there. An independent Formosa without either a Red Chinese or native Chinese government on the island is not a present possibility whatever its theoretical desirability may be in the long-run future. Probably their only real alternative to rule by the Nationalists would be rule by the Communist police state. As a practical matter, the native Formosan's position would be unchanged; and he is certainly far better off under an independent Nationalist China than he would be under Communist rule.

In view of the military impracticality of the Nationalists' undertaking an invasion of the mainland in the immediately foreseeable future and of the unwillingness of the United States to support it, it follows that while an offer to negotiate would be a heavy blow to that particular Nationalist goal, it cannot be unexpected.

The psychological effect upon most of our other allies and India, Burma and Indonesia might be just the opposite. We shall have made an offer to settle our differences peaceably. Red China's refusal of it should clarify the matter of responsibility. One more graphic example of the complete unreasonableness of Communist international policies will have been presented to the neutralists.

If the offer is accepted, we have reasonable hopes of a stable *modus vivendi*. What we have given for it may be little more than we might well have lost anyway by gradual corrosion of

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allied unity, pressure for trade and the mounting of our global obligations. We shall have gained in leadership, added unity to the free nations, and freed personnel, prestige and equipment for perfecting our defense perimeter elsewhere.

There is always the possibility, of course, that, once having gained the benefits of an agreement, the Communist Chinese may not live up to their promise. It is a risk which is inherent in almost any policy. It could be minimized by securing specific promises of wide support from allied and neutral sources in the event of Communist betrayal. Sanctions, such as a prearranged allied embargo and similar devices, should be clearly outlined as a stipulated consequence of any breach. The settlement certainly should be guaranteed by the United Nations, and Asian nations such as India should participate on any supervisory commissions, thus ensuring that any breach on the part of the Communists would provoke effective sanctions and carry with it such a loss of prestige as seriously to impair their aspirations for political leadership. However, no short answer can be given in advance. This is the kind of problem which must be wrestled with in the context of actual negotiations and the factual content thereof.

V

The juridical status of Formosa and the Pescadores has not been so altered by the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China as to preclude a "two China" policy, if it should become in our interest to follow that theory. As Mr. Churchill pointed out in the House of Commons on February 1 of this year, the Cairo Declaration and the Japanese Peace Treaty have not operated, in any formal legal sense, to cause Formosa to become a part of China.

The Mutual Defense Treaty, by its terms, does not commit the United States to that position. It is only for the purposes of Articles II and V (providing for joint resistance to an armed attack) that the territories of the Republic of China are defined in Article VI as including Formosa and the Pescadores. And it is rash, in any event, to think that the United States by its unilateral act can alone determine the juridical status of the island.

International law provides two basic ways in which title to a given territory can be acquired. One is formal cession from one sovereign to another; the other is occupation of a *terra nullius*. Japan, in renouncing all right, title and claim to Formosa, did

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not thereby transfer it to China. Whether a formal cession could now be made by all of the signatories of the Peace Treaty (which does not include the Republic of China or the Democratic Peoples' Republic of China), on the theory that the right to make this cession passed to such signatories, is an open question. But apart from annexation, it would seem, from a legal point of view, that the United States can consummate a cession of Formosa by itself.

Customary international law will allow a country to acquire legal title to territory which is *terra nullius* (unclaimed) by a demonstration of "the intention or will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of authority." The Chinese Nationalist Government surely has satisfied these requirements. And, if the island of Formosa was not unclaimed territory before the 1951 Japanese Treaty, it probably became so upon the renunciation of Japan's claim.

Even if Formosa were assumed to be a juridical part of the Republic of China, a perfectly good legal means of achieving the political result of two separate Chinese States would be to recognize Communist China as a new State which has broken off from the Republic of China and, at the same time, to acknowledge that the Republic of China has acquired title to Formosa and the Pescadores through occupation, or, if necessary, effect a formal cession of these territories to the Republic of China.

The Republic of China, having a people, a defined territory, and a sovereign government, would continue to satisfy the conditions of statehood stipulated by international law, and have a legal basis for asserting title to assets such as bank accounts and buildings and for undertaking to protect, and for exercising personal jurisdiction over, citizens of China when they are abroad. China's treaty rights, including the seat in the Security Council, would be secured to the Republic of China or appropriate revisions made in the Charter satisfactory to us. Or if the *terra nullius* theory is not accepted, then the Nationalist Government would at least have a juridical status similar to the traditional "government in exile," but even stronger, because it actually holds a portion of its national territory.

VI

The larger aspects of a foreign policy towards Formosa must not be ignored. One danger of devoting so much diplomatic

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and military energy to this particular problem of Formosa is that of disproportion. American foreign policy in other important areas may well become a mere adjunct to the problems of this small Pacific island if all our political influence must be concentrated on keeping our reluctant allies behind our policy there and if all our military power is to go into maintaining a readiness to rebuff a constantly threatened armed attack there.

The Russians know this. By skillful encouragement of peripheral conflicts, fought by Chinese or satellites, the U.S.S.R. can pin down American troops and matériel, shake the morale of the free nations and divide their unity. An added benefit for the Russians is that such crises absorb the energies of the Chinese Communists and divert their attention from their very real territorial and economic conflicts of interest with the Soviet Union. It is a cheap, useful, yet dangerous ploy for the Russians. The system works well for them as long as no one inadvertently starts a major war.

The Chinese, as the Kremlin surely is aware, are too big to fit easily into the category "satellite." Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai are able men and not likely to be unnecessarily subservient when a clear conflict of interest arises between People's China and the U.S.S.R. Significantly, Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev conducted a major part of the negotiations for the Chinese-Soviet agreement of October 1954. The fall of Premier Malenkov, perhaps attributable in some measure at least to the failure of his policy to slow Western defense efforts, has left these two men as the titular and recognized leaders of Russia. The Sino-Soviet partnership is surely a central feature of Communist strength.

Our foreign policy stands to gain if it is free to find sore spots in the relations of the two countries and to add to the frictions by actions like those that the Communists use when they coo and growl, in turn, to divergent opinions in the West. China and Russia have differing interests, even though it is to the Russian interest to keep the issues alive and troublesome, just as it is to ours to smooth out and settle them. The risks of a global atomic war over Formosa surely are not alluring to the U.S.S.R. Russia's historic national interests suffered severely when she was obliged to release Port Arthur and Dairen to maintain the Chinese alliance last fall. And the shipping of economic and military supplies to the Chinese undoubtedly is a potential source of friction

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—the Red Chinese annoyed by the inadequacy of the shipments, the Russians by the slowing effect on their own industrialization and the inordinate demands involved for their own economy. Moscow can hardly be happy at Peking's decision to go to Bandung, Indonesia, in April for the African-Asian conference, where the "non-white" nations are likely to consider China, not Russia, the apostle of Communist leadership in the East.

Secretary Dulles has already made efforts to emphasize inherent cleavages in the Soviet hierarchy by implying that the United States would be willing to deal with those in the Soviet Union "who are primarily concerned with the welfare, the security and the greatness of the Soviet Union and its people." Nationalism versus internationalism is a good theme to play upon within Russia. We are missing another when we maintain a blanket refusal to consider alternatives to the "outlaw" policy towards the present rulers of mainland China. This precludes both a realistic playing upon the potential split with the Soviet Union and any hope of establishing a stable relationship in the Formosa straits. Our initiative should be along the lines suggested by Secretary of State Dulles when he said:

> It is hardly to be expected, of course, that the Chinese Communists will renounce their ambitions. However, might they not renounce their efforts to realize their goals by force?

If we forswear any possibility of taking such initiative, we may be throwing away the ammunition we need most to combat the dynamic, multi-temperatured offensive with which we are battling. Our policy should certainly not be to "indefinitely pile up one-sided concessions to the Communists." We should be tough realists. If we are, we can exact concessions of equivalent value for each concession we yield—and otherwise simply not make concessions.

This approach may offer some hope of reaching a stable *modus vivendi* in the Far East. It is offered in an effort to show that we need not necessarily resign ourselves to the gradual deterioration of the Far Eastern situation to our detriment, or that the only alternative is war.

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HOW "NEW" IS THE KREMLIN'S NEW LINE?

By Philip E. Mosely

HAS the struggle for top place within the Soviet hierarchy come to a more or less orderly conclusion with the dramatic resignation, on February 8, of Premier Georgi Malenkov and his replacement, on nomination of Nikita Khrushchev, by Marshal Nikolai Bulganin? Is the Soviet Government scrapping its post-Stalin program, advertised with much fanfare, for relieving the harsh lot of the great bulk of its citizens? Has it come to the conclusion that it must go all-out in preparation for an early showdown with the growing strength of the free West? Has a "soft" line, both at home and abroad, widely attributed to Malenkov, succumbed to a "hard" line, promoted by Khrushchev and the military?

The startling events of February 8 provided only a small dose of hard facts and can be interpreted varyingly to support a rather wide range of projections and speculations. One firm fact is that Malenkov has been demoted from the position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and assigned to the Ministry of Electric Power, an important but not decisive post. Its importance, incidentally, has been greatly diminished by the creation, by decree of November 22, 1954, of a separate Ministry of Electric Station Construction. However, if the Ministry of Electric Power is responsible for the atomic power industry, Malenkov will continue to occupy a key position in Soviet military programs, as well as remaining, so far, as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

A more important question is whether Malenkov will remain a member of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the real center of power and decision. Meetings of this all-powerful body are rarely mentioned in print, and in the past members have been appointed and dismissed without any immediate announcement being made. Even the composition of the highest Party organ can remain concealed from public view for many months. For example, from the Nineteenth Party Congress, in October 1952, until after Stalin's death, in March 1953, real authority within the enlarged Party Presidium was actually exercised by a small "Bureau" of the Presidium. Even the exist-

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ence of this "Bureau" was made known only after Stalin's death and after the Bureau had again been transformed into a small Presidium, patterned after the former Politburo! Under the rule of a conspiratorial dictatorship it is entirely possible for Malenkov to be dropped from the Party Presidium, or to be excluded from its meetings, without any indication reaching either the Soviet public or the outside world for many months.

The detailed work of the Party Presidium appears to be carried on by a network of active committees dealing with foreign affairs, the international Communist movement, defense, industry, agriculture, ideology and perhaps other topics. Some scanty and not very firm information about the interlocking memberships of these operating committees has occasionally become known retrospectively, but nothing can be said currently about their composition and assignments. Within the Presidium, Malenkov's rôle would be strongly affected by any changes in his position in the committee structure, but nothing is likely to be known of this except after the fact.

On balance, the evidence currently available points to a probable early elimination of Malenkov from the seat of power. The terms of his letter of resignation, read to an astonished Supreme Soviet on February 8, are without recent precedent in Soviet practice. "I see clearly," he wrote, "that the carrying out of the complicated and responsible duties of Chairman of the Council of Ministers is affected negatively by my insufficient experience in local [administrative] work and also by the fact that I have not had occasion, in a ministry or an economic organ, to exercise direct administration of individual branches of the national economy."

This admission of inadequacy deliberately writes off Malenkov's long experience in the work of central administration and decision-making. From March 1939 he served as a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, and as a member of its Organizational Bureau, which, until October 1952, exercised detailed authority over the entire range of executive appointments in the Party, in the governmental, military and economic structure and, though perhaps not at all times, in the secret police. During the Second World War, Malenkov was a member of the extremely powerful State Committee on Defense. From February 1941 an alternate member of the Politburo, he became a full-fledged member of it in March 1946, and he became Chair-

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man of the Council of Ministers on March 7, 1953. The terms of Malenkov's self-excoriation hardly hold water, for the central bodies in which he has held high posts for almost 15 years make a tremendous number of detailed decisions and exercise a constant supervision over a vast range of "local" and "economic" activities. Sooner or later, no part of the Soviet system escapes their direct attention. The listing of Malenkov's Party and official posts, furthermore, leaves out of account his extensive experience, during the 1930's, as an increasingly powerful and experienced member of Stalin's own secretariat.

The wording of Malenkov's resignation resembles the "negotiated" self-flagellations and abject recantations by which Stalin gradually wore down and discredited those Old Bolsheviks whose early claims to authority were no less weighty than his own. How often did Rykov and Bukharin, Piatakov and Sokolnikov, and many others, confess their "mistakes," in agreed formulas, only to drift lower and lower in the hierarchy of power! In the Stalinist practice, in which both Malenkov and Khrushchev are past masters, the step from admitting "inadequacy" to confessing "sabotage" and "treason" is a short one.

If Malenkov thought to survive and save part of his influence by his letter of resignation, he accepted, in any case, extremely unfavorable terms of partial surrender. He has left the way open to make him the scapegoat for the poor showing of Soviet agriculture. ". . . I see especially clearly my guilt and responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of affairs that has developed in agriculture, since for several years prior to that I had been entrusted with the duty of supervising and directing the work of the central agricultural organs and the work of the local Party and Soviet organs in the sphere of agriculture." Will the world be told, within a few months, that this "guilt and responsibility" were inspired by Malenkov's rôle of a "restorer of capitalism" and a "hireling of the imperialist intelligence services?" The answer to this rests in the personal relations within the top Soviet leadership, the most secretive group of rulers in the world.

If Malenkov's resignation is, as it may be, but the first step toward discrediting and eliminating him completely, why was this not carried through at once? While an abrupt downfall might satisfy the human yearning for drama, a sudden shock would have many negative effects for the Soviet system of control, for it would raise havoc with higher personnel in all branches of the

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Soviet administration. Since 1939, Malenkov has had a leading part in appointing and promoting leading officials, and his complete removal would leave them exposed to the threat of a sweeping and highly disruptive purge. By receiving a clear indication of Malenkov's decline, the men whom he has appointed or favored are given time to shift their allegiance, to realign their loyalties with the new "boss," and thus to avoid "panic" and "wavering." Indeed, if the leadership turns the wheel toward the complete elimination of Malenkov, his former friends can be expected to supply the necessary incriminating evidence, thereby proving that they put "Party unity" above "personal relations."

A further step toward "amalgamating" his present rivals for power with the "traitors" of an earlier period of struggle may have been foreshadowed by Khrushchev's speech of January 25 (published on February 3). Arguing that the forced development of heavy industry must continue in order to provide the basis for building up both agriculture and consumer goods' production, Khrushchev attacked in strong terms the contrary argument that ". . . at some stage or other of Socialist construction the development of heavy industry, supposedly, ceases to be the main task, and light industry can and must overtake all other branches of industry. . . . This is a belching of the Right deviation, a belching of views which are hostile to Leninism and which, in their time, were preached by Rykov, Bukharin and their ilk." True, this revived "Right deviation" was attributed in Khrushchev's speech to obscure "would-be economists," not directly to his rivals for power. But, obviously, the question of the continued hegemony of heavy industry would not have been agitated so strenuously during the past few weeks unless it has been occupying the attention of the decision-makers at the top.

Khrushchev's speech of January 25 was preceded by a detailed attack on the proponents of a balanced development of both heavy and light industry. An article of January 24, on "The Party General Line and the Vulgarizers of Marxism," signed by D. Shepilov, Editor-in-Chief of *Pravda,* condemned the new "Right-wing" theory that "the policy, pursued by the Party, of forced development of the branches of heavy industry has allegedly entered into conflict with the basic economic law of Socialism, since the forced development of the branches of heavy industry retards public consumption."[1] Much has been made of the

[1] Cited from *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* vol. VI, no. 52, p. 4, February 9, 1955.

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obscure status of the economists whom Shepilov attacked by name. This argument cannot be pressed very far. Persons named by Shepilov as "candidates for the Ph.D. in economics" may, in Soviet practice, actually be fairly influential experts and advisers in various planning and other economic bodies.

Is the struggle over heavy versus light industry also reflected in the dismissal of Anastas Mikoyan as Minister of Trade (by decree of January 22, published on January 25)? This is one of the four ministries most closely concerned with the flow of consumer goods. However, the probability of a drastic change may be lessened by the fact that Mikoyan's successor, Dimitri Pavlov, had been First Deputy Minister under Mikoyan. It is possible that Mikoyan has now joined a number of other "Deputy Chairmen without portfolio," including Kaganovich, Pervukhin, Tevosyan and Kosygin. If so, this emerging pattern would resemble in part the administrative structure which was applied during Stalin's last years.

As the operative ministries, mainly economic, grew in number to over 50, they were grouped under the supervision of Stalin's close subordinates, who served simultaneously as members of the Politburo and as Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers. Immediately after Stalin's death the ministries were consolidated into one-half the previous number, and the senior Party people again took over direct responsibility for them. During the past year many ministries have again been subdivided, and coordination among their competing claims appears again to be vested in Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers who are also members of the Party Presidium. Whether Mikoyan, who has served since the 1920's as an economic administrator and who has gained a high reputation for efficiency, has fallen prey to an inner dispute over basic economic policy, or whether he has been relieved of detailed administrative responsibility and given broader responsibility for policy-making, cannot be determined from the evidence now available.

Has there been a real fight at the top between the supporters of heavy industry and those who, allegedly, favor putting "butter" before "guns?" An examination of the public statements of Malenkov, Khrushchev and Mikoyan since Stalin's death shows that all Soviet spokesmen have continuously stressed the basic rôle of an expanding heavy industry, as the necessary foundation for the strengthening of both light industry and agriculture.

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Has the decline of Malenkov been followed by a real change in emphasis between heavy industry and light industry? What evidence is now available gives some slender support to this interpretation. Among the few indices available are the relative rates of investment in heavy and light industry. For 1954, the planned investment in heavy industry from the state budget was just over 90 billion rubles; for 1955 it is 101 billions. Light industry, including food and local industry, received 7.6 billion rubles in 1953, and an estimated 14 billions in 1954, and is to receive 10.6 from the budget in 1955. However, light industry is expected to receive an additional 15.4 billions available from its profits for investment, making a planned total of 26 billions for both permanent and turnover capital. The figures given above are not exactly comparable, for the 1955 budget figures do not distinguish between permanent investment and turnover capital. The conclusion is, then, that in 1954 a modest extra effort to stimulate the development of light and food industry was carried out, and that a slightly smaller assignment of investment funds will be made in 1955. This is, however, a far cry from the widely held assumption of a sudden swing, in 1953, from heavy industry to light industry, and again, in February 1955, from light industry back to a stress on heavy industry. The fact is that the principal stress has been placed on the forced development of heavy and military industry and the major resources have been devoted to it. All that really happened in 1953 and 1954 is that a small marginal shift of resources was effected to strengthen light industry somewhat. Even in 1954, however, the rate of growth in heavy industry was far higher than that in light industry, as it has been ever since 1928.

What is more important is the new and urgent emphasis on raising agricultural production, and on the choice of programs to achieve that. Since September 1953 the new leadership has had two main programs, with conflicting claims on resources, in this field. One has called for raising production in the long-settled farming regions. To achieve this the government has simplified and reduced taxes on the personal household plots and the livestock of the collectivized peasants, has cut back deliveries by the collective farms, at low fixed prices, has promised improvements in farming techniques, equipment, seeds and supply of fertilizer, and has strengthened its apparatus of control over the peasantry. Most of these measures are aimed at providing

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stronger incentives for better production. But increasing the return to the peasants for their work creates an increased demand for most types of consumer goods.

The economic report claims that in 1954 the real income of the Soviet population, in comparable prices, increased by 11 percent over 1953, and that the turnover of goods increased by 18 percent, in comparable prices. Even if these figures must be discounted substantially, it is clear that, if the government expects to provide further incentives in the form of improved standards of living, it would have to step up the development of consumer goods even more than it has done in 1954.

While the Kremlin has been increasing slightly the size and attractiveness of the carrot held out to the hard-pressed collective farmers, it has also been increasing the size and weight of the stick. During 1953 and 1954 the number of "labor-days" required of the collective farmers was substantially increased. If the individual member fails to meet the "norm" set for his labor on the collective, the taxes on his privately owned market-garden and livestock are doubled, in effect confiscating the product of his private labor. In addition, the Party's decree of January 31, 1955, on raising the output of animal husbandry, places in the hands of the state-owned machine-tractor-stations close control over the work and deliveries of the collective farms.

The other half of the new program in agriculture is more spectacular, and more risky. The new leadership has embarked on a plan for plowing up from 67 to 72 million acres of virgin and long-fallow lands. In 1954 tens of thousands of tractors and several hundred thousand young workers were assigned to this program. In his report of January 25, Khrushchev claimed that the additional grain reaped in the new areas even in 1954 made up for the losses from drought in the Ukraine, North Caucasus and Volga regions. Significantly, no total figures for grain have been published for 1953 or 1954, and the assumption must stand that the crop for each of the last two years was at least no better than that of 1952.

Khrushchev's speech also contained the first admission that the Kremlin's concern for a larger grain supply is due, in part, to the growth of the population, estimated at 3 millions per year. Previously, Soviet leaders have boasted of the high Soviet rate of natural increase as a factor of strength, rather than of worry.

The "virgin lands" program is designed to increase the culti-

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vated area by one-fourth and to increase the marketed grain supply by one-third. The Kremlin is making a big investment in this gamble. Total agricultural investment from the state budget amounted to 12 billion rubles in 1953 and 21 billions in 1954, and is to jump to 55 billions in 1955. This budget allocation can be compared with 101 billions for heavy industry and 10.6 billions for light, food and local industry. The major part of the investment in agriculture is being directed to the virgin-soil program.

Clearly, the new leadership has decided that it can make greater short-run gains by putting these large resources into the virgin-soil scheme rather than by concentrating the same effort and sacrifices on raising production in the older cultivated areas. If the newly plowed marginal lands of Southern Siberia, Kazakhstan and Altai receive adequate rainfall, and receive it at the right time of the year, the gamble may pay off handsomely. If the rainfall cycle swings against it, as it now has against dryland farming in many parts of Texas, Colorado, Kansas and other states, no amount of whipped up enthusiasm or mechanization of work will see the program through to success.[2]

Increased farm production has become a vital issue for the Soviet leadership, and its plans to raise incentives for better work will stand and fall with it. Food represents about 70 percent of the average urban budget in the Soviet Union, and other farm products—cotton, wool, leather, linen, tobacco—supply the necessary raw materials for the most needed consumer goods. It is partly because of the failure to increase the supply of cotton and leather more rapidly that cotton cloth and footwear have shown increases of only between 3 and 6 percent in 1953 and 1954.

The rapid development, by the growing season of 1956, of a new grain area of 67,000,000 to 72,000,000 acres is now coupled with a new program, announced on February 2, for raising the output of livestock and animal products. As new lands are sowed to wheat, older lands, especially in the Ukraine, are to be turned over to raising corn and livestock. The acreage of corn, amounting to 8.3 million acres in 1953, is to be raised by 1960 to 67,000,000 acres, and the supply of meat products of all kinds, as well as milk and eggs, is to be doubled by 1960. Speaking enviously of the great advances made by American animal husbandry over

[2] Chauncy D. Harris, "Growing Food by Decree in Soviet Russia," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1955, p. 268–281.

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the past 25 years, Khrushchev has called for the wholesale adoption of American techniques, including the use of hybrid corn, the extensive building of silos, and the ensilage of milk-corn. Khrushchev paid no attention to one of the most important aspects of the American revolution in animal husbandry—the specialization of each region in particular stages of breeding, raising and fattening cattle.

It is probable that the real conflict within Soviet policy-making has hinged on the choice between these two main programs of raising agricultural production. The victorious side must have argued that only the virgin-soil program for wheat would provide the necessary margin of food and allow a more intensive development of animal husbandry. The defeated side may have maintained that the "new lands" scheme was a gamble and that much more could be achieved by investing the same resources in the improvement of labor incentives by increasing the flow of consumer goods.

The clash has been over means, not ends. Is it more profitable to provide some slight relief for the Soviet consumer, some slight improvement in labor incentives? The primacy of heavy and military industry has never been questioned. The immediate issues, involving the use of marginal resources amounting to 2 or 3 percent of the Soviet budget, have become entangled in the personal struggle for control of the Soviet power-machine.

Has the Khrushchev-Malenkov rivalry involved basic issues of Soviet foreign policy, or, again, are only questions of tactics involved? In many parts of the world the post-Stalin actions of the Soviet Government inspired a belief, born of wishful thinking, that a new and moderate era of "coexistence" had begun. The abandonment of territorial claims which, if fulfilled, would destroy Turkey, the release of a few Russian wives of American citizens, the admission of a few foreign tourists—these unaccustomed gestures were blown up out of all proportion as harbingers of a coöperative, even friendly, approach to the non-Soviet world. During these two years, however, the Soviet government has not given up a single "position of strength." It has continued to denounce each defensive effort of the non-Soviet world as "preparation for aggression." It has fought hard and cleverly to delay the strengthening of Western Europe and the rearmament of Western Germany. Its position on the liberation of Austria has hardened. Molotov now declares openly that his government

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will agree to a treaty for Austria only if it first secures major concessions in Germany. By "persuading" the Chinese Communists to be satisfied at first with acquiring control over the northern half of Vietnam through negotiation, it has posed as a defender of peace.

In the two years since Stalin's death there has not been the slightest evidence of any substantial change in the objectives and methods of Soviet foreign policy. The recent cautious "normalization" of Soviet-Jugoslav relations, like other minor gestures, represents the removal of an irritating issue which, continually harped upon, brought only disadvantages to Soviet policy and prestige. The most significant recent change in Soviet tactics is the grudging recognition of India's rôle as the principal "uncommitted" power in Asia, after several years of denouncing the Nehru government as a "tool of the imperialists."

In his speech of February 8, Molotov boasted that one-half the population of Europe and Asia is now within the Soviet-led camp of "Socialism" and "people's democracy" and predicted that it is only a matter of time before the Americas, so far recalcitrant to the Soviet example, would begin to move in the same direction. He went on to speak flatteringly of India's rôle. "The fact that there is no longer a colonial India, but the Republic of India, has great historical significance. . . . The international authority of India as a new and important factor in the cause of strengthening peace and friendship among nations is growing more and more." *Pravda,* of February 5, published excerpts from a speech by Mr. Menon, Indian Ambassador to Moscow: "The Soviet Government, striving for peace, is fully conscious of its strength. . . . The government and people of the Soviet Union . . . value highly India's independent foreign policy and its rôle in the cause of preserving peace. Russia . . . understands that it is very essential to its own interests to assure a prolonged period of peace."

The absence of any real change in Soviet policy has been emphasized by the extensive and unusually frank interviews which Khrushchev, Molotov and Zhukov gave to prominent American journalists before and after Malenkov's dismissal. Totalling many columns of *Pravda*'s limited space, these statements were longer and more detailed than the total interviews given by Stalin during his entire period of rule. Attacking the Marshall Plan, NATO, German rearmament, American bases abroad, SEATO, and the

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United States' defense of south Korea, Japan and Formosa, Khrushchev reaffirmed the Kremlin's view that any building of strength and unity in any part of the free world is equated to "preparation for unleashing a new war." He made clear the Soviet preference for making gains through "cold war" while avoiding the risks of a "hot war." "It is good that the war in Korea has been ended, that the fire has been put out there, and the Soviet Union would not want it to break out again anywhere."

Khrushchev was equally frank in reaffirming the Kremlin's long-range ambitions. Arguing that "capitalists" believe in the ultimate triumph of capitalism and that Communists believe in the ultimate triumph of "Communism," Khrushchev went on to urge the "capitalists" to abandon all thought of building "positions of force" (the Soviet translation renders "positions of strength" as "positions of force" and propagates this version through all available channels) and to open up "advantageous trade" with the Soviet bloc. "The future," he declared flatly, "is for the Communist system."

Pressed to explain how long "coexistence" would continue, Khrushchev replied with the traditional Bolshevist double-talk to the effect that this "depends on historical conditions, historical development." For Khrushchev, as for Malenkov, "coexistence" is a temporary tactic, an episode within an all-embracing, inescapable struggle between hostile and irreconcilable systems of power. Quarrels within the secretive circle of the Soviet dictatorship are concerned with persons and with tactics: at home, a little more butter or a few more guns, a slight relaxing or tightening of the girths on their hard-pressed people; abroad, a few forced smiles or a slightly fiercer brandishing of Soviet armed might.

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GERMANY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

By Lord Strang

BY the majestic series of agreements signed in Paris in October last, which at the time of writing still await completion of ratification, the Western European Powers, in association where appropriate with the United States, have marked out a decisive step towards the reinforcement of their security in the face of the menace looming over them from the East. The fact that they have reached these agreements is a sign that they have recognized their peril and that they possess the necessary vigor to translate their fears into action. The profound misgivings which have understandably attended the course of the negotiations, and which indeed still deeply perturb many minds and have caused heartsearchings about ratification, are the measure of the difficulties inherent in the situation and of the gravity of the problems which called for solution. They also bear witness to the courage and skill of the European statesmen who, with support and encouragement from the United States Secretary of State, brought these agreements into being. All the statesmen concerned have deserved well of the free world; but without the bold, imaginative and superbly timed initiatives of Sir Anthony Eden it is doubtful whether success could have been wrested from the disastrous crisis precipitated by the French Assembly's rejection of the E.D.C. Treaty.

The misgivings about these agreements were of several kinds: misgivings about the extent to which they did or did not draw inspiration from the idea of a United Europe under supranational institutions; misgivings about the proposal for a military contribution by the Federal German Republic to Western defense; and misgivings lest their conclusion should stand in the way of German reunification, or should provoke a violent reaction from the Soviet Union. As to the last of these, I would here quote in passing a remark made by Castlereagh when one of his colleagues urged that it was important to avoid irritating the Tsar Alexander "by a pertinacious opposition which is unlikely to be successful." To this Castlereagh replied: "You must make up your mind to watch and resist him as another Bonaparte. . . . Acquiescence will not keep him back nor will opposition accelerate his march."

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When the agreements are brought into force, there can be good hope that, through the creation of the Western European Union upon the well-tried foundation of the Brussels Treaty Organization, there will be a reconciliation between France and Germany, and that the main obstacle to common action by the Western European Powers will thus be removed; and that the Federal Republic will take her place as a loyal member of the Western European Community and will be able to make a contribution to Western defense in conditions which will provide adequate safeguards against the revival of militaristic or ultranationalistic policies. The terms of the agreements being such that the United Kingdom was able to subscribe wholeheartedly to them, and indeed to make a decisive contribution to their conclusion, the new Union will be fortified by the Commonwealth and transatlantic associations of the British Government. Within the wider Atlantic community, the members of this intimate Western European group will add strength to and draw strength from their other European associates and from the United States and Canada, the two representatives of the New World which—in a measure undreamt of by George Canning—have been called in to redress the balance of the Old.

II

Now that these pregnant possibilities have been opened up, what of the future relations between Russia and Germany? What of the prospects of German reunification?

Before looking forward, we may look around and look back.

The seven states which have entered into these agreements (Belgium, France, the Federal German Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) include those which, above all others, created and still have vitality to help to sustain the precious inheritance of Western European civilization which now faces the supreme challenge of its history. Among them are those which, with Spain and Portugal, projected themselves across the oceans and founded the new communities of what has been styled "Europe overseas." Some of these communities, themselves participants in and contributors to the common European inheritance, have more than once in the past, and now in our own time more powerfully than ever, moved in to safeguard the cause of freedom in Europe.

Western Europe, a small peninsula at the western tip of the

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great Eurasian continent, is highly populated, rich in inventiveness and skill, with high industrial and military potential, but lacking in space for manœuvre, vulnerable to attack, an inestimable prize for an invader, the nerve-center of the civilized world. It has faced perils in the past, from Huns, Tartars, Moors and Ottoman Turks, and has beaten them back. It has in our own day survived the onslaught of the renegade European who sought to institute a New Order based upon as foul a régime as has ever been found in human history. Cruel and tyrannous as it is, the Power by which Western Europe is today even more dangerously menaced has (unlike Nazism) at least something to be said for it, and therein lies the root of the danger. In its origins, the fundamental objective of Communism, which is to bring to an end the exploitation of man by man for his own profit, is a humane one. But in pursuing it, and other objectives less respectable, the Communist leaders have framed a doctrine and developed a practice which are aimed at the seizure of power by their adherents everywhere, and which inevitably lead to a denial of the freedom of the human spirit. And since the inheritance of Western civilization—at its best such a gracious thing—is, for all its grave shortcomings, founded on the freedom of the human spirit, the opposition of the two régimes is complete.

The polarization of power in two mighty concentrations based on Washington and Moscow, which marks the present age, was foreseen long ago by, among others, de Tocqueville and Henry Adams. Wars, especially total wars of the modern type, which use the latest skills and resources of technology, accentuate existing trends. The strong grow relatively stronger and the less strong grow relatively weaker. The United States has mightily increased its strength in two successful wars. The First World War made possible the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917; the Second World War opened the way for the subjugation of Eastern Europe by the Communists, and for the subjection of the peoples of China to Communist control. The massive industrialization of Russia, begun in Tsarist times, will be one of Stalin's most permanent titles to fame. Now the two giant Powers overtop all the rest. Not one of the others could conduct a world war with its own resources: not one of them could conduct more than a local war without assistance. They could be allies, even indispensable allies of the greater Powers, but not their rivals.

Lord Acton once said: "This law of the modern world, that

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power tends to expand indefinitely, and will transcend all barriers, abroad and at home, until met by superior forces, produces the rhythmic movement of history." In Asia there is still a vast debatable land between the two opposing groups. In Europe they have moved up to their common frontier and stand face to face. For us in Western Europe the enemy is at the gate; indeed he is within the gate. His agents are the great Communist Parties of France and Italy, and in other countries those citizens who, giving their allegiance to a foreign Power, make honest men their dupes and persuade them to undermine the foundations of the state. The power of Russia was foreseen; but as I have said elsewhere, "what was not foreseen was that this great force, directed by a consistent body of doctrine, and operating through a carefully designed system of political strategy and tactics, implacable in purpose but flexible in method, would take as its objective the establishment of its own particular organization of society throughout the world."

III

In Europe the frontier between the two halves of the world runs through Germany. In Europe the main contest now joined is for the body and soul of Germany. Upon the issue of this contest the future of Western Europe and indeed of the free world may well depend.

The line dividing the British and American zones of occupation in Germany from the Soviet Zone was drawn by the European Advisory Commission and approved by the member governments. During the earlier part of their deliberations in 1944, the European Advisory Commission, since they had to find some basis for their plans, worked on the assumption that there would still, at the armistice, be some central German authority which would continue to exercise a measure of jurisdiction during the occupation and after the establishment of the control. When it became clear in 1945 that the central German authority would disintegrate, the Commission made provision for the assumption of supreme authority by the occupying Powers themselves; and after the military surrender, this is the system that was instituted at a Four-Power meeting of Commanders-in-Chief in Berlin in June 1945. Even so, although under the mechanism of control then established, each Commander-in-Chief would exercise supreme authority in his own zone, and the joint Four-Power

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authority would be supreme in matters affecting Germany as a whole, it was still contemplated—at any rate on the British and American side—that the zones would not be sealed off from each other and that there would be a good measure of free movement from one zone to another. In line with this, it was decided at the Potsdam Conference that, although no central German Government was to be established for the time being, there was to be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany, and Germany was to be treated as a single economic unit. The Soviet Government disregarded these agreements, put down a barrier along the Western frontiers of their zone, stripped their zone of industrial equipment in the interests of their own reconstruction, and in time set about building up a so-called People's Democracy in Eastern Germany.

Had the Potsdam agreement been faithfully observed, something like what has since happened in Western Germany might have happened in Germany as a whole. The rehabilitation of local government, the economic assistance, the fusion of the zones, the currency reform, the bringing into being of a central government, the emancipation of Germany from military government and administrative control—these are the steps that might well have been taken on a Four-Power basis had the Russians not been Russians. The fact that the Russians had sealed off their zone and would not come to an agreement about Germany as a whole gave the Western Powers an opportunity, of which (after some initial reluctance on the part of the French) they made good use, to see that the developments which they were fostering in their zones, and which came to fruition in the establishment of the Federal Government, were directed to the promotion of truly democratic institutions in our own sense of the word and to the inculcation of a truly democratic outlook. He would be a bold man who would confidently predict that the kind of government over which Dr. Adenauer presides would permanently survive, or that the Federal Republic would always be a comfortable partner in the Western European Union. But if the Federal Republic is a healthier political and social organism than was the Weimar Republic (and there can be little doubt it is), the credit must in good measure be attributed (though there are also domestic reasons) to the enlightened political and economic measures of the British and American occupation authorities.

The total occupation of Germany and the assumption of su-

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preme authority by the occupying Powers steadied the Western Zones, helped the transition from the horrors of Nazism and the desperate chaos of defeat and destruction to a new and more stable life and saved Western Germany from the ills that developed after the First World War. But none of this could have borne full fruit had it not been for the German people's will and power to work. Thanks to these, millions of refugees and expellees have been absorbed, shattered cities have been rebuilt and a prosperous economy has been established. This is one of the most remarkable achievements of our time.

IV

Such is the setting in which the problem of the reunification of Germany now presents itself. The other side of the picture is the problem of German-Russian relations. Germany and Russia have come together in the past. Will they do so again? It is well to ask ourselves what were the circumstances in which these earlier *rapprochements* were brought about.

In the nineteenth century there was an effective balance of power in Europe among some half dozen Great Powers of comparable strength. Russia and Prussia were usually to be found on the same side of the scales, and this for the sufficient reason that they had a strong common interest in the continued subjection of Poland. It was only towards the close of the century, after the fall of Bismarck, that with Germany's "new course" (William II was to say in February 1914, "Russo-Prussian relations are dead once and for all! We have become enemies"), with the creation of her two-front army and of her high-seas fleet, the final estrangement began to develop; and it was owing to Germany's support of Austria-Hungary over a Balkan nationalist issue, of vital interest to the multi-racial Empire and of great moment to Russia's prestige, that they were drawn into war. After the First World War, both Russia and Germany were gravely weakened and, in spite of differences of régime, came together in the twenties at Rapallo as fellow outcasts from the international community. By 1939, both had recovered their strength, and in August of that year they again came together, once more on an anti-Polish basis. Germany was moved by her need to be free from disturbance from the Soviet side in her attack on Poland, planned for the end of August. The Soviet Union, having failed to come to an understanding with Great Britain and France, turned to Ger-

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many because Germany had more to offer; because a treaty with Germany would make it more likely that the Soviet Union could remain neutral in the now inevitable war, and could cash in on the projected partition of Poland and on the proposed delimitation of spheres of interest in the Baltic States; and because it expected that, after Germany and the Western Powers had exhausted each other, it would be the *tertius gaudens,* sated and secure. Matters did not turn out this way. The Soviet Union made good its spoils but did not avoid war. It was brought to the edge of defeat, and only at the cost of the harshest sufferings and bitterest sacrifices was victory in the end achieved.

What is the position today? The Soviet Union, by deploying the most intense effort, by plundering its victims and by placing crushing hardships upon its own people, has rebuilt its economy and restored and expanded its military strength: this is a colossal achievement. Germany is divided. The Eastern Zone is an abject Soviet satellite. Western Berlin is an oasis of freedom in a Communist desert. The Federal Republic has brought order and prosperity out of chaos: but it is only a part of Germany, a truncated fragment, not a Power of the first rank, not able to speak on equal terms with the Soviet Union.

What basis is there here for the reunification of Germany by agreement between West and East, or for a new Soviet-German rapprochement?

V

If the intentions of the Western Powers and of the Soviet Union in regard to Germany are to be judged by their acts, then it is clear that their immediate objective has been and remains to bind their respective spheres more and more closely to their own political systems. From this point of view, the Paris agreements represent no more than the crowning act in a process which has been going on since 1947. The two sides seem to be agreed in this, if in nothing else, that if they cannot bring about the reunification of Germany on terms which they conceive to be vital to their own security, then they think it better that Germany should remain divided, and that no thought of future reunification, which both declare to be their ultimate objective, should deter them from promoting in their respective areas the political and military orientation that best suits their major policies in the contest now engaged for the future of Europe and the world.

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The outlook of responsible authorities in Western Germany does not, it would seem, differ substantially from this. They ardently wish for reunification in freedom, but only in freedom. Failing this, they would rather wait, and meanwhile discourage a rebirth of extreme German nationalism by a close association with the Brussels community and avert a rebirth of German militaristic ideas by, so far as may be, fusing the renascent German forces with those of the other countries of the West. The German army has in the past been used as an instrument in adult education of a questionable kind: the new Federal German forces can, in the spirit of the Brussels Treaty, become a channel for propagating positive democratic ideas in Germany and for combating current apathy and disillusion. The more firmly the Federal Republic can be founded in Western democracy, the stronger would be the pull upon the Eastern Zone, should a situation arise in which such a pull might be effective. It is the measure of the success of the postwar policy of the Western Powers, and of good hope for the future of democracy in Europe, not to be underestimated, that there should be Germans in positions of authority who think on these lines, and that the Brussels Powers could, as they did in Paris in October last, solemnly proclaim their conviction of the Federal Republic's devotion to peace and its allegiance to democratic institutions.

The decision of the Federal Government to enter into close association with the other Western Powers will naturally make it less likely than it was before—and this indeed was never very likely—that the Federal Republic will turn away from the West and seek an Eastern orientation. To do so would be to lose independence. The Soviet Union wants satellites, not allies. To contemplate securing reunification on any other terms than freedom would mean suicide for Germany. The Paris agreements, if and when they come into force, will be an additional guarantee, if any is needed, that the Federal Government, as at present constituted, will not embark on this course. The political obligations in the agreements will be reinforced by the military safeguards. The Federal German forces will be tied into the NATO infrastructure, without which they would be impotent.

VI

"Unity," like "peace," will be a weapon in the Soviet propaganda armory to which some Western Germans, and particularly

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the Social Democrats, will be vulnerable. Were there to be a Social Democratic government in Bonn that proved to be less sagacious and less resolute than Dr. Adenauer's administration, the Western Powers might be hard put to it to stay them from courses of political unwisdom to which German Social Democrats seem to be especially prone.

Where the Social Democrats chiefly differ from Dr. Adenauer is in their assessment of the international situation. They hold that tension has continued to decrease since the death of Stalin, and that this offers an opportunity for negotiation with Moscow; they profess to believe that the reunification of Germany might still be achieved on terms which in substance would both ensure German freedom and be acceptable to the Soviet Government. In any event, they urge that one more attempt should be made to reach such an agreement before the Federal Republic moves into the Western Community. They do not seem ever to have clearly stated how they conceive that this circle can be squared. They have not indicated what price they think should be paid to the Russians, in terms of the definition of free elections or in terms of diminution of German sovereignty, in order to secure the abandonment of the strategically valuable Eastern German satellite and its Soviet-controlled puppet governmental party. Nor have they suggested that they would rather that a united Germany should be subjected to servitudes in a peace treaty in respect of armed forces and foreign policy (and this is what neutralization would mean) than that the Federal Republic should enjoy the equality of status embodied in the Paris agreements, subject only to safeguards which will not necessarily be perpetuated in a peace treaty. The Western Powers and Dr. Adenauer hold that there is a better chance of securing German unity in freedom, in negotiation with the Russians, after the Paris agreements have come into force than before; and that even if German unity is delayed, the Federal Republic will meanwhile be free and equal with the countries of the West.

And what, in the Western conception, does "unification in freedom" mean? The three Western occupying Powers have stated in the revised Convention on Relations between themselves and the Federal Republic that "pending the peace settlement, the signatory states will coöperate to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aim of a reunified Germany enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution, like that of the Federal Republic, and inte-

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grated within the European Community;" and they have declared elsewhere that the achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of their policy. Reading these two declarations together, we may infer that unity in freedom is a *sine qua non*; and that a democratic constitution and integration within the European Community are desiderata, which it is earnestly hoped will be achieved through the exercise of free choice.

This is firm ground on which to take position. It raises the standard of unity, to which every German must passionately aspire. It opens up a prospect of membership of the European Community, which should be welcomed in the Eastern Zone. But it outlines a program to which the Soviet Government has so far shown no sign of being willing to agree; and until there can be agreement between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, there can be no reunification of Germany short of war. The Western program does, it should be noted, hold out certain risks, which would become evident were the Soviet Government to accept it. If there were genuinely free elections throughout Germany under international supervision, and if as a result a genuinely free all-German government were to emerge, that government would, under the plan proposed by the Western Powers, be free to subscribe or not to subscribe to the obligations undertaken by the Federal Government under the Paris agreements; and accordingly to join or not to join the Western European Union or NATO. If that government were Social Democratic, which would be more likely than not, given the traditional political complexion of Berlin and of the Eastern Zone, its decision on this point might be in doubt. It might well choose an independent policy of manœuvring between East and West. In such a case, the Soviet Union would have much that it could offer at the expense of Poland and thus might have the advantage. But it ought not to be assumed that the Soviet Government would despoil Poland of territory for the benefit of Germany unless the result was worth the price—unless, namely, the result was the complete integration of the German state as a People's Democracy into the Soviet system. This is the risk which the democratic process must always carry with it. But the risk should not be overestimated. The antagonism between Germans and Russians, rooted in the experience of war and occupation, goes deep. A genuinely free German people would be unlikely deliberately to subordinate itself

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to Moscow, in company with Poles and Czechs. But the tactics of the Communists can be insidious; and the follies which governments can sometimes commit are almost beyond belief.

VII

Would the Soviet Government, in the hope of some result like this, be likely to agree to genuinely free elections in our sense of the term? It does not seem very likely. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. It has been open to them for the last seven years to try to turn the position of the Western Powers by taking them at their word; but they have been unwilling to take the risk of doing so. It is true that, in face of the detailed proposals for the holding of free elections in Germany under international supervision put forward by the United Kingdom Delegation and accepted by the United States and French Delegations at the Berlin Conference in February 1954, the Soviet Delegation went so far as to propose the preparation and carrying out of what they called "free all-German elections." But the spurious character of this proposal (the elections would not be free and would be indefinitely delayed) was cogently demonstrated by Sir Anthony Eden; and the Soviet Government, though repeatedly challenged to do so, did not furnish any clarifying details as to the timing and nature of the elections which it has in mind. It has since then, indeed, in a propaganda bid to prevent German ratification of the Paris agreements, thrown in international supervision, but still without any clarifying details; and it may well raise its bid. But the fact is that, with Mr. Molotov in charge of affairs, the Soviet Government does not much care to gamble in foreign policy, especially on an issue as grave as that of Germany. Better (it would say) hold on to the Eastern Zone and try to reach the final objective by other means.

The Soviet policy has been to prevent the integration of the Federal Republic in the Western European Community so as to keep the way open for the final objective, namely the incorporation of Germany as a satellite into the Soviet system. How, in the face of the Paris agreements, can the Soviet Government hope to achieve this final result? It will no doubt be content to take its time about it. It has a newly-born Chinese Communist Government to attend to; and a Communist Germany would no doubt be a handful. But meanwhile there will be a fertile field for using every kind of influence, argument, exhortation, cajolery and

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threat in order to attack and break down the minds of the governments and peoples of the Western Powers and of the Federal Republic so as to bring them to agree to a program for the achievement of German unity which will at any rate detach Germany from the West with good hope later on of attaching her to the East. The safety of Europe rests upon the firmness with which such threats and blandishments can be resisted. While holding out a program of reunification through free elections, whatever the risks which this would carry with it, the Western Powers must be firm in their minds, and make clear to their own peoples and to the governments and peoples of the Federal Republic and to the Eastern Germans, that nothing less will serve. To hold out for free elections must also imply that we shall not go to the other extreme and come to an agreement with the Soviet Union which would expressly perpetuate and formalize the division of Germany. However distant the reunification may seem to be, the division must remain *de facto* and provisional, a necessary evil: any other attitude would outrage German public opinion in both West and East and do grave harm to the standing of the Western Powers in Germany.

This psychological battle will be difficult to wage. Soviet propaganda is insidious: it appeals to the longing for peace that weakens the steadfastness of so many faint hearts.

VIII

Is there to be no end to this struggle for Germany? There might be an end if the Soviet Government, in face of the new and disagreeable pattern of events in Europe, would take the risk (which there is now an increased incentive to do) of agreeing to a truly democratic process in Germany. There might be an end if the Soviet leaders would desist from their ambition for power: this is hardly to be looked for until, as may happen in course of time, the revolutionary fires die down. Alternatively, there might be an issue, one way or another, if the Soviet Government, fearing as it undoubtedly does the menace of a rearmed Germany, took to other and more violent methods than those which it has hitherto used.

In the Berlin crisis of 1948 both sides tacitly observed the rules of the non-military war: neither side resorted to force, even on a local basis. It would in theory be possible for the Soviet Government to go beyond these limits without itself embarking upon an

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all-out war. There is the possibility of what Captain Liddell-Hart has called "guerrilla-type action combined with political subversion, or local advances in remote non-vital areas." Even with the present disparity in nuclear power in favor of the United States, and still more if that disparity were to be levelled off some years hence, the Soviet Government might think that the Western Powers would prefer to resist an attack of this kind with conventional weapons alone, even to their own disadvantage, rather than risk plunging the world into a nuclear war, in which neither side could expect to establish an easy advantage and in which all would probably be ruined. There are places in the world where such considerations might apply: but it is hardly likely that Germany could be one of them. In Germany the two sides confront each other in an area which is vital to both, in which neither can afford to tolerate an advance by the other, and in which there are public commitments which might make all-out resistance imperative. Even a new blockade of Berlin on the old pattern would be a much more hazardous enterprise than it was in 1948; the risk of war would be greater. The Western forces in Germany are equipped with tactical atomic weapons and might well use them to repel a local attack; and the distinction between the use of tactical atomic weapons and the use of strategic atomic or nuclear weapons is one which is unlikely to be maintained in practice.

The conclusion therefore is that, the Paris agreements notwithstanding, the Soviet Government would hesitate to embark on local action in Germany, either directly or through their satellites, which could lead to a nuclear war unless they had, upon a cool calculation of possibilities, convinced themselves that the hour had struck for such a war to be brought about. The First and Second World Wars were both conducive to the spread of Communism. The time might now be held to be ripe for a Third World War which, whatever else it might do, would give the *coup de grâce* to the capitalist world and lead to the final triumph which the historical process holds in store for Communism. If an opinion may be hazarded, it is that at this stage the Communists would take risks in the debatable lands in other parts of the world rather than in a nerve-center like Germany. But this does not mean that there is any cause for the NATO Powers to relax their preparedness in either nuclear or conventional weapons against an outbreak which always remains a possibility. Too much is at stake to permit any lack of vigilance.

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IX

It is sometimes said that the conclusion of the Paris agreements will make impossible the conclusion of an agreement about Germany with the Soviet Union which would have been possible before. The only agreement which it would have been possible to make with the Soviet Union before the Paris agreements was a bad agreement, and one which, in the interests of their own security, neither the Western Powers nor the Federal Government could possibly have entertained. What the coming into force of the Paris agreements would do would be to make it less likely than before that a bad agreement will be entered into. It would also give the Soviet Government a new incentive to abate its terms. Only by so doing can it now hope to change the pattern which the Paris agreement would consecrate.

How far the two sides have been from agreement was made patent at the Berlin Conference in February 1954. The Western proposals, as put forward at Berlin, are logical and consistent: free elections under international supervision under an electoral law prepared by the four Powers; convocation of a National Assembly; framing of a Constitution; establishment of a provisional all-German government; preliminary negotiations for a peace treaty; adoption of the Constitution; formation of an all-German government, free to make international agreements and to assume or reject existing obligations of the two parts of Germany; negotiation, signature and entry into force of a peace treaty, the Four Powers to retain till then certain rights as regards the stationing of armed forces in Germany and as regards Berlin and the reunification of Germany.

Under the Soviet proposals, the division of Germany would be prolonged, since East and West Germany would both become parties to the proposed European Treaty for Collective Security; they would participate in the preparation of a peace treaty; they would form a provisional all-German government, which would work out an all-German electoral law and hold all-German elections; occupation forces would be withdrawn (except for limited contingents for guard duties) before elections were held; in the peace treaty, which would be accepted by an all-German government, Germany would be neutralized, with only rudimentary armed forces for internal, frontier and anti-aircraft defense, and with only restricted rights to enter into international agreements.

According to these Soviet proposals, the participation of the

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totally unrepresentative Soviet puppet administration of East Germany in the provisional all-German government would mean that this government would rest on no electoral basis. The Soviet puppet administration would continue to exercise its influence in the well-known Communist manner throughout Germany for as long as the formation of a German government on an agreed electoral basis might be delayed—and this might be a very long time. Meanwhile the Soviet Government would possess an instrument by which to unify Germany by infiltration.

There can be no question which of these two programs points the way to unification in freedom and which does not.

X

There are those who revolt against the thought that, at the best, the present state of tension between the two halves of the world, typified by the difference about Germany, may continue for years, even for generations, and that if the heritage of Western civilization is to be preserved there must be unsleeping vigilance and unremitting military preparedness and unblunted resolution and infinite patience and unshaken confidence; and that this is the challenge which our generation has to meet. They hug the thought that there must be some colossal misunderstanding and that if only two or three men of high authority could talk round a table all would be well. Though the enemy is at the gate, they pretend that he is not the enemy; or if he is, he is not at the gate; or if he is at the gate, he can be bought off by concessions. But what concessions? What concessions could we make to the Soviet Union in the program which we have put forward for dealing with Germany that would not lead to the rendering up of the fortress? In offering free elections for the whole of Germany, and all that may ensue therefrom, the Western Powers are indeed already putting the future to the hazard in the name of democracy. This is an act of faith which they owe to themselves and to all that they stand for. But no more than this should be required of them. And if by the conclusion of the Paris agreements they seek among other things to ensure themselves in some measure against that hazard, this should not be made a reproach: it is an act of wise statesmanship.

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JAPAN RECONSIDERS

By Lily Abegg

THE Japanese people feel cold. They shiver in the unaccustomed atmosphere of democratic institutions and individualistic ways of thought. They long for the warm surroundings of familiar traditional values, the old ideas they used to share in common. And when the Japanese feel a need for giving rein to sentimentality and patriotism they have only their Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples to turn to.

During the first two days of January 1955, almost 3,500,000 people visited the Meiji shrine in Tokyo. What is more, this sanctum, dedicated to the memory of the great Emperor Meiji (1868–1912), hardly exists since it was destroyed by incendiary bombs in 1945, and there is only a small temporary wooden structure where it used to be. But that does not bother the Japanese; what counts is the *genius loci.* Other popular sanctuaries, Shinto and Buddhist, also reported record figures of visitors, ranging from 300,000 to 500,000, at the turn of the year. For instance, nearly 400,000 people insisted on visiting the inconveniently located great shrines of Ise dedicated to the sun goddess, the ancestress of the Imperial house. It is indeed surprising that after years of defamation by the occupation authorities these places are now being visited by more people than ever before—more than during the nationalistic and militaristic epoch when visits to such sanctuaries were practically a part of civic duty. Today citizens come of their own accord. Even Prime Minister Hatoyama, a Christian, bowed before the Ise shrines on New Year's Day. Nor was that all; Mosaburo Suzuki, head of the Moscow-conditioned Leftist Socialists, came to pay his respects to the Emperor's celestial ancestor, doubtless for propaganda reasons in view of the elections.

More unpleasant than the conservative tendency expressed in the mass pilgrimage to shrines and temples is the reappearance of ultra-nationalistic and distinctly reactionary trends. Dozens of radical Rightist organizations, most of them known and held in bad repute from prewar days, have been reëstablished since 1952. They justify themselves to the public mainly by their combative attitude toward Communism, and for the rest, unfortunately find enough reason to attack the deterioration of morals in pres-

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ent-day Japan. The direct following of these organizations and associations has never been very large, nor is it today. It should not be forgotten, however, that assassinations and rebellions by ultra-nationalists have had a most important influence on recent Japanese history. Four Japanese Premiers and ten other prominent figures have been assassinated within the last 25 years.

Up to the present, the Japanese people, or at any rate the majority of them, has never been the determining factor in politics. The elements that made policy were the relatively small and for the most part anonymous groups in power, as well as the activist shock troops of the radical Rightists. It is interesting that the extreme Left, namely the Communists, who also are a minority, occasionally use intimidation but not methodical assassination or mass assassination as practised by the extreme Right. One reason is that the organization and strategy of the ultra-nationalists is based on feudalist traditions, which, of course, is not the case with the Communists, at least not in principle. Another is that the Japanese people have understood and to some extent tolerated nationalistic acts of violence, but not Communist ones. The noisy scenes staged by Leftist extremists in recent years have been regarded with disgust. Unlike the Nipponists, Communists have no manners. Nipponists put on ceremonial clothes for the great event, make their prayers and then shoot.

While small groups are more decisive in Japan than perhaps anywhere else, the people as a whole generally are only spectators. In February 1936, when army and navy units fought a battle with thundering cannon right in the center of Tokyo, the people, including the so-called intelligentsia and people in business, watched the drama the way a movie audience might, as though the outcome did not in the least affect the fate of Japan. It was not much different during the dispute between Yoshida and Hatoyama last autumn. The anti-Yoshida atmosphere was marked, but the people watched the political battle at a distance; except for the politicians involved, nobody entered into fervent arguments, nobody heatedly took sides. Politics are the business of the government and the politicians; the good citizen cautiously sticks to his job.

Nevertheless, in the Japan which I am describing, where Rightist tendencies are strong, a strike took place last year which the Left claims will be known as a decisive point in the history of the Japanese labor movement. This was the strike of the 4,000 work-

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ers of the Japanese Steel Works in Muroran (Hokkaido) which lasted six and a half months. They were fighting against the dismissal of 900 of their colleagues. Due to the economic depression the employers could not give in; nevertheless the strike continued, encouraged by Minoru Takano, the Communist secretary general of the Sohyo, Japan's largest trade union with over 3,000,000 members. At the end of December a compromise was reached and 100 of the dismissed workers were reëmployed. For this meagre result the workers' families, some 10,000 people in all, starved and suffered for more than six months, yet Takano regarded it as a victory. "From all over Japan," he said, "offers of money, bags of rice and donations poured in for the strikers. The farmers of Hokkaido donated vegetables and the doctors of Muroran treated the sick workers without charge. Actually, it was a whole city on strike, a wonderful example of community spirit and mutual assistance. Never has there been such a strike in the whole world. It could happen only in Japan." Takano, whose chief aim is to infect the trade unions with Communist ideas, adds: "We are firmly against American-style democracy. What we need is unity and community."

Unity and community! You hear it from the Left and also from the Right. But, of course, what the Conservatives mean by "community" is different from what the Leftists mean. For the one it is a traditional, old, organic idea, for the other a rational Marxist one. The Conservatives are thinking of the Confucian family system, of patriarchal ties of various kinds and of the community of the children of Nippon under the father of the nation, the Emperor. The Leftists are thinking of the Soviet system or of a milder centralized Socialist order. But both have a tendency toward collectivism and away from the individualism which is the basis of personal and political freedom and genuine democracy.

Of course there also are advocates of freedom and democracy in Japan but their number and the response they arouse is rather small. Generally speaking, they include the Japanese Christians (about half a million in a population of 88,000,000), as well as part of the youth in the big cities, part of the women and some of the intellectuals. Politically speaking, the Rightist Socialists may be described as genuine democrats; they held 62 of the approximately 450 seats in the last House of Representatives. The Leftist Socialists have brought suspicion on themselves by their

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close ties to the Sohyo and their partiality to Red China. There are democrats also among the Conservatives, particularly the younger ones, but almost the entire leadership belongs to the older generation (with an average age in the Hatoyama cabinet, for instance, of 63), who prefer to rely upon familiar and proved methods and show little inclination for promoting the idea of democracy with any fresh initiative. How, for instance, could the Minister of Education, Ando, who is 78 years old, be expected to pioneer for the democratization of the Japanese youth?

The attempts to democratize Japan have been described frequently, so that it will be sufficient to stress only a few examples to give the flavor of the situation today. In the beginning, the majority of the people welcomed the reforms introduced by the Americans as representing the dawn of a new era. This feeling was mainly a reaction against the police state of the militarists and the miseries of the war. How is it possible, then, that only a few years later an anti-democratic atmosphere should prevail, with anti-Americanism as one of the ingredients?

For one thing, Japan made the acquaintance of democracy in an absurd and paradoxical way—by order of a foreign occupying Power. By its very nature a military occupation can never be democratic. Thus freedom of the press was ordered, yet criticism of even the minor measures of the American headquarters was forbidden. The administration was supposed to lie in the hands of the Japanese Government, but the ministers spent many hours in the military offices receiving advice and instructions, and the Japanese Diet would never have dared turn down a law ordered by General MacArthur. As a result, the supposedly democratic nature of the régime was never taken seriously and Japanese politicians lost their sense of responsibility. How were Japanese representatives, who had never been used to taking much initiative in any case, to acquire a new independent and active spirit under such circumstances? The Japanese Diet has initiated very few of the laws passed since 1947, when the new constitution came into effect. Almost all the laws came from the occupation authority and, after 1951, from the Japanese Government, as had always been the case in the old days.

It was their respect for power which made the Japanese turn to the victor, that is to General MacArthur, to satisfy their loyalty needs in 1945. To a certain extent MacArthur had replaced Tojo. Yet they did it with more than just instinctive respect for their

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feudalistic tradition; they did it also because they thought it wiser. It was better to give in. The idea was similar to the principle of Judo whereby the weaker suddenly throws himself backward, causing the attacker to fall over him onto the ground. One had to flatter the victor, praise his laws, do one's best to display a freedom-loving and Christian attitude.

Furthermore it was considered a good idea to get to know the Americans and their methods since these had proved superior to Japanese methods. The Japanese have always copied everything whenever they considered it useful from a national point of view. But when it became apparent that many of the American innovations were not exactly suited to Japan the spirit of criticism appeared. It did not show itself clearly at first as opposition but as a kind of passive resistance. Many of the new laws and regulations remained on paper; violations of them—for instance, by employers who disregarded the labor legislation, by parents who sold their daughters for prostitution, by election grafters who became frequent in the impoverished postwar years—remained unpunished or were punished only mildly. In the shelter of the new legislation, held over them like an umbrella by the occupying Power, the Japanese began to settle down cozily into their old ways. Loud criticism was not heard until later, in fact not until 1952.

But Japanese respect for power and Japanese hypocrisy were not the only reasons why criticism was dormant for so long; the censorship imposed by the occupation authorities was also a factor. To take one example, until 1952 it was forbidden to publish pictures of the effects of the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and all that could be found were seized. At the risk of being jailed and severely punished, many Japanese, especially journalists, nevertheless hid and kept such photographs, and their publication in 1952 made a tremendous impression not only in Japan but also abroad. The terrible pictures of defacements, burns and mutilations, of disfigured young girls and slowly dying children, planted horror in the hearts of the Japanese. Without recognizing these facts the Japanese reaction to the Bikini incident cannot be understood. It was not "hysteria" but very human excitement and fear. Only insensate blocks of granite would have reacted in any other way. From a political and psychological point of view it would probably have been better if most of the bomb photographs had been released at once, when

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war-weary Japan did not wish to see or hear anything concerned with the war, when she had not yet forgotten her own atrocities and when a marked anti-American feeling had not yet developed. But even if the press policy had been more skillful the fact would still remain that the Japanese are so far the only nation in the world that has been subjected to A- and H-bombs, and in the case of the latter in time of peace. Would we react differently under the same circumstances?

Quite apart from the pseudo-democratic character of the Japanese régime during the occupation, one sees that there were disadvantages in transplanting various institutions from the giant American continent to the small and overpopulated Japanese islands. The occupation authorities kept almost exclusively to the American pattern, disregarding European and other democratic institutions. Thus impoverished Japan was given a decentralized and costlier administration in place of her former centralized one. As former Japanese governments were fully aware, the distinct regional mentality of Japan makes a central administration the most effective balance to persistent feudalistic ties and local interests. When small districts were allowed to control their own police forces, the result often was that due to lack of financial means they were not even capable of employing a policeman. Furthermore, coöperation among local police detachments left much to be desired and crime went undetected. Certainly one of the most important measures after Japan again became independent was the recentralization of the police, if only in order to conduct an efficient fight against Communist subversion. Lately there has been criticism of the number of regional and municipal bodies, the members of which all draw salaries, and it has been suggested that their number should be reduced, especially as they are often corrupt.

As a result of the severe dislocation caused by the introduction of democratic methods education is practically in a state of chaos. By an American-inspired innovation, children now spend two years more at school than they used to but they learn less. There are no national schoolbooks and almost every school can choose its own teaching equipment (though it has to be approved by the Ministry of Education). The teachers' union is so infected with Communism that some elementary schoolteachers consider Communist propaganda more important than their teaching, even though political activity on the school premises is for-

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bidden. There are schools where the national imperial hymn is sung every morning and schools where ultra-nationalistic orators are admitted. There are schools where Karl Marx's "Capital" is used in teaching foreign languages and others that prefer American authors. There are teachers who tell their pupils that they do not have to obey their parents and others who teach the children once again to bow deeply to their parents and other respected persons. There are colleges where fencing with wooden swords has long come back into fashion but there are also ones where teachers try by every method to prevent the pupils from joining the Japanese self-defense units. So far the Ministry of Education, the authority of which has been much reduced, has not been able to bring order into this confusion. However, the present general rather conservative tendency may result in more disciplinary action being taken in the future.

All this has not touched upon the main reason for the failure of democracy in Japan, namely the fact that the Japanese finds it difficult to consider himself an individual and to act as such. In spite of Western inspirations dating back decades, Japanese traditions and particularly Japanese education remain governed essentially by the spirit of collective rather than personal responsibility. The head of the Japanese family, for instance, makes no decision without having consulted its members. "Leaders" in the Nazi sense of the word have always been rare in Japan. On the contrary, what predominates is the group whose head, just like the head of the family, takes decisions only after careful and often extremely lengthy consultations. In actual fact, Tojo was not a "leader" so much as the representative of a group. Down to the present, the Japanese have always been brought up in a spirit of collectivism, duty and sacrifice. The trend was reinforced after the Manchuria incident in 1931–32 and in the end was abused by the military.

After the war, freedom of the individual was preached to this people. They were given a new constitution which proclaimed among other things that everyone has the right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"—a thesis, incidentally, which even a European may find irritating. In Japan it meant a total revaluation of ethical terms. The emphasis on personal concerns that had hitherto been a weakness was now proclaimed a virtue. Well, was the response, if I am encouraged to look after my own interests and pursue happiness it obviously is right and proper to

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think of nothing but to pile up a fortune for myself as quickly as possible. "Live fully and as you please" soon became the motto among wide sections of the people. To the Japanese, individualism and liberalism are not much more than egotism and concentration on selfish interest.

The devaluation of domestic ethical traditions and the one-sided and wrong interpretation of Western ideals resulted in a deterioration of morals and general degradation. The unpleasant symptoms evident in Japan today are mainly the result of a chaotic state of mind and only in the second place of economic misery and poverty. During the war when food, clothing and all consumer goods were hardly obtainable there was relatively little criminality. It was only after half of Tokyo had been burned down and many people were entirely destitute that it became necessary to lock doors during the day as well as at night. Today stealing goes on as never before and in the year 1954 this country of formerly honest and well-behaved citizens recorded about 3,000 murder cases. The great scandals which occurred during the Yoshida régime must have made the deterioration of public morals known to the entire world. The same conditions also prevail, of course, in the lower echelons of the administration. Formerly Japanese civil servants were slightly supercilious and bureaucratic but on the whole honest and industrious. Today many officials themselves complain about the lack of a sense of duty.

Japan has at least twice as many places of amusement today as before the war. There are amusements of every kind—ancient Japanese, modern Japanese influenced by the West, and purely Western. Everything is allowed and nothing forbidden. There used to be accepted rules and a traditional order in this field (the geisha system, for instance) but the "democratic evolution" brought confusion here also. Today the once-dignified capital of Tokyo sometimes recalls disreputable Shanghai and other ports.

At this point there must be a short passage about the relationship between American soldiers and Japanese women and the problems thereby created. Wherever foreign troops are stationed problems of this sort arise, but they have to be taken more seriously in Japan than elsewhere. The main difficulty lies in the impact of two different cultures. I shall not go into how money-hungry Japanese fasten their places of ill repute and gambling dens like glue to the army camps, or the indifference of the Japanese police, but turn straight to the main problem.

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It starts with the fact that the Japanese consider our "natural" behavior barbaric and uncivilized. To most of them we seem repulsive because we have "neither self-discipline nor manners." Even today, for instance, they feel embarrassed when foreigners kiss in public when saying goodbye, even in the case of a mother and child or husband and wife. They find it disagreeable to be patted on the back or to see a man take a woman's arm with even the most polite intentions. All of this offends the Japanese sense of dignity and reserve. Granted that things have somewhat changed since the war, the general attitude remains the same, as those who understand the Japanese language have frequent cause to know. Particularly everything connected with sexual emotions is strictly taboo in public. Young soldiers are naïve and thoughtless and do not know why their Japanese girl friends (provided they are not degraded Pan-Pan girls) stiffen if they show even the least familiarity in a movie theater or a railroad compartment.

This leads to a further difference between Japanese ways and ours. In Japan some things are officially permitted which according to our Christian code of morals are actually forbidden. Thus the Japanese had no trouble "organizing" life, dividing it into family life and amusement and drawing a sharp line between the two. The result is that in principle a Japanese would never address a woman in the street unless it were evident (which it would be from her clothes) that she belonged to a class which may be talked to. Until now a so-called respectable woman—whether foreign or Japanese—could go home at night without being bothered, which is not always the case in European countries. Foreigners in Japan have never kept strictly to this old Japanese rule and when the occupation brought them there by thousands it was continually broken. The Japanese have long grown accustomed to the behavior of "uncivilized" foreigners, but it irritates them. Here is a fundamental difference in viewpoint that basically affects the relationship between American army personnel and Japanese women—a relationship frequently attacked and exploited by anti-American propaganda.

Within the frame of the Japanese mania for amusement gambling plays an important part. The police claim that today every seventh Japanese is a gambler. The game in which millions indulge is called pachinko. Originally it required skill, but then the slot machines appeared and turned it into a game of pure

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chance. Today Japan has 40,000 pachinko halls with two million slot machines, and these halls are said to make over $35,000,000 per month, more, that is, than all the large department stores of the country together. Family rows, bankruptcy, even crime and suicide can be traced back to pachinko. It is reported that the city of Tokyo plans to prohibit slot machines and there is hope that the prefectures will then follow suit.

It is significant for conditions in Japan that the city has to intervene in this problem. The public hardly ever starts a campaign for or against something, even though one would suppose that the local papers with their millions of circulation or other organizations would be capable of doing so. It is always the state that has to intervene like a nursemaid. Lack of public spirit is also to some extent responsible for this shying away from any sort of personal initiative. If a window is open in a railroad compartment and all the passengers are freezing no Japanese as a rule will bring himself to close it, for that is the business of the conductor. If street lights are out of order or a bridge has been dangerously damaged nobody reports it to the authorities; one waits patiently till they notice it of their own accord. During the war people suffocated in the overcrowded Tokyo subway because nobody opened the window and near Shanghai a steamer sank with women and children because the women did not dare to enter the lifeboats or to jump into the water without instructions from the captain.

If many Japanese carry their last cent to pachinko halls and other places of entertainment the reason actually is not a desire for enjoyment but a mania for distraction which derives less from a joy of living than from desperation. The Japanese are at a loss; they feel a compulsion to escape from themselves and from the toughness of life. Young people in particular no longer have any goal or ideal and do not know why and for what purpose they are on earth. They stand before an abyss; the old system has been shaken and the new one is neither understood nor loved. Mere money-chasing leaves the people unsatisfied, not only because the chase is difficult and often unsuccessful but also because the Japanese are essentially a spiritual people. They are quite capable of tightening their belts—much tighter than today—and of being quite satisfied in spite of it, but their will to work and their sacrifices require a sense of purpose and they cannot see such a purpose today. The psychological tension is just as strong

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in present-day Japan as the economic and social tensions, and perhaps even more important.

Japan is the only Asian country without illiteracy. Reading is a mania. More than 75 percent of Japanese households own a radio. Television is widespread. The progressiveness of the country makes it inevitable that the Japanese are bothered by largely the same problems that worry us. The wearying rush of life in the big cities, the endless daily commuting to places of work, the smoking industrial centers, the crazy motor traffic, the croaking loud-speakers—it is the same here as it is in Europe or America. However, apart from those universal problems of the technical age Japan has her own specifically Japanese problems connected with the general controversy between the traditions of East Asia and the Western World. One of these is the thrust of Christian missionary zeal against a philosophy which is fundamentally conditioned to Buddhism—the clash of a rationally minded Western philosophy with a way of thinking that is universalistic and mystical—the conflict between faith in individualism and a form of society that is organic and collectivist. The resulting psychological confusion is particularly variegated and striking.

A young Japanese girl from Kyoto, the only large city in Japan not destroyed in the war, once said, "What a pity that Kyoto was not bombed too!" She had suffered from the traditional atmosphere of the old imperial city and claimed that in Tokyo total destruction had brought a fresher spirit. One often hears remarks of a similar nature. A 16-year-old boy, somewhat crazy, also from Kyoto, gave expression to his feelings two or three years ago by setting fire to the "Golden Pavilion," one of the beautiful old buildings of the city. He told the police that such buildings were not the expression of present-day Japan and he had not been able to endure any longer having such things stared at by sightseeing tourists. Though only a single deed of a crazy mind, it is a symbol of the desperation of many young Japanese, the reason for the large number of suicides among young people.

Their spiritual uprooting combined with their poverty make Japanese youth cast a flirting eye toward Peking. Many students are undernourished and many have to make a prodigious effort to find extra work, for unemployment is on the increase. Some earn money by repeated blood donations, which ruin their health. In the opinion of the students (and, of course, not only of the students) everything is considerably better in Red China, for

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there they have leadership and social security. "Is it true that they have no unemployment in China?" asks the maid who makes your bed. "Is it true that the Chinese students don't have to earn money?" asks the student who cleans a pachinko slot machine. Disillusioning replies are received skeptically. Moreover, the Japanese who once overran China are deeply impressed by the fact that she has been able to regain her strength within such a short period and that she now is "truly independent."

China's lack of personal freedom and her compulsory collectivist economy rouse not the slightest horror in the minds of many Japanese, including particularly a great number of students and academic personnel, both university professors and teachers in elementary schools, as well as a part of the workers. These seem to agree with everything in China so long as the Chinese people obtain "leadership and social security." Communism began to develop in Japan after the First World War, but today the danger is much greater. The social uprooting was much less drastic then, there was no attraction from a strong Communist China and there was none of the anti-American feeling which at present helps swing the pendulum away from the West. Besides, economic misery and the pressure of overpopulation are worse today than ever. China has shown us that the departure from collectivist and patriarchal ties and other Confucian ideas (which also were strong in Japan) does not necessarily lead toward emancipation of the individual and Western style of political organization but may as easily swing over into a Marxist collective system. In principle this might also be the case in Japan, though for a variety of reasons it seems unlikely.

The Japanese people which has shown so little aptitude for democratization seems likely for the time being not to take the road to the Left but the one to the Right. The millions that flock to the holy shrines make a more convincing impression than the strike of the 4,000 workers of Muroran and the pinkish students who make fun of the Emperor. The roots of home are still proving to be stronger than Communist ideas from abroad. In this connection the fact that the conservative peasant population is a majority is of decisive importance. Taking the road to the Right will very likely involve modifying a number of the laws passed in recent years, and it probably will also mean strengthening the authority of the state. Some observers even consider it possible that state Socialist tendencies (called "military Socialist" in the

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past) may become stronger—trends which can be placed on neither the Right nor the Left but form a mixture of both extremes. Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, a demagogic talent who for the moment acts behind the scenes, represents such tendencies.

Responsibility for the fact that democracy has not "taken" in Japan should not be laid at the door of just the small number of convinced democrats who have been working for it. Little is being done in this respect in the field of education. The school laws were changed in letter but not in spirit. A foreigner who has never visited a Japanese school or college will find it difficult to imagine how different Japanese education is from ours. There is no emphasis on training minds to think freely and independently; on the contrary, the pupils repeat everything like parrots. It is not customary, it is even taboo, for pupils to ask questions. Foreign professors have trouble in bringing even adult university students to ask questions and discuss intellectual problems freely. To them discussion means contradiction and criticism, and criticism of the "master," that is, the teacher or university professor, is still looked upon as really sacrilege. It is significant that the teachers at the new International Christian University at Tokyo (opened in 1953) are half foreigners and half Japanese. Very likely this was agreed upon not only to stress the university's cosmopolitan character but also because the Japanese as a rule hold to their old attitude even when they are Christians.

Moreover, the liberalization and democratization of Japan were attempted in an epoch which, viewed historically, seems unfavorable to the propagation of such concepts. The roots of our Western ideas are more than 2,000 years old, yet our ideals of freedom in their present form became valid only when we made room for them by conquering the world. It was easy for our ancestors who emigrated to America and found a giant continent open before them to extol freedom and equality. But their maxims sound differently on our present overcrowded earth, where even the old democracies voluntarily subject themselves to restrictions which would not have been necessary in the time of our parents. One large part of the world is already forcibly organized on a collectivist pattern and the other part is beginning to stress collaboration and collectivism both at home and in dealing with other nations. Psychologically it is a difficult moment for the Japanese to learn about our ideals and understand them. (The Japanese press, for instance, is quick to denounce the fight

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against Communists and related actions in the United States as undemocratic.) The tender and noble flower of freedom needs a favorable soil if it is to live and grow robust despite the voluntary and reasonable restrictions put upon it.

Present-day Japan must be reckoned a democracy because the people have a vote and because on the whole their will finds expression in the result. It should be kept in mind, however, that the elections are determined plutocratically since they turn to a very large extent indeed upon where big business places its donations. Secondly, they are manipulated to some extent. Finally, they are influenced greatly by the loyalty principle. Complaints about the "feudal" methods of the leading politicians are heard even in the ranks of the Sohyo and the Communist Party. In what direction does the popular will seem to tend at present? By a considerable majority, apparently, in favor of the Conservatives, who in the past usually formed two-thirds of the Diet. The popularity of the Hatoyama cabinet has proved that no grudge is held against men who occupied high positions in the authoritarian period and during the war, but that on the contrary the majority trusts them, in the hope that they will reëstablish a Japanese order and not one inspired from America. The people are tired of corruption, laxity, laisser-faire, lack of a sense of duty and in particular of the rule of money—and all of these are things which the democratization of Japan brought in its train.

As we understand things in the West, we are tempted to say that the Japanese people votes against itself. Otherwise why would not the Right Socialists who are genuine democrats and not exaggerated State Socialists get more votes? When the Japanese military caste came into power it was by degrees, without a coup. In Germany, Hitler attained power legally. While history never repeats itself exactly, these examples may suggest the possibilities inherent in the present Japanese development. To say this may disappoint those who have believed that there is an absolutely valid form of government and that our ideas should be accepted as ideals by other peoples. Japan is beginning to think of her real self, and that is necessary, since a caricature such as she has become today has no strength and is exposed to dangers of all sorts, including Communism. The present trend to the Right may, we hope, remain within reasonable limits; at least it avoids a switch to Marxist collectivism such as has overtaken China.

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MILITARY POLICY AND DEFENSE OF THE "GREY AREAS"

By Henry A. Kissinger

IT is surprising how little affected American strategic thinking has been by the fact that within just a few years the U.S.S.R. will have the capacity to deliver a powerful attack with nuclear weapons on the United States. To be sure, advocates of radical solutions propose to cut the Gordian knot by a policy of preventive war. But there has always been an air of unreality about a program so contrary to the sense of the country and the constitutional limits within which American foreign policy must be conducted. For the rest, there seems to be such general agreement about the main lines of American strategy that some of the recent transformations in our strategic position are rarely publicly debated.

Whether these postulates of American strategic thought are interpreted in Secretary Dulles' "massive retaliation" speech and subsequent article,[1] in Vice-President Nixon's reply to Adlai Stevenson of March 13, 1954, or in Mr. Finletter's lucid book, "Power and Policy,"[2] they amount to the assertion that the chief deterrent to Soviet aggression resides in United States nuclear superiority. The corollary is that the United States must not exhaust itself in a "war of attrition" in peripheral areas or keep in being a force so large as to drain our economy without adding to our effective strength on A-Day (the hypothetical date of the outbreak of nuclear war).[3] Since only the threat of "massive retaliation" can deter Soviet aggression, major reliance must be placed on the development of our Strategic Air Force and on increasing the power of our nuclear arsenal. Since the Sino-Soviet bloc possesses interior lines of communication and is therefore able to choose the point of attack, we must not let them lure us into areas where we would be strategically at a disadvantage. Instead, we should inhibit aggression at its source by the threat of a general war. To be sure, there are some areas where we shall resist aggression on the ground, the NATO region for example, and for the defense of these it is considered that conventional

[1] "Policy for Security and Peace," by John Foster Dulles, *Foreign Affairs*, April 1954.
[2] Thomas K. Finletter, "Power and Policy." New York: Harcourt, 1954.
[3] Finletter, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

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forces perhaps backed by nuclear weapons are essential. But in the remainder of the world, the part which Mr. Finletter calls the "grey areas," Sino-Soviet moves can be prevented only by the threat of a general war. This in substance seems to be the rationale for our present military policy.

The argument is persuasive. It has the advantage of fitting in with the historical experience of a nation which, for over a century, felt secure from hostile attack. And it is reinforced by the memory of the Korean conflict which has come to symbolize the frustration experienced in waging peripheral wars. But one of a nation's most difficult tasks is to interpret its past correctly. However efficacious the threat of a general war may have been during the period of American nuclear monopoly or near-monopoly, it takes on a different aspect when we consider the soon-to-be atomic stalemate. And however costly the Korean war may have been, it still may prove a better model for our future strategy than an all-out atomic conflict. For the increasing Soviet nuclear capability has transformed power relationships not only quantitatively but qualitatively. While the United States enjoyed an absolute atomic monopoly, even a small number of nuclear weapons had a powerful deterrent effect. But as the Soviet capability to retaliate on American cities becomes imminent a new dimension is added to the United States strategic problem. No matter how vast our remaining margin in number and technological refinement of the ultimate weapons, henceforth not only *they* but *we* must fear them. In these circumstances a major or exclusive reliance on general war as a deterrent to Sino-Soviet aggression may come dangerously close to a Maginot mentality—a belief in a strategy which may never be tested but which meanwhile prevents the consideration of any alternative. If we accept an all-or-nothing military policy we may well find ourselves paralyzed in the years ahead, when the increasing Soviet nuclear capability undermines our willingness to run the risk of a general war for anything less than to counter a direct attack on the United States.

And it would seem the height of folly for the Soviet Union to attack the United States directly and thereby unleash S.A.C. The Soviets can achieve their ultimate goal, the neutralization of the United States, at much less risk by gradually eroding the peripheral areas, which will imperceptibly shift the balance of power against us without ever presenting us with a clear-cut challenge.

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It may be argued, of course, that they will not attempt to absorb the peripheral areas if it means the destruction of Moscow or Peking. But this is merely begging the principal question—whether as the Soviet supply of nuclear weapons grows, as well as the capacity to deliver them, nuclear war does not become a double-edged sword? The more fearful the weapons, the more risky their use. And the more risky their use, the more the Soviet strategic problem is reduced to presenting its challenges in such a manner that the pressures for solutions short of war will be maximized not only with our European allies but in this country also. If we refused to fight in Indo-China when the Soviet nuclear capability was relatively small because of the danger that a limited war might become general, we shall hardly be readier to risk nuclear bombing for the sake of Burma or Iran or even Jugoslavia. On the contrary, as Soviet nuclear strength increases, the number of areas that will seem worth the destruction of New York, Detroit or Chicago will steadily diminish.

There is no doubt that we must have a powerful nuclear arsenal and the best strategic air force, if only to discourage an attack on us. But the power of these should not blind us to their limitations as instruments of the cold war, particularly to the fact that exclusive reliance on them runs counter to a coalition policy even within the NATO area and that there must be a point beyond which development of them will yield diminishing returns. What will be the advantage of accumulating a greater store of fission weapons than would be necessary to destroy every Soviet manufacturing center? Or of improving them to the point where one bomb can destroy an average city twice over? Nor should we overlook that certain technological advances—the atomic submarine, for example—will add much less to our effective strategic strength than to that of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Thus for the first time in military history there is the possibility of a stalemate despite an absolute superiority in number of weapons and in technology; and when this point has been reached the American strategic problem is transformed. The Red Army may have been immobilized by the American atomic monopoly, but it may be liberated by the Soviet capacity to retaliate on Washington. It is argued by some that the atomic stalemate is nothing new, that it has in fact existed on the Eurasian continent since 1949. But this is surely not the same as saying that it has been part of the American *consciousness* since then, and this is the crucial factor

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in determining willingness to engage in a general war. The stalemate on the Eurasian continent has been maintained solely by the relative freedom of action of the United States. That is precisely why our nuclear arsenal is no better than our willingness to use it, and this is in danger of being reduced as the Soviet nuclear capacity grows.

An all-or-nothing military policy will also sap the vitality of our system of alliances. If we assert that nuclear weapons represent the only deterrents to Soviet aggression, one of two consequences becomes almost inevitable: either our Allies will feel that any military effort on their part is unnecessary, or they may be led to the conviction that peace is preferable to war almost at any price. With the end of the American monopoly of nuclear power our demonstrations of weapons in that field may actually work to Soviet advantage. Thus our explosion of the hydrogen bomb was certainly a factor in deterring British action in Indo-China. Our only policy consistent with a policy of alliances, therefore, is one which minimizes (or seems to minimize) the risks of nuclear war and at the same time offers protection against Soviet occupation through the use of conventional armies.

In short, the strategic problem of the United States has two aspects: to create a level of thermo-nuclear strength to deter the Soviet bloc from a major war, or from aggressions in areas which cannot be defended by an indigenous effort; but to integrate this with a policy which does not paralyze the will to resist in areas where local resources for defense do exist.

II

But is there any deterrent to Sino-Soviet aggression other than the threat of general war? Does not a policy of peripheral actions run counter to the geographic realities of the situation, specifically to the fact that the U.S.S.R. possesses interior lines of communication and can therefore assemble a superior force at any given point?

It must be admitted that we alone cannot possibly defend the Soviet periphery by local actions; nor can we intervene without the coöperation of the local governments. Our immediate task must be to shore up the indigenous will to resist, which in the "grey areas" means all the measures on which a substantial consensus seems to exist: a political program to gain the confidence of local populations and to remove the stigma of colonialism from

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us, together with a measure of economic assistance and similar steps. But though a political program may be essential it will prove useless without an increase in the capacities for local defense. Few political leaders will run the risk of foreign occupation even though liberation is to follow eventually. The promise of victory in a general war will mean little to the leader of a threatened country which is meanwhile to be Sovietized. The strength of this feeling even in the NATO area is best expressed in an editorial in a leading German newspaper which has supported Chancellor Adenauer's foreign policy: "We must oppose any strategy the basic postulate of which involves giving up our territory. Our partnership in the Atlantic alliance means more to us than that our 12 divisions represent a strategic asset for the West; it includes a demand for the protection of the German people. . . . A substantial retreat is equivalent to our moral and physical destruction."[4]

The argument thus runs in a circle: Can the peripheral areas be defended, assuming the willingness of the countries concerned to resist and our readiness to help them? To support a negative answer such factors are cited as the "unlimited" Chinese manpower or the vast distances of the "grey areas" from the centers of our strength. Now to underestimate an adversary may be disastrous, but to overestimate his resources may lead to a needless paralysis of policy. Absolute numbers are important, but only the part which can be utilized effectively is strategically significant. In these terms Chinese manpower is limited by the Soviet-Chinese capacity to equip and train it, and Chinese effectiveness by the difficulty of communications and supply. The vision of hordes of Chinese streaming into the "grey areas" is unrealistic. If it were possible to develop indigenous armies of moderate size but substantial firepower these should be able to fight delaying actions until the arrival of reinforcements, particularly if American air power (perhaps carrier-based) were hampering Chinese movements. Nor can the Chinese keep pouring in men and supplies so far from their centers of production, despite the seemingly contrary lessons of the war in Korea. After the beginning of the armistice negotiations, the Korean war was fought under conditions nearly ideal for an army with inferior technology and air power: actions were always confined to a small segment of the front; they could be delayed until there had been an ade-

[4] *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, December 2, 1954.

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quate build-up; they could be broken off when stocks were depleted. The risks were always tactical and not strategic; the penalty for failure was limited by the self-imposed restrictions of the armistice negotiations. "Operation Strangle" therefore did not represent a fair test of the Chinese ability to sustain a major effort over a considerable period of time and in the face of superior air power. The only continuous drain on Chinese supplies occurred after the front was stabilized near Suwon in March 1951, and from then until the beginning of the armistice negotiations in June the Chinese were much closer to a decisive defeat than we. Had we committed even four more divisions, indeed even if we had put a time limit on the truce negotiations, we might have achieved a substantial military victory.

To be sure, the limitations imposed on the Chinese freedom of manœuvre by the narrow peninsula and the proximity of our bases in Japan gave us an advantage in Korea which probably could not be duplicated in other areas. On the other hand, certain circumstances were propitious for the Chinese also. Korea was close to their main production centers and to the Russian supply lines, and communications between Korea and China were good. Neither of these conditions would be duplicated in, for example, Southeast Asia. We thus might say that these are two prerequisites of effective local action by the United States: indigenous governments of sufficient stability so that the Soviets can take over only by open aggression, and indigenous military forces capable of fighting a delaying action. If these conditions are met, the American contribution to the defense of the "grey areas" will involve the creation of a strategic reserve (say in the Philippines, Malaya or Pakistan) capable of redressing the balance and of a weapons system capable of translating our technological advantage into local superiority.

This is difficult but not impossible. Of the countries around the Soviet periphery, only five possess insufficient forces to put up an initial defense: Iran, Afghanistan, Burma, Thailand and Indo-China. India and Pakistan are protected by a difficult mountain-barrier and still more by the fact that an attack on them would almost certainly lead to a general war. As for the other countries, the defense of Afghanistan depends on the strength of Pakistan; an attack on Iran would have to reckon with the flanking position of Turkey; India would not look on an attack on Burma with equanimity and might intervene; while the fate of Thailand will

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be decided in Indo-China, where an all-out American effort may still save at least Laos and Cambodia. It should not be beyond our capabilities, then, to create nucleus defense forces in the three critical countries: Iran (to help Turkey and Pakistan cover the Middle East), Pakistan (to strengthen Afghanistan and to back up Iran and Burma), and the Indo-Chinese states (to protect Malaya and Thailand). If concurrently we develop a supply system perhaps based on existing British facilities in Malaya, and develop a political program capable of enlisting the support of the countries concerned, we could bring about situations in which American local action is physically and psychologically possible. And once a certain level of indigenous power exists, a Chinese or Soviet attack can occur only after a period of build-up in the border areas which an effective intelligence system should be able to discover and which should give time for us to concentrate our forces or take political steps to avoid the conflict.

It is not at all obvious, therefore, that China or even the U.S.S.R. could utilize its interior position to assemble an overwhelming force at any given point around its periphery. But can we counter even the forces they are able to assemble? If we admit the local war thesis, do we not run the risk of having our army always at the wrong place? To be sure, China can pick the initial point of attack, but the greater mobility of her interior position is illusory because of the difficulties of communication. Once the Chinese are committed in an area, they are not able to shift their troops at will against our air power or with greater speed than we shift ours by sea. They cannot, in short, draw us into Indo-China and then attack in Burma with the same army. They can, of course, build up two armies, but we should be able to learn of this in time and then decide to defend one or the other area, or neither, depending on the strategic situation. In any case, the two armies cannot support each other (the classic advantage of interior lines). And this still leaves out of consideration the utilization of tactical nuclear weapons which would further increase the Sino-Soviet risk.[5]

But assuming its feasibility, should we permit ourselves to be drawn into a "war of attrition" with China? The ultimate answer will have to depend on local conditions and on the precise

[5] For a useful discussion of a tactical nuclear weapons system see "Counter-Force Strategy," by T. F. Walcowicz, *Air Force,* February 1955; and "No Need to Bomb Cities to Win War," by Richard Leghorn, *U. S. News & World Report,* January 28, 1955.

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circumstances in which the Chinese challenge is presented. But it seems clear that the "war of attrition" argument mistakes the crucial indices of modern war. The significant attrition of modern war is in matériel, and there would appear to be little likelihood that a state with a steel production of less than 10,000,000 tons annually could win a contest with the United States. Soviet help could certainly redress the balance to a degree, but we do not know to what extent the U.S.S.R. is prepared to go to save its Chinese allies in a crisis, above all if Chinese requests for help involve a sacrifice of its own economic goals. Soviet and Chinese difficulties would be increased if we coupled our intentions with face-saving devices and guarantees of the integrity of metropolitan China. Even with Soviet assistance, a protracted, large-scale military effort may lead to the stagnation, if not the exhaustion, of the Chinese régime. A war of attrition is the one war China could not win.

III

The ultimate argument for the little war thesis, however, must be in terms of the over-all requirements of United States security. The most frequent argument in favor of our maintaining a foothold on the Continent of Eurasia, and specifically in Western Europe, is, in military terms, that our whole strategy depends on the refueling facilities which our allies provide for our strategic air force. But we have a strategic interest in Eurasia independent of the range of our heavy bombers (which can, after all, be increased by technical advances), namely, the geopolitical fact that in relation to Eurasia the United States is an island Power with inferior resources at present only in manpower, but later on even in industrial capacity. Thus we are confronted by the traditional problem of an "island" Power—of Carthage with respect to Italy, of Britain with respect to the Continent—that its survival depends on preventing the opposite land-mass from falling under the control of a single Power, above all one avowedly hostile. If Eurasia were to fall under the control of a single Power or group of Powers, and if this hostile Power were given sufficient time to exploit its resources, we should confront an overpowering threat. At best we would be forced into a military effort not consistent with what is now considered the "American way of life." At worst we would be neutralized and would no longer be masters of our policy.

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If this is true, we cannot cast off the "grey areas" without dire consequences. We may be able to win a war without their assistance, but we cannot survive a long period of peace without denying them to the U.S.S.R. If the United States ever became confined to "Fortress America," or even if Soviet expansion in the "grey areas" went far enough to sap our allies' will to resist, Americans would be confronted by three-quarters of the human race and not much less of its resources and their continued existence would be precarious.

But there is no necessity for this to occur. It should not be forgotten that the defense of the Free World is a problem not only of power but of will. In 1941 Germany alone nearly defeated the U.S.S.R. and today the combination of Western Europe and the United States should be able to contain it. The steel production of Western Europe still equals that of the U.S.S.R. In Asia, China appears as strong as she does at least partly because of the irresolution of her opponents. The task of creating a balance of power would therefore be far from hopeless if one considered nothing but the available resources. But while a balance is attainable along existing lines on the Eurasian continent, it will nevertheless always remain tenuous. As long as Soviet armies are poised on the Elbe, Western Europe will be insecure. As long as China strides unopposed through Southeast Asia, the uncommitted Powers will seek their safety in neutralism. The Soviet bloc presents to the outside world a vision of ruthless strength allied with artful cunning, of a constant readiness to utilize force coupled with the diplomatic skill to secure the fruits of such use. The United States, therefore, faces the task not only of stemming the Soviet tide but also of reducing the Soviet sphere and demonstrating the limitations of Soviet power and skills. The last is almost as important as the reduction of the Soviet sphere, for to the extent that the Free World, now swayed by a sense of its impotence, realizes that the Soviet bloc, too, behind its façade of monolithic power shrinks from certain consequences, its resolution and its policy will both become stronger.

A strategy which admits the *possibility* of fighting limited actions is more likely to achieve this objective than the threat of a total nuclear war. Since the destructiveness of strategic nuclear weapons has made them useless except for acts of desperation, the threat of massive retaliation will have two consequences: either the Sino-Soviet bloc will consider it a bluff and thus con-

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front us again with the dilemma of Dienbienphu, or it will transform all contests into questions of prestige which will inhibit any concessions. An all-or-nothing military policy therefore makes for a paralysis of diplomacy. By leaving no alternative between total nuclear war and an uneasy armistice, it prevents attempts to ameliorate the situation progressively and supports the Soviet bloc's pose of moderation.

Actions short of total war, on the other hand, may help restore fluidity to the diplomatic situation, particularly if we analyze what is implied by the term "reduction of the Soviet sphere." The Sino-Soviet bloc can be reduced, short of waging a general war, in two ways: by a voluntary withdrawal or by an internal split. The former is unlikely and depends on many factors outside our control, but the latter deserves careful study. A great deal has been written about it, but this much seems clear: the rift will not come by itself. Too much is to be gained by unity, too many prizes are still to be won, the memory of Tito is still too fresh in the Kremlin, for us to be able to count on Soviet mistakes. A split between the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, and even more a split with China, can come about only through outside pressure, through the creation of contingencies which may force a divergence of views into the open. Thus Tito's break with the Cominform was due at least in part to his disenchantment over Molotov's lukewarm support on the Trieste issue, which in turn was caused by the U.S.S.R.'s unwillingness to risk a major war for a peripheral objective. The most fundamental indictment of our present military policy, then, is that its inability to differentiate its pressures may actually contribute to the consolidation and the unity of the Soviet bloc.

It is therefore misleading to attack the little war thesis on the ground that it does not offer a military solution to our strategic problem, for its merit is precisely that it may provide a political solution. Had we defeated the Chinese army in Korea in 1951 we would have confronted the U.S.S.R. with the dilemma whether to risk everything for the sake of increasing the power of China; and had we followed our victory with a conciliatory political proposal to Peking we could have caused it to reflect whether American good will might not represent a better protection than blindly following the Soviet line. But even if we had failed in our primary task of dividing the U.S.S.R. and China, we would have greatly improved our position towards our allies and even more

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towards the uncommitted nations in Asia. The best counter-argument to the charge of colonialism is political moderation after a military victory. Indo-China gave us a similar opportunity, if under less favorable circumstances, although the Indo-Chinese problem would hardly have assumed its present dimensions had China suffered a decisive reversal in her first military encounter with the United States. Thus, if limited actions are implemented as part of a policy which offers the other side a way out short of total surrender or total war, they may bring about local reversals which may start chain reactions difficult to control and might magnify the tensions within the Soviet bloc. In such a strategy our nuclear superiority and our strategic air force would become a means to permit us to fight local actions on our terms or to shift the opus for a general war onto the Soviet bloc.

IV

But what if the local war should become general? Would we then not have isolated ourselves? To pose the question in the abstract is to prejudge the issue because it assumes that the present course will not lead to our isolation, albeit slowly. Something more fundamental is involved—a misapprehension of the nature of collective security. It is often said that the two world wars would have been avoided if the aggressors had been aware of the forces which would eventually be aligned against them. But even granting this proposition, it would be paradoxical if the Power strong enough to resist local aggressions *alone* were prevented from doing so by a doctrine of collective security.

An alliance represents an increase in strength only when its members agree on the nature of the danger. For it is not the fact that an alliance exists which deters an aggressor but the spirit of determination which animates it, as the fate of the French system of alliances in the inter-war period showed. To ask unstable NATO governments which are hard put to play a European rôle to make themselves responsible for what we do in Asia is to demand the impossible. Even if we are able to induce them to support us by economic pressure and by considerations of long-range strategy, we shall certainly undermine their domestic support. Thus it becomes important to consider whether the military assistance they can give us in peripheral wars is worth this price. The only contingency in which an allied military contribution is essential is a general war or an attack on the NATO

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areas, which amounts to the same thing. In local wars we do not need them and should not insist on their assistance if they have no direct interest at stake. This is not to argue that "going it alone" is a virtue in itself. We must in any case be able to count on the support of Britain and the Commonwealth in Southeast Asia. Only we cannot permit the balance of power to be overturned for the sake of maintaining the form of allied unity.

The way in which a policy that does not exclude the possibility of fighting local wars affects our strategy in a general war therefore depends on two factors: (a) how the local war comes about; (b) how the general war develops from it. Clearly, the little war thesis is no better than the policy into which it is integrated and clearly American intervention can never take place ad hoc. The efficacy of the little war thesis depends, then, on the nature of our leadership. If we demonstrate that we are able to use our strength with moderation, that we know alternatives other than to talk nuclear war or surrender, we might bring about the psychological climate which will make limited actions supportable.[6] If such local wars as we may fight come about not as acts of truculence but as a last resort, they need not undermine our relations with our allies; and if then it were the other side which opted for *general* war the moral basis of our diplomacy would not have been badly prepared.

Thus our capacity to fight local wars is not a marginal aspect of our effective strength; it is a central factor which cannot be sacrificed without impairing our strategic position and paralyzing our policy. The risks involved in an all-or-nothing military policy are so fearful that if we follow it our resolution will weaken and leave the initiative to the other side. A military policy which cannot offer the uncommitted nations protection against Sino-Soviet occupation will defeat our attempts to rally them to our side and in time it will even demoralize the NATO alliance. This would be true even if it should be maintained that our present force levels do not absolutely preclude local actions; valid as this contention may be in the abstract it is unrealistic psychologically. The unlikelihood that a chief-of-staff would commit an army of the present size in peripheral actions is demonstrated by General Ridgway's attitude with regard both to Indo-China and the Chinese offshore islands.

[6] For a discussion of the diplomacy consistent with this conception of the American rôle see the author's "American Policy and Preventive War," *The Yale Review*, Spring 1955.

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The impact of our military policy on Sino-Soviet calculations may prove even more pernicious. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons having made it unlikely that any responsible statesman will lightly unleash a general war, the greatest danger of war—unless the Soviet leaders have become totally reckless—will lie in a miscalculation on their part. This is the only war which it is within our power to avoid, assuming that we leave no doubt about our capabilities and determination. But even this "avoidable" war may break out if the other side becomes convinced that we cannot interfere locally and that our threats of instant retaliation are bluff. If that should happen, the other side may then decide, as its nuclear arsenal grows, to absorb the "grey areas" and confront us with the choice between relinquishing them or risking the destruction of American cities. And because the Sino-Soviet leaders may well be mistaken in their assessment of our reaction when faced with such an alternative, our present military policy may bring about the total war which it seeks to prevent. An improvement in our capacity for local war is therefore indicated not only by considerations of national strategy but as our best chance to preserve the peace.

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THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

By Frank Tannenbaum

THERE is no reason for believing that political stability in Latin America is greater in the nineteen-fifties than it was a hundred years ago. Revolutions in the last 30 years have been as frequent, dictatorships as numerous, durable and oppressive as they were a century ago. It may, of course, be argued that the reasons for instability have changed, and the contention may or may not be true. But the fact of revolution versus dictatorship has remained constant. It cannot even be said that the contemporary revolutions are less bloody or that the tyrannies are more humane. What happened in Colombia between 1946 and 1954 is sufficient to disprove that thesis. Democratic government has remained an unfulfilled hope in spite of the many interesting constitutions that have been written during the last century. The aspiration to achieve the ideal of legality has failed. I shall seek here to suggest some reasons for the failure and to argue for a way out of the dilemma posed by the dream of representative democracy and the fact of revolution or dictatorship.

Contemporary Latin American political difficulties cannot be divorced from their historical past. The Spanish tradition is authoritarian, bureaucratic and centralized. The tradition is to leave political responsibility to the government and expect it to do everything. The extreme individualism of the Spanish character and the authoritarian tradition of the Spanish government seem to go hand in hand. The bureaucratic colonial administration controlled every agency of political administration—with the exception of the *cabildo* (township), and the township government was immersed in petty localisms. It was aristocratic in character and incompetent to become the base of a national government. The descendants of the Spaniards, the *criollos,* who led the independence movements, were inexperienced in politics and possessed no clear concepts of nationality. The nation was in the future, something to be forged, molded and solidified. This was true territorially as well as ideologically. There was either no American tradition to appeal to, or it was nebulous and fanciful —such as the attempt to resurrect the Incaic past. There was certainly a sense of identity of the American as against the Span-

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iard or the European, but the form and substance of this something new upon which the future political life of the people was to be reared had not been molded and the process of integration remains incomplete.

The character of the Latin American people is still being formed and a sense of inner identity and unity such as characterizes the Italian, the French or the English people is something that lies in the future. The king and crown of the Spanish past were unacceptable, and the local milieu, as Bolivar so clearly saw, would not tolerate an American monarchical system. But the milieu proved recalcitrant to all other forms of government. If it visibly rejected the rule of the absolute king, it also resisted and found unpalatable the ideas that derived from the French *philosophes* and United States constitutionalism.

The bitter and disorganized wars of independence, that had no central guidance, no official date of termination, and ended in no peace treaty, had shattered a great empire and stable government and led to a political vacuum and social disorganization. The end of the wars found Latin America divided in many separate countries, each in turn fractured into regional provinces governed by municipal oligarchies and ruled by local military *caudillos*. The king as the symbol of government had disappeared without leaving as substitute any other universally accepted idea around which a common loyalty could be evoked and in the name of which government could be carried on. The magic words of liberty, equality and fraternity fell on deaf ears and had a hollow sound, for the society remained stratified, and divided in *castas*. Neither the sacrifice nor the heroism of the wars of independence made the ideals of the French *philosophes* and American constitutionalism operative. For what had happened was that, of the two great public institutions—the crown and the church—the first had been destroyed and the second had been seriously weakened. The traditional sources of recognized authority were no longer sufficient. They were substituted for, because authority there has to be, by the informal and legally non-recognized rule of the plantation family associated with the local military. The hacienda with its control of acreages sometimes greater than a European principality became the effective source of local political power. The fact that the power it exercised had no basis in law was irrelevant to its effective rule of its own domain. With the hacienda went the control of hundreds and sometimes thou-

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sands of people. These retainers and *peones* provided a personal militia useful for defense and, if need be, for attack. By intermarriage, by the institution of *compradazgo* (godfatherhood), by alliances forged of mutual dependence and neighborliness, the plantation system ruled the region, and the leading landowner was "king of all he surveyed." The independence movement had substituted this locally effective but legally nonexistent means of rule and governance for the authority of the king it had destroyed.

The national governments in the early days were so busy trying to stay in power that they had little time to "govern." When there is a new rebellion to suppress every month, and when for many years there is annually a new "national" administration brought in by a new revolution, it is idle to talk about the details of governing—that fell naturally to those that had both stability and power locally. Someone had to protect the locality, its families and its animals, and they who could do that were in fact the governors even if not graced by the name or sanctioned by the requisite legal formula. A detailed description of the life of the older plantations would show it to be both a society and a government; and so it had to be, and so it remained during the nineteenth century, and to some extent so it is, or was until 1910 if not until 1930. There have been some changes—by revolution in Mexico, by the effect of new means of communication, industrialization, social theories, movements and agitation. But the plantation was until the day before yesterday, or the year before last, an economic, a social and a political system with powers of local rule and governance and with a powerful rôle in controlling the provincial and the national political systems. Only in Chile was this substantial fact recognized for what it was—a political force—and a government frankly designed to rest on the plantation family gave to that country peace and quiet through the years when the rest of Latin America was trying to build government upon an individualism that did not exist and upon ideas that had no local relevance.

The splintering of political authority and the rule of the local *caudillo* were fortified by a social stratification that has persisted in spite of the racial tolerance characteristic of Latin America. Certainly since the Independence, if not before, it has been possible, at least in some countries, for the pure-blooded Indian, like Juarez, to reach the highest office. There has been room for the exceptional individual who, by some magic, had shed his Indian

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ways and taken on the outlook and interests of the *criollo* (descendant of the Spaniards). It was possible for him to become a respected member of the non-Indian community. Very much the same thing may be said of the Negro. An age-old law defined him as a legal person and the rule of the Catholic Church identified him as a moral person. This made manumission relatively easy, and kept the social system sufficiently flexible to permit the abolition of slavery without violence and to allow for the acceptance of the ex-slave as a freeman rather than a freedman. This tolerance opened the doors to cultural participation and made possible important contributions by the Negro and the mulatto to art, architecture, music and literature. Latin American society has certainly been friendly to the non-European, and the Negro, at least, has long felt himself identified with the people in Latin America. This is in sharp contrast to the fear and isolation that for so long beset the Negro in many parts of the United States. But after all this has been said, it has to be added that Latin American society has remained stratified, immobile and, if a colonial expression may be used, divided into *castas*. These are relative statements, but compared to the United States there is noticeably less vertical mobility in Latin America. The countries vary among themselves. There is more mobility in Argentina, Southern Brazil and Cuba than there is in Ecuador or Colombia, and a great deal more than in Peru. But the rôle of the important family, the barrier made by wealth, race and occupation, is markedly obvious in its effect upon social mobility.

More important perhaps than the above sources of social stratification is division between country and city, between urban and rural. The city belongs to one world and the country to another. The capital of the country, like Mexico, Guatemala or Lima, will have all the modern conveniences, newspapers and universities, electric lights and refrigeration. But the little village in the country will in all likelihood have neither literacy nor shoes nor electric lights—it may not even have the Spanish language. More than that, the rural communities may have value systems of their own; their own inner hierarchy, their own sense of propriety, make them a world apart from the city, nation, state or government. A village of Trique Indians in Oaxaca, a Cakchiquel village in Guatemala, a Quetcha Indian village high in the mountains in the province in Ayacucho, has little in common with the world to which it officially belongs, and the political life of the

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"nation" remains an unrevealed mystery. They do not know the meaning of the activity called politics.

For these and many other reasons political leadership has been regional and personal. The local *caudillo* was secure from outside interventions and beyond the need of support from a "political party" because his power rested in the loyalty of an extended family, rich in lands and sure of the coöperation of neighboring towns entwined economically and socially with the dominant hacienda ownership. This leader was the "political party" in his region. The people were his. The phrase went "people of Don Pancho" or "of Don Pedro," or "of General Contreras;" there were no other people in the region—and the region might be larger than a good-sized state in the United States. In that area there was only one politician, one party, one loyalty. Everyone belonged to him, and all affairs, even the most personal, the most trivial, were brought to him for settlement and adjudication. He knew and tolerated no opposition, and no stranger could travel in the country without his explicit or implicit consent, for he controlled all the agencies of government, in so far as there were such agencies, including the tax gatherer, the judge, the sheriff, the schoolteacher and the local militia. He was the patron, the father, the judge, the protector of all "his people" and they were loyal to him. If he wanted to run for office, he could always be elected unanimously—for it would occur to no one to oppose him —and his politics did not matter. If he did not wish to run for office, his blessing was sufficient to elect anyone it was bestowed upon. In fact, his mere consent was equivalent to an election—with or without a counting of the votes. This *caudillo* could die but he could not be removed. He could be murdered, or driven from power by armed force coming from another part of the country under another *caudillo,* or by the national army controlled at the time by his enemies. But short of these exceptional circumstances, he enjoyed lifelong tenure and his place was secure and his rule absolute.

Under these and similar circumstances, the government could rest only upon the army, and the political party could be only personal. Admittedly, this is a somewhat overdrawn description if taken as applying universally to all parts of Latin America—but not so overdrawn as to be misleading. Admittedly, too, this is a picture of rural rather than urban social, economic and political structure. But Latin America is rural, and the urban has been

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deeply influenced by this leadership design of the countryside. In the smaller mestizo towns and cities this influence is immediate and visible—because the "family" and its many ramifying alliances fill the important places and are conspicuous in the economic and social life of the community. To an extent hard for New Yorkers to understand, but not so difficult for people in Charleston, South Carolina, or Richmond, Virginia, the important families rule the state, and not only socially. Lima and Quito are good examples of what I am trying to say. But Popayan, Mendoza and Bahia would be even better examples of a rule over the town by families whose roots are in the country. National politics were shaped by the antagonisms and alliances among these regional *caudillos* and their extended families.

Since 1910 a number of influences have tended to change this picture. Better communication, increased literacy, a growing industry, a larger middle class, a trade union movement, the impact of such exotic ideas as Fascism and Communism, the great rôle of a strident nationalism, the criticisms of and legislative attacks upon the *latifundia,* the very rapid expansion of the large cities with their tendency to dissolve the older family loyalties and dependencies, the wealth produced in some places by oil, minerals and large investments in agricultural enterprises—these have, taken together, weakened the rôle of the regional *caudillo* and the dominion of his imperious family. Another reason for his lessening power and prestige has been the acquisition of more efficient arms by the government in power. This has tended to weaken the "democratic" impact of regions against the national *caudillo* who has the machine guns, the tanks and the airplanes so generously provided him by the United States on the assumption that it was in the interest of the defense of continental democracy—but for the time being helping to perpetuate the self-elected ruler in the control of the government. Under the circumstances, political parties continue to be personal.

The trade unions have made some differences, but they, too, are largely dominated or controlled by the government in power. Presumably, the middle class has interests of its own and would —or should—have independent political aspirations that manifest themselves in political activity. But the middle class, like the trade unions, is so much under the thumb of the administration and so beholden to the government for favors received that it has in fact no effective means of opposing the administration. The

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mass of the people in most places are beyond the political horizon —they do not vote, are indifferent to the election, and in many instances, especially in the Andean countries, unaware of the nature and meaning of the political process. It must by now be clear that the government rests upon the army and why it can in fact rest upon nothing else. In the Andean countries at least, the local leadership, which was the natural foundation of political power in the past, has not been adequately substituted for. From some points of view, the political foundations in Latin America are weaker and less stable than they were, because nothing so clearly representative of a region or a class or an interest has replaced the local leadership.

Under the circumstances, the president of the country must be the author of his own political party and must unite about himself the group with which he governs. Once in office, he can brook no opposition because disagreement is a challenge to the power of the president and not to his policies. All dissent leads in the direction of revolution, and criticism is taken as a prelude to political violence. The president must make all the decisions, even the most trivial. He must rule the army, the civil service, the judiciary, the legislature, the universities and the economy. And with the current penchant for increasing governmental participation in the economic affairs of the nation, the president is ever more competent to favor his supporters and to punish his opponents. He must and does control the national and the local elections. No governor of a state can come to office against his will or remain in office against his wishes. The frequent use of the constitutional provision for "intervention" in Argentina and Brazil, and the equally effective powers exercised through the permanent committee of the congress in Mexico, make that clear enough. What holds true of a governor also applies to the election of members of congress and of the Senate. The power of the president is pervasive and nothing escapes it completely, not even the judiciary.

In addition, the president must decide who is going to succeed him, and he must be able to enforce that decision or face a revolution. This is true whether there is an official governmental party, as in the case of Mexico and Argentina, or not. The president will either choose his successor and place him in power, even if he decides to succeed himself, or someone else will make that choice and overthrow the régime to make sure of the election.

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This is the most important political decision of the president and will affect his ability to pass on the executive powers peacefully to his successor. The more peaceful the election, the larger the officially announced vote, the quieter and the more democratic the electoral process seems, the more effectively has the original decision been carried out. Doubtful governors will have been removed, the police heads changed, the army's loyalty made sure of, the control of the voting machinery securely placed in proper hands and the final result known long before the formal decision-making process has been set in motion. That is why opposition parties frequently refuse to participate in the voting. They, like everyone else, know the outcome in advance and have no desire to lend moral sanction to an executive decision by taking part in the election. If, however, they do participate, it is in the hope that some accident—a rebellion or division of the army—will upset the official plan and a revolution will pave the way for their own candidate. One could point to Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile and possibly Brazil as exceptions, but both Chile and Brazil have relatively recent histories that would neatly fit into the electoral process just described. The recent history of Bolivia is in some ways an exception. The government in power failed because of ineffective executive leadership to produce an electoral majority, the army took over the government, and a revolution based upon the miners and the urban workers ousted the army. But the entire electoral apparatus as revealed in the election of 1951 involved for all parties only 50,000 voters out of a population of more than 3,500,000. The parties do not represent the people—they represent the leaders.

In fact, party organization does not attempt to embrace the mass of the people and there is no experience that would lead a political party to the idea that it needs to be based upon the local communities, representing local interests meeting together to hammer out national policy. If one excepts Colombia, Chile, Uruguay and Cuba, it might be questioned whether there are, in fact, any political parties in Latin America that fit any meaningful definition. The APRA is a movement rather than a party. The Fascist and the Communist "organizations" are exotic groupings that may have significant political consequences but they are not describable as political parties; they are organized from the top down, have centralized control and discipline, and lack the local spontaneity so essential to representative political

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activity. The intellectuals in Latin America are an important political influence but they are not organized, have no power and serve a purely critical and negative function.

II

This bleak political panorama leaves little room for an optimistic formula on how to establish democratic and representative government in Latin America. What then is to be done—if anything effective can be done—in the face of a personal leadership tradition and a tenaciously stratified social system? The first need is to draw the people into political activity, and these are mainly rural rather than urban folk. In most of the countries, 50 to 80 percent of the people live in country villages, and many of the seemingly urban communities are essentially rural in their outlook, interest and activities. More important is the fact that the rural folk are, in the Andean area, in Central America and in Mexico, *communal* rather than individualistic. The concept of the individual as the base of the political party system, so characteristic of the United States, is not really applicable to vast areas in Latin America. If we are going to talk of effective participation in politics by the mass of the people in most of Latin America, we must recognize that we are talking about isolated and often highly integrated rural communities possessed of an internally tenacious value system. These communities must become part of the political party system if the parties are to represent the mass of the people or become instruments of effective democratic governments. But it will be hard to come by these aims.

In the Andean countries, with the possible exception of Venezuela, in Central America and in Mexico, the special character of Latin American rural organization, so largely neglected by intellectuals and politicians, hampers the easy development of effective political parties. The individual peasant-*ranchero* is a relatively rare specimen; perhaps not more than 5 percent of the total rural population and certainly not as high as 10 percent live on individual small farms which they own. One needs to make an exception here of Costa Rica and the highlands of Venezuela and parts of Colombia, but in countries like Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and to a lesser extent in other places, the people live either in hacienda communities or in free villages. And these villages, as suggested above, are isolated from the nation politically, socially and to a very considerable extent

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culturally. In vast areas they are Indian rather than European, and even the mestizo villages are often immersed in an Indian rather than European cultural milieu. These rural communities live on the fringe of the monetary economy. They build their own houses, weave their own clothes, raise their own food, make their own utensils, and what they secure from the outside comes through a parochial market from other villages and frequently by barter. Many have little or no knowledge of the Spanish language, they are illiterate, and those who can read have neither newspapers nor books. They are in fact nonparticipants in the affairs of the nation.

These communities are the actual base of the nation, whatever city folk may think of the matter, and the future of the Latin American countries will be largely shaped by the changes that occur in these little human groupings. Mexico alone has over 100,000 rural villages. In countries where the hacienda system remains in full vigor, the problem is complicated by the fact that a majority of these villages may be located within the confines of the plantation and have no possibilities for independent political life and no room for initiative in their own community affairs. They can neither build a school, hire a teacher nor freely shape their own agricultural activities. We have no statistics for the distribution of the rural communities between the free and the plantation, but it would require great boldness to suggest that less than 50 percent of the inhabited places in Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Guatemala, not to mention other countries, are not located within hacienda boundaries. The point is worth stressing because it complicates the attempt to integrate the rural folk into the political life of the nation. To bring these communities to participate in the active political parties is difficult enough and the plantations make it more so—perhaps make it impossible. The preliminary to the growth of peaceful and representative government in Latin America is the disintegration of the present hacienda system. This may for many reasons prove neither possible nor practical. If so, then hopes for democratic government in Latin America are dim indeed.

But the plantation system is not the only thing that stands in the way. The cultural isolation of the rural community is equally effective as an obstacle to the growth of national representative government. This isolation, as the people working on the Point Four program know, makes the community apathetic and indif-

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ferent, almost unaware of the nation. The major single issue in the political destiny of Latin America is to bridge this gap between the rural Indian and mestizo community and the nation. This can be done only with an adequate system of rural education. At best, it will take—even with heroic effort—generations of unremitting devotion to the task.

The successful pursuit of this task requires a new vision of the nation itself—a nation of thousands of free, economically competent and culturally developed rural communities. The stability and well-being of the nation must be seen as depending upon the initiative and leadership shown by these villages. Latin American nations—at least the nations facing the Pacific—are multicellular, and each cell is frequently a community with its own value system. These communities have to be developed as such. The emphasis has to be on the group and not on the individual in the group. The needs of the community determine the school curriculum. The available resources are the raw materials which the school must use in its program, for in the long run it has no others. It needs to be remembered that a rural community has a fixed habitat—the mountains, the woods, the earth, the spring, brook, river or lake are given, and little can be done to change them. If the community is to achieve the good life, it must do so in *that* place—for there is no magic to move the mountain or change the course of the river. The climate, too, is given. The heat, moisture and rain are what they are, and man must find the skills and the wisdom to abide in comfort within the limitations nature has provided. Literacy may be useful, but habits, techniques, practical wisdom that derives from experience, and the special knowledge modern science can offer, are more immediately effective.

The question to be resolved is how to fit what modern science has to offer into this specific and limited environment. How to use and conserve the resources, how to keep the soil from eroding, how to purify the water, how to drain the swamp, or how to irrigate the land with the available waters and with the little means at the disposal of the community, how to make two blades of wheat grow where only one was grown before, how to increase the yield from the stalk of corn, how to select the new fruits that could thrive in the specific place, how to prune the tree, how to protect it from disease, how to conserve and use the fruit, how to build a good house out of the available stone, clay or bamboo,

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how to improve the diet by growing vegetables that will not wither or die, how to tap the underground for water in a desert area, how to make new uses of the local fibres, how to improve the weaving, how to design and cut a dress, how to improve the cooking, how to breed good pigs, how to smoke, salt or otherwise conserve the meat, how to improve the cattle of the village and how to adapt the hundred different possible uses of milk. All of these activities and a thousand more are the legitimate curricula of the rural school, not to mention the town band, the arts and crafts, and, if one lets his imagination go, the reading of good fiction and poetry.

The program of the school is how to discover the ways to the good life within the place where the community is located and with the available resources—for there are no others, and even the best of governments can do little to substitute for what nature has provided. The emphasis must be on creativity rather than on book learning. The school becomes the House of the People that is open from sunrise to the middle of the night. For the life of the community itself is mirrored in the school's activities. The children are there, but so are the women folk who use the school sewing machine or school medicine chest or consult the teacher who is a practical nurse; and the men are there when not at work to learn how to read or to use the tools from the school carpenter shop, or to discuss one of the many questions that arise every day of the year. The emphasis is upon the development of local leadership and the tapping of the tradition of coöperation imbedded in the rural community. Everything is done coöperatively. The school is built by the community with its own labor, all taking part, including the women and children. And every activity has to have its committee, its mutual responsibility, its special leadership, its special discussion. The school has to be built and largely maintained by the community, for the simple fact is that the governments do not have the financial resources out of which to build the schools, equip them and pay the teachers as well. *If it cannot be done by the communities it will remain undone.* Even in Mexico, where such heroic efforts have been made to develop a rural school system, at least half the children of school age are not going to school, and this is probably an understatement. In fact, the villages must learn to build and maintain their rural schools as they once built and maintained their rural churches; otherwise, the dream of a matured and self-confident rural community will

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remain a dream and representative democracy an unfulfilled hope.

III

It is easy enough to pose the issue in these—shall I say, romantic?—terms. It is difficult to visualize a realistic effort to meet the challenge the rural community represents. For one thing, this kind of program requires an almost religious devotion to the idea of an independent and mature rural community. Such a devotion to a rural ideal is hard to find and difficult to generate. Latin American intellectuals are urban and not rural minded. They are filled with the ideal of literary rather than practical education, and they simply do not know their own rural community and are on the whole indifferent to it. They do not see that the strength of the society and its stability requires a healthy and vigorous rural basis which in the Andean areas means thousands of self-sufficient rural villages.

What is true of the intellectuals is in most cases even truer of the governments. The government bureaucracy is urban minded and preoccupied with the large city. The capital of the country crowds all other communities to the very thin edge of the bureaucratic conscience. And equally serious is the fact that such a program cannot be developed in a country where the large plantation is the dominant rural institution. Unless the government has an effective agrarian policy, it cannot have an effective program of rural education—and the first may, for political reasons, be impossible and the second appear undesirable.

But even where the intellectuals—or some of them and the government as well—have a commitment to building a healthy multi-cellular nation based upon rural communities, the difficulties are so great as to seem almost insurmountable. The program of bringing these commitments and their leadership into the nation will require many years of continuing effort in the *same* direction. There is, to begin with, the lack of funds—a chronic state of affairs and, except for a windfall as in the case of Venezuela, not visibly remedial. But even with funds, where are the teachers to come from? The ordinary teachers' training courses do not prepare for the thousand needs and skills essential for the rural community. And worst, perhaps, teachers raised in an urban environment, unless moved by missionary zeal, find the rural community—where no Spanish is spoken, where there are no electric

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lights, no moving picture houses, and no newspapers—a place of exile. To be a rural schoolteacher in these surroundings calls for a high degree of self-sacrifice and devotion to an ideal. The Mexicans have tried to meet this difficulty by developing the Cultural Mission which, by periodically bringing the poorly trained rural schoolteachers together, gives them a renewed stimulus, additional training and a feeling of working on a task of national importance. A fully staffed and wisely administered rural normal school so placed as to train teachers for a given rural environment with similar problems would meet part of the difficulty, but only if it succeeded, which is almost impossible, in imparting many skills without so changing the habits and attitudes of its students as to make them wish for an escape to the city, which unfortunately is too often the case.

But all these obstacles are perhaps secondary to what is after all the major difficulty—to make the educational efforts constructive rather than disruptive of the life of the rural community, where prejudices are tenacious, values noncommercial and noncompetitive, and where the local mores are something apart from the urban and sophisticated world whence the educational impulse must come in the first instance. To be useful, the teacher, the administrator, must learn respect for the idiosyncratic cultural traits of the rural folk as a preliminary to the acceptance and trust without which nothing useful can be done. The emphasis must be upon building new habits, attitudes and institutions inside the rim of an older culture complex and not against it. It must always be borne in mind that the new habit or institution must make its way and be absorbed by the community, that changes must come from the inside, from accommodation, and not be forced. That if this can be accomplished, then there are vast resources of possible coöperation, initiative and leadership to be had. But confidence and good will must first be won, and they can be had only if the administrators and the teachers can accept the communities as moral entities with their own integrated value systems.

We have had some useful experience in this matter, most of it in Mexico where the rural education endeavor dates back to at least 1923. Here, however, the original impulse derived from a social upheaval that emphasized the needs of the rural community and the worthwhileness of the rural population. But even here some of the original impulse has been lost: impatience and

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too much sophistication have, as they always do, borne their usual fruit—skepticism and indifference. But the experience did show that when given the opportunity, thousands of rural communities not only built their own schools but took on, with an almost childlike faith, the many new responsibilities that the school brought.

It still remains a question whether such a program is sufficient for the purpose of bringing the communities into the political life of the nation. In some way the leadership developed in the rural communities must become related to or identified with the leadership of the larger world, and the schoolteachers and the inevitably bureaucratic personnel of a Department of Education are not the real leaders of either the community or the nation as a whole. General Lazaro Cardenas has recently initiated a voluntary effort by active people in the region about Uruapan, in the state of Michoacan, each of whom adopted a rural community as his special interest and responsibility. The individual in a sense is elected as the *padrino*-godfather of the village and takes on the rôle, establishing contact for the community with the larger world. He is the adviser and consultant, the guide and the counselor of his village, and tries to help it work out its own problems. This is an initial effort. It is nongovernmental. There are about 40 such individuals, each of whom has adopted and been accepted by a community. The undertaking has to remain nonpolitical, nonbureaucratic, and take on a missionary flavor. A meeting of these 40 people represents a cross section of the best available skills and scientific knowledge in the region. The group contains doctors, lawyers, engineers, chemists, agronomists, foresters, specialists in cattle, in fruit culture, and so on. The scientific and cultural resources of the group are impressive. And at the meeting which I attended it was interesting to see that these men would call on each other for help. One man said to another, "I have a water problem that my village does not know how to deal with. You know about these things. Could you come and spend a day with me?" It was evident that here were substantial resources that could be tapped in behalf of any one community. Equally important, here were possible contacts with the active leaders of the larger world.

If one could assume that the effort will persist, that it will not become bureaucratized, that it will develop into a kind of missionary movement, then perhaps we have the opening of a way

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towards bridging the gap between the rural community and the nation. But so many unresolved questions face the project that it will be a miracle if it fulfills even part of the promise it carries.

And any such program, difficult in itself, would have to hurdle two stubborn "states of mind" so deeply imbedded that they are likely to survive whatever political changes the winds may blow across Latin America. It would require the toleration of increased local independence and the devolution of the tax system so as to give the localities an increasing measure of income. As things stand at present, and have stood from time immemorial, the central government absorbs most of the available income and leaves a pittance to the states and the municipalities. Everyone expects it to be that way and local officials beg hat in hand as a favor what they could have had on their own if the tax were differently distributed. I would like to believe myself wrong in this characterization—for it will largely determine the prospect of political stability in Latin America—but the one revolution that has no advocates, no parties and no prospects is the one that would strengthen the parish, the township, the county and the state at the expense of the central government. And yet without such a change, neither the rural education we have been suggesting nor the political party to which it is antecedent can fully make its way.

The other "state of mind" is the well-nigh universal expectancy of centralized control and guidance of the economic and social life of the nation. The tradition of governmental regulation and "planning" antedates the Independence and is so much part of the milieu that all political credos take it for granted. The idea of planning, seemingly so new and so revolutionary, is congenial even to the most conservative Latin Americans, for to them the notion is old and inevitable. The government must do everything, for no one else will. That is the conviction and the expectancy. The friends of Latin American democracy who look to the planning of the economy as a means towards political stability and representative democracy will, to their disillusionment, discover that they have strengthened the central political machine at the expense of the localities and increased the barriers to representative government and political stability. The route out of the dilemma lies in the growth of local and national institutions with resilience enough to survive the all-absorbing tendency of the central government. But that growth will be slow and painful.

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AFRICAN DILEMMAS

By Cornelis W. de Kiewiet

AFRICA is headed for great political changes. The trend of events is inexorably towards an adjustment of relations between the native population and its European rulers. The manner and the framework in which these changes take place will be of considerable interest to American foreign policy.

The Central African Federation, which came into being in 1953, precipitated a controversy over the wisdom and justice of federating or consolidating a number of hitherto separate political units. In my opinion all such movements in Africa deserve to be viewed with sympathy since they reduce the menace of separatism and fragmentation in the continent of the future. We have all the historical evidence that is needed of the wisdom of creating, however imperfectly and artificially in the beginning, the largest reasonable political and economic areas.

In Asia, history has already imposed an almost complete veto on the continuance of the traditional colonial relationships. In Africa, it has approved a more rapid modification of them than even very keen observers thought possible a short generation ago. On both sides of the Iron Curtain there is agreement that the nineteenth century is dead and a new chapter has been opened in the traditional areas of colonial and imperial activities. Both Soviet Russia and the United States have deep-seated objections to the traditional colonial systems, even though the historical causes of such objections are different and the two national policies pursue widely different goals. Political aspirations in Africa are consistent with modern forces so powerful that thoughtful men throughout the West know that it will be wise to give them discriminating coöperation. It is not too late to create larger and economically more viable areas in order to accommodate the new order towards which various parts of Africa are reaching.

Americans are trying today to assess the strategic place of the African continent in the great international crisis in which they are involved. It is very easy to see that access to Africa would be absolutely vital in the deployment of American offensive power in another world war. American power has lost strategic access to Asia as a result of the rise of Russia, the hostility of China and

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

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the neutralism of India. Its ability to maintain a firm foothold in Western Europe is open to question. Great Britain almost lost control of the Mediterranean in the last war; in another war, the security of the Mediterranean is far from certain. Because of its geographical relationship to the highways of the Mediterranean, to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and to the oil fields of the Middle East, Africa would immediately become part of the global front line in the event of war. If the influence of the West continues to deteriorate in Egypt and the Arab areas generally, East Africa in particular would be an indispensable staging area.

All of this sounds as if the United States has an African policy. If we mean by policy a consistent body of convictions and aims concerning Africa, then the United States has no African policy. Many of the policy statements that have been made read like exercises in double talk. Critics of the United States, Marxist or not, seize upon them as proof of American hypocrisy. The truth is that the African policy of the United States is split down the middle by a stubborn and troublesome contradiction between immediate strategic and ultimate historic interests.

American history has taken a deep set against the subordination of colonial peoples to distant metropolitan powers. Yet the metropolitan powers, together with their colonies and fortified places, are America's principal allies. As a people we have not fully faced up to the contradictions in which these separate interests involve us. The Second World War produced a number of power vacuums. The British withdrawal from India and the collapse of the French and Dutch positions in Southeast Asia and the East Indies produced something like a power vacuum in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. A comparable vacuum was created in the Far Pacific by the defeat of Japan. The Russian-Chinese bloc is determined to enter the vacuum in the Far Pacific and Southeast Asia, while Russia is pressing heavily upon a line running roughly from the western Baltic by way of its satellites to the Black Sea and Iran. The United States is struggling to prevent a disastrous Communist penetration of this immense line which begins in the Baltic and ends in Korea.

In one sense it may be true to say that the United States has entered the paths of imperialism by taking over a large part of the costly and dangerous function of maintaining the major lines of communication and defense against Communist expansion. Although it did so largely without the advantage of actual terri-

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torial ownership and political control it has nevertheless inherited some of the appearances and functions of a metropolitan power. The political and historical ideal of independence for subject peoples and the strategic need for dependable bases and safe lines of communication dwell together in American foreign policy like two unwedded persons who hope that the outside world will not observe too closely their unnatural intimacy or the pretenses which necessarily result. The liberal and liberating impulses of the American Revolution struggle to find a working compromise with the American responsibility for preventing the collapse of the democratic world under Communist pressure.

American public opinion is very prone to analysis by slogan and platitude, and some of the slogans and platitudes commonly applied to colonial issues are simply shortcuts to misunderstanding. A special word of caution is necessary against the assumption, very common in both Great Britain and America, that the movements toward federation and consolidation in the British territories are primarily devices to reinforce the economic and political control of the white minorities.

There is, to begin with, no substantial reason for leaving the integration of peoples and territories to native Pan African movements. There is general unrest on the continent, but it is not bound together by a real sense of common cause. Talk of Pan Africanism is confined to a few intellectuals who have discovered the equivalent concept in European history. Communication between native leaders in the different regions is inadequate and often totally wanting. Even Communism has not fashioned meaningful bonds.

II

Africa south of the Sahara has no early golden age of achievement which it can invoke as justification for resisting an aggressive outer world, no proud classical tradition which it can use as a native framework on which to build a modern existence. When the first Europeans came to Africa they found no great fused cultural systems that held people together over wide areas. Africa south of the Sahara has always been poor and powerless. The political and cultural emptiness of the African past is the key to any understanding of the continent's present problems. Africa is as incapable of generating its own renaissance as it is incapable of generating the capital needed to finance for all its peoples

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even the lowest standard of living that could still be called modern.

In the cultural poverty and historical emptiness of Africa there is, however, some potential advantage. There are no ancient and deep philosophic and religious contradictions such as divide India from China, or the Mediterranean shore of North Africa and the Levant from the neighboring European shore. Africa has its hates, of course, but they are local and tribal. New political and cultural combinations in Africa are entirely possible. That is why federation movements make sense.

The present article has its principal focus upon the future—the shape of things to come in Africa, a long span of historical development. It assumes that Africa has finally entered the stream of change that is coursing so strongly in most of the non-Western world, and that therefore there is need to consider closely what will be the African territorial and political units in the future. Federation and consolidation can be important allies of effective modernization, for they produce a diversified framework on which viable states may be built. Parliamentary statutes and constitutional instruments such as created the Central African Federation are not an answer in themselves. They acquire meaning only to the extent that they have available the means and instruments of modern progress and can apply them to meet the needs of their populations.

British colonial policy for more than a hundred years has shown an almost instinctive ability to recognize the moment when it was no longer wise to defer grants of self-government. When the colony had adequately consolidated its territory, established enough stability in its finances, acquired enough political experience and developed a sufficiently diversified economic and social pattern to carry the burden of autonomy, then autonomy was almost always granted. In much of Africa the demands for political change are arising ahead of the implicit time schedule which British colonial experience has followed. This is another way of saying that the territorial arrangements and the sum of available skills, experience and modern social virtues are still markedly less adequate than was considered safe and reliable in earlier grants of autonomy.

In America, self-government and independence came at the end of a long period of training and growth within the British Empire. This training and growth produced more than politicians

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and polemicists. Self-government was possible in 1783 because by that time the Thirteen Colonies possessed a body of men experienced in diversified fields. In addition to politicians, they had bankers and preachers, teachers and merchants, successful farmers and skilled craftsmen, lawyers and civil servants, editors and authors. Though the new nation did not yet have the great and varied body of skills of England or France it had them in sufficient degree to meet the burdens of self-rule.

In our own generation, similar comments can be made regarding the grant of self-rule to India, but with several qualifications which throw light upon Africa's problems. Modern autonomous India is substantially the creation of British rule which from Clive to the Indian Mutiny labored to consolidate the separate principalities of eighteenth century India, giving its diverse populations the framework and institutions to support a viable modern state. The fact that consolidation was not complete by the time the British withdrew was largely the result of the impact of the Indian Mutiny upon the liberal England of Richard Cobden and John Bright. From that moment British rule was extremely careful not to lay violent or abrupt hands upon Indian customs and institutions, and the process which had been eliminating internal frontiers never regained its former momentum. The result was that 90 years later an independent India had to finish the task of political and territorial consolidation. The Indian Mutiny had another and more far-reaching consequence. Late Victorian England was unwilling to accentuate the secularizing impact of the Western World upon the whole complex of superstition, backwardness, bigotry, discrimination and medievalism which Indian religious life tended to foster. This unfinished business of history hangs over modern India, and no man can tell how much commotion and tragedy may be caused by the unavoidable pressures to which India must subject her ancient ways of life in order to acquire her full share of science, technology and economic development.

There is so much unfinished business in Africa that the trained and experienced observer shudders at the thought that the temper of the times may precipitate major political decisions which the continent is unprepared to make. The traditional American conviction that independence and self-government are a good in themselves must be tempered by the recognition that their meaning and effectiveness are in proportion to the ability of people to

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sustain them. What this means, bluntly, is that Africa south of the Sahara still needs the West, its capital, skills, political experience and very certainly its industrial leadership.

A society has a better chance of achieving political maturity if it possesses a reasonable degree of modern skills and literacy; and to maintain itself and grow it must be productive enough to generate its own capital or else be held in sufficient confidence to be able to attract capital from abroad. In the United States we must generate between four and five thousand dollars of new capital to guarantee our present standard of living to each addition to our population through birth or immigration. In this connection Africa must face some hard and stubborn facts. Africa is poor, very poor, and the fact that it has the greatest gold, diamond and uranium mines of the world does not significantly modify the statement. Right now, most of Africa south of the Sahara is not rich or productive enough to give all of its indigenous population anything approaching a Western standard of living, not even on the lowest levels of the Spanish or Greek peasantry. Outside the few industrialized centers, Africa generates new capital in utterly insignificant amounts. What the former Governor of Kenya, Sir Philip Mitchell, said of that colony in 1946 is widely applicable: "The ignorance, inexpertness and low productivity of native agriculture provide a totally inadequate foundation for an enlightened state of society, a high standard of living, and elaborate social services . . ." Without more productive and efficient native economy "a great deal of modern talking and writing about colonial development and welfare is moonshine."

Since the African economy is predominantly agrarian it has all the well-known characteristics of backward agrarian communities. Diet is poor; the incidence of disease is high; life expectancy is low. The effective working life of a man may be as low as 15 or 20 years. Due to the influence of the West, cash needs for taxes and consumer goods weigh on the population out of all proportion to their ability to produce or to earn. In Kenya an annual cash income equivalent to $60 is very unusual. In Natal which is very much richer the average native income barely reaches $60 per annum. Government revenues of $10 per annum per capita of the native population would be remarkably high in most African territories. A rural family does well if it can feed itself. A country's standard of living rises when the supply of goods and

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services rises more rapidly than the population. In Africa the ratio between population and production is normally so unfavorable that the African cannot begin to generate the capital to finance the costs of an adequate diet, proper shelter, and sufficient medical and educational services, not to speak of the roads and communications which are the first of all African needs. Contrary to "scientific" Marxist analysis, ideas and institutions are ahead of the technological and material equipment of society. This is a root cause of the modern dilemma.

Further modifications in native life and custom are inevitable and part of the price of progress. To anybody who has any knowledge of the ignominy, poverty, congestion and tragedy that smite the conscience in Nairobi or Johannesburg, these remarks could sound very sinister and callous. The rotting of tribal life and the rottenness of much of the resulting urban life are the deplorable consequence of a modern economic enterprise which has been insufficiently attentive to the human beings whose hands at the same time that they dug the mines tore apart the familiar fabric of their own lives. Yet the way out is not to eliminate capital and industrial enterprise. The cause of the degradation is also the principal source of relief. The time has gone by when the land can be the sole economic support of the African people or tribal governance the appropriate form of political life. A significant proportion of the population has been drawn into pursuits that are the direct result of European economic activity. In some areas 70 percent of the adult males earn an important part of their income working for Europeans. This detachment from their original tribal and agrarian condition cannot be reversed. The plea that the African must have more land, or better land, or better conditions for working it, is still justified, but along with this plea must also go recognition that he cannot vacate his place as a worker and wage earner in the industrial and economic environment created by Western enterprise.

The familiar indictment that Africa has been exploited is in one sense misleading. One of Africa's great troubles is really under exploitation—in the favorable sense, of course, of applying capital, science and skill to national resources. Progress involves the continuance of Western influence upon the life and labor of the native population. This means more mining, not less; more industrial development; and certainly not a return to a simple and primitive rural economy. It also means, maybe above every-

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thing else, more roads, in which most of Africa is desperately deficient. The great revolution Africa needs is a better network of roads and communications. The total amount of capital and skill required for even a modest improvement in roads, public amenities, health services and education is significant. It is unavailable to Africa unless the West, which today must include the United States, helps to provide it.

Capitalist enterprise in Africa must learn to yield or be compelled to yield a greater share of its benefits to the native population. Individual enterprises in Africa have sometimes shown both wisdom and generosity in providing valuable benefits, especially for their employees. As matters stand generally in Africa, however, the authority of the state is necessary to see to it that the total community shares in the profit of modern enterprise. To do so effectively, it is important that the state be as large and diversified as conditions permit. Federation should improve the conditions for capital investment, for the rational application of money and skill to industrial enterprise, and for the orderly application of the benefits of industrial enterprise to the population. Let it be repeated that in our day it is no longer acceptable that the African should be the rightless and suffering victim of Western enterprise or even that his gain should be an unplanned and incidental by-product. Mining developments, for example, cannot be favored enclaves within a surrounding wilderness; as in civilized lands, they must contribute to the general welfare of the society in which they exist. General welfare means more than roads and health, more than cash incomes and schools; it means also dignity and justice, above all a voice for the "emergent" African in the conduct of human affairs. By these things history will judge the territories and governments of Africa.

III

The arguments in support of federation and consolidation have a very broad application in Africa. The Central African Federation between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is an accomplished fact. Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika are betwixt and between, under the general supervision of a High Commissioner, but blocked at the moment from closer federation by a number of stubborn political and historical factors. To some readers it will no doubt be disconcerting to recognize that the Union of South Africa's policy towards Southwest Africa, Be-

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chuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland is the logical continuation of the acts of consolidation that created the Union itself.[1]

The Central African Federation is a very critical experiment. Its success or failure, which must be measured very largely in terms of the welfare and progress of the native population, will be a definitive chapter in modern African history and would be most likely to influence the course of events in East Africa and even in the Union of South Africa. At this point some concessions are in order. One must frankly admit that the federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland places power in the hands of the white population which could be used against the interests of the native population. On paper and in the minds of its really enthusiastic supporters, it purports to initiate an effort to associate natives and Europeans in the government of the Federation and to set in train developments which in the indefinite future will give equality to civilized men of both races. Many of the natives who stubbornly resisted federation to the bitter end did so in the conviction that federation actually increased the chances that, in spite of the announced program of multi-racial coöperation, a rigid rule of white over black will ultimately be established. Most native leaders are openly distrustful of federation. Their fear is that the economic improvements promised by federation will mean more European immigrants, more overcrowding and less land for the natives, more taxes, more pressure to leave their inefficient land to work for the white man, without any really substantial improvement in their political and economic status.

Historically, Southern Rhodesia was first settled by men who came from the Cape Colony. As far back as 1930 the Land Apportionment Act openly accepted the segregationist assumption that Europeans and Africans should live as separate societies in their own areas. The Southern Rhodesian Sedition Act of 1936 was based upon the South African Sedition Act, and was invoked almost entirely against native agitators and malcontents. Thoroughly familiar to Rhodesians is the principle of the South African Urban Areas Act which rules that natives in European urban areas are transients without permanent domicile. Although land is provided in the native reserves of Southern Rhodesia more

[1] The feelings provoked by *apartheid* policies have distracted our attention from the frustrations of separatism in South Africa before the Boer War, and from some of the brilliant results of unification.

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generously than in the Union, the fact remains that in extent and quality it is insufficient. The economy of the Southern Rhodesian reserves is a deficit economy, and their native inhabitants are pumped by economic necessity into employment in mines, factories and European households. There is a depressing record in Southern Rhodesia of economic and social discrimination against the natives, their cattle and crops.

The European settlers in the Central African Federation follow events in Kenya and South Africa with the closest interest. There is much positive sympathy with the determination of the average Kenya settler to maintain his superior economic and political status. The segregationist policies of the Confederate Party which lost the election in December 1953 arose from many of the same fears and convictions which sustain South African *apartheid.* The average English-speaking settler in the new Central African Federation does not love the Afrikaner and still less the government of Mr. Strydom. Yet it is a mistake to assume that the gospel of *apartheid* is the peculiar belief of Dutch-speaking South Africans. In a somewhat less extreme and doctrinaire form, ideas of separation and segregation are common amongst English-speaking settlers in Southern and Northern Rhodesia. Native policy will remain the central issue in the Central African Federation. The flow of ideas and events from Kenya and South Africa will continue to influence the politics of the Federation. Whether the liberal guarantees and assurances made on behalf of the constitution will take root and grow into greater economic and political opportunities for the 6,000,000 natives is an open question. It is not impossible that Central Africa may move into the orbit of South African *apartheid.*

It is far more difficult to speak with assurance about the issue of federation in East Africa. In South Africa unification was the aftermath of war. In Central Africa, the prestige of the British government, fear of South African extremism and republicanism, the absence of a compact Indian population, and the preponderance of the English over the Dutch population, all coöperated to make possible a practical decision in favor of the federation experiment. Although the theoretical case for closer integration between Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika is every bit as strong as in the two other areas, the concrete objections are more difficult to surmount.

East Africa is peculiar in that each of the racial groups—Afri-

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can, European and Indian—has a special territorial and political bastion from which to assert its separate interests. Historical agreements and deliberate policy have given Uganda a virtual charter to the effect that the present rights and the future prospects of the black man are paramount. Native thought and feeling in Uganda are aggressively opposed to giving any more room on the land or under the law to white men or to Indians. In Kenya, the Mau Mau crisis has reinforced the feeling that under federation the white settlers would have to make major and damaging political and economic concessions. In Tanganyika, influential Indian opinion is convinced that it would be folly at the present juncture to give up the special bargaining power provided by the separate status of Tanganyika as a mandated territory. In 1951 I listened to a prominent Indian leader frankly assert that the correct policy for Indians was to resist closer federation between Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika in order not to obscure the special claim, not merely of local Indians but also of India, to settlement and opportunity in East Africa. India has already assumed the rôle of spokesman for the Indian population of East and South Africa. The concept of a more active relationship between India and East Africa is very appealing to a small but energetic group of East African Indians who see India as the proper heir to the opportunities which are opening up in this area. The first murmurs have already been heard that a nation like India which must grow 700,000 tons more grain each year simply to keep up with the growth of its own population may be forced to look about for more *Lebensraum*. In spite of her present neutralism, there is a latent and implicit imperialism in India that could be shocked into action not only over Kashmir or Pakistan or the exigencies of her economic development but also over Indian "nationals" in Africa. Active and hostile action over these issues is not thought to be inconsistent with India's general emphasis upon pacifism or neutralism.

In East Africa, as in Central and South Africa, there is no real prospect that the Europeans, Asians and Africans will follow the patterns of miscegenation and assimilation which in parts of Latin America are producing new fused societies. Almost from the beginning the Spaniards and Portuguese yielded enough of the hospitality of church, home and blood to obscure any hard line of separation between Europeans, Africans and the native Indian. By contrast, the record of African settlement is marked

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by the inhospitality of church, home and blood to the native peoples. Some of the severest problems of the areas under discussion are caused by the existence, side by side, of unassimilable racial groups. Racially East Africa is more like South Africa than Central Africa, and as a result there is a very complicated pattern of resentment and suspicion. The quarrels of India and Pakistan, for example, are reflected in sometimes acute differences between local Indian and Mohammedan groups. Native leaders distrust Indian protestations that they all have a common cause. The wealthier Indians are sometimes surprisingly frank in expressing contempt for native sloth and backwardness. Schemes of federation must make allowances for these hard facts.

This does not mean that federation in East Africa is not possible. The Mau Mau movement has won an important victory; it has raised native problems, even beyond the confines of Kenya, to a new level of urgency. Kenya Europeans soberly recognize that their economic and political security depends upon improved relations with the native peoples. The British Government under the Conservatives does not have the same sense of guilt and haste which led the British Labor Government to a number of emotional and doctrinaire acts, and it draws upon a greater fund of historical experience. It also has courage, as was shown in its willingness to overcome the roadblocks in the way of Central African Federation. Whether the talk of a "new deal" in East Africa is bringing it closer to a major decision in favor of real federation is impossible at the moment to tell. Since the area, in spite of its rich highlands, is poorer than Central or South Africa, it is even more in need of a pooling of resources and an integration of policies. As has already been pointed out, further, it is a key area in the system of global defense, which makes its consolidation an American interest.

History in Africa is out of joint. The most liberal mind may contemplate its dilemmas and see no clearly right road. They could not be resolved at a single blow by violence nor by a single act through decree. Here men are the prisoners of one another, products of an historical process that brought them together without softening their differences or dissolving them into each other. As matters actually stand, the best that anybody who has observed the history of mankind can say is that those societies prosper best where all who live within them have some reason for hope and faith in the future.

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BRITISH PARTY PROGRAMS: THE MIRACLE AND THE MIRAGE

By Thomas Balogh

THE victory of the Labor Party in 1945 represented a protest by a large majority—many of them Conservative voters in earlier elections—against the unemployment and stagnation that had prevailed in the period between the two wars. Never again, it was felt, should the nation be exposed to the uncontrolled forces of markets if they worked to the detriment of the economic future of the country. It was hoped that Labor would ensure not merely full employment and social security, but also a consciously planned and accelerated development of the nation's resources. The nationalization of a number of key industries was to enable the government to establish full control over the economy and free it from the shackles of the profit motive.

To some extent these hopes were fulfilled. Social security, the welfare state, was indeed achieved by Labor. So was full employment. And there can be no doubt that technical progress and economic expansion in Britain were far swifter in the postwar years than at any period since before the turn of the century. Nevertheless the ebbing of confidence of the voters, and the hesitancy of Labor leadership after 1950, showed that the Party had exhausted its immediate program and was uncertainly (and not very successfully) groping for new inspiration. The confidence of the voters, and the Party's own confidence, in its ability and determination to shape the economic destinies of the country had been very badly shaken, first by the fuel crisis (caused by the inexplicable failure to ensure a strict allocation of coal supplies) and by three exchange crises occurring in regular two yearly intervals. The Party had been equally badly shaken in its belief in the need for and the efficacy of national ownership as a means of planning and directing investment. The Labor program of 1950 and even more of 1951 was timid and defensive. It aimed mainly at "consolidating" the gains achieved and promised further benefits to consumers without giving any real assurance of the solution of the problem of how to provide the means of fulfilling these promises by increased efficiency and output.

The election of 1951, which put the Conservative Party back into power, was fought in the midst of the third upheaval in

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Britain's balance of payments. The circle had come to a full turn. The Conservatives on their side declared themselves opposed to all planning, which in their view could result only in misery and muddle. They promised a dash to freedom and, much like the Republican Party in the United States in the following year, a complete break with the inflation that, in their view, was the fount of all trouble. Sound money was to be restored, together with the sovereignty of the consumers. The Labor Party, countering this appeal, warned the electors that the Conservative program could not be implemented except by severe deflation and unemployment, that the consumers' sovereignty unavoidably involved a fall in the consumption of the large majority, and that the success of the Conservative Party would involve a return to the inter-war policy of unemployment and relative stagnation.

In the next three years Conservative policies were substantially modified. At the same time the forebodings of the Opposition received a startling refutation, partly no doubt aided by a favorable turn in the world economic tide, but to a considerable extent through the evolution of a new Conservative approach to economic problems. The international economic position of the country has been consolidated. The most important social gains made since before the war have been safeguarded. In particular, full employment has been successfully maintained. The Conservatives have succeeded in performing some, if not most, of that consolidation of the welfare state which the Labor Party had lately put on their banner as their final task. The present British Government has, in short, taken the wind out of the sails of the Opposition and thus diminished their chance of electoral success.

II. THE CONSERVATIVE RECORD

Mr. Butler, the Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, can be satisfied with the development of Britain's internal and international position. The balance of payments has changed from a large deficit to almost as large a surplus. This consolidation was achieved despite the relaxation of controls over commodity markets and imports, and despite the ending of all rationing of consumers (which is a sort of indirect import control). Yet all of these measures were bound to increase the demand for foreign currencies. It was, last but by no means least, achieved without causing depression and unemployment. The restrictive credit

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policy which the Bank of England initiated at the outset of the first Conservative postwar régime was soon reversed. Mr. Butler has travelled very far from his plan to rush into convertibility—a plan which even United States experts opposed early in 1952. He had already relaxed the budget in that year and he gave a further boost to demand in his financial proposals of 1953. Bank rate is back to 3 percent. Not since 1950, well before the last crisis, have British Government securities been at comparable high levels. The rate of interest on Consols, that bellwether of monetary policy, has fallen by almost 1 percent.

The response to these measures was instantaneous and remarkable. Industrial production had fallen by just under 3 percent between 1951 and 1952. It began to recover early in 1953, and by the summer the whole of the previous loss had been made good. At the end of 1953 production surpassed the previous high point. In the first eight months of 1954 industrial production was 6.5 percent higher than a year before and more than 10 percent than two years previously. There is, as yet, no check in sight. The fall of unemployment has also been most gratifying to the government: from a temporary peak of just under 500,000 —the highest since the war but only about half the minimum attained in the inter-war period—it has fallen continuously to 220,100 in July 1954, the lowest figure since 1951, just over 1 percent of total employment.

Retail prices, after the steep rise between 1950 and 1952, have remained practically stationary since the end of that year, though there was a slight (just over 2 percent) rise last summer, due mainly to the derationing of meat (which itself rose some 7 percent). Yet demand and consumption rose in real terms more than 4 percent last year to a new peak, about 2 percent above the previous record level in 1950, and has since continued to expand. It is now nearly 7 percent above the low point reached in 1952. Nor is this all. Investment in houses, though the size of units have been cut, has expanded by more than £200,000,000, owing to the rise in the numbers completed from 192,900 in 1951 to 315,223 in 1953. In the first six months of 1954 there was a further increase to 197,101. It is estimated that in 1953 total physical production at home, *i.e.* excluding the effect of foreign trade, was about 3.5 percent above the previous peak reached in 1951. It must now be running as much as 5–6 percent above the 1951–52 low. This means that from domestic production alone additional

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output worth some £600,000,000 a year at current prices has become available in the last two years. Though the rate of interest has slowed down it is still very satisfactory.

All this was accomplished in a period when controls were relaxed, and when, therefore, demand for foreign products would have increased even without the expansion of output (which itself increased demand for imports). Yet in the same period the worst that could be feared abroad also came to pass: American production abruptly fell by 10 percent and has not fully recovered. Truly Mr. Butler need not envy his German colleague, Dr. Erhard, for his economic miracle. He has a full-sized one all of his own.

How did all this come to pass? How in particular were the unfavorable consequences on the foreign balance of recent British economic policy and world developments, insistently pointed out by Labor politicians and economists (including myself), so completely avoided?

The answer is surprisingly simple. The crisis of 1951 was to some extent due to temporary circumstances: in the first place to the violent rise in the price of primary products which in 1951 worsened the British terms of trade by some 30 percent and suddenly reduced British real income. But this rise was caused, apart from the delayed effects of the devaluation of 1949, mainly by the exceptional increase in world demand following the outbreak of the Korean war. Once the urgency of stockpiling was satisfied it was bound to pass. In the second place, the sudden imposition of a very large rearmament plan on a fully employed economy disorganized production, and interfered with the parallel increase of exports. As armament plans were pared down and production increased, a better balance was bound to emerge. Moreover, the crisis of 1951 was due also to a violent increase in inventories: some £600,000,000 against a loss of gold of some £344,000,000. This rise also had to come to an end, and with the diminution of this strain there was automatic relief to the balance of payments. Last but not least the 1951 crisis was due to a speculative attack on the pound.

In the past years none of these things happened. The price of imports fell. There was no undue increase in inventories. The British productive machine was not overburdened. In all this the deflationary monetary policy played a rôle at the outset of the Conservative régime. The stimulus given to entrepreneurs by

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having a friendly government and by decontrol and tax concessions restored confidence. There was no speculative attack on the pound from inside or abroad. There was no need for devaluation or for cutting British domestic demand to restore gold reserves. The shrinking American demand could therefore be offset by the expansion of production in Britain and, indeed, in the whole of Western Europe. Thus the prices of the things the sterling area exports to the United States did not collapse despite the recession there. If anything, they slightly rose in the autumn of 1954. While American imports decreased in volume, they did not decrease as much or more in value. Confidence in the Conservative Government helped to maintain the balance of payments in Britain, just as confidence in the government in the United States maintained investment in the teeth of a stagnant demand.

For the first time since before the war, therefore, Britain was presented with a uniquely favorable combination of circumstances. The British terms of trade are now back where they were just before devaluation. In other words, Britain was enabled to save some £500–600,000,000 on her import bill: and it was this gain and the confidence of foreign owners of sterling which enabled her both to abolish controls and to increase production without causing an immediate balance of payments crisis. Though the large increases (due partly to capital movements) in reserves have not continued, the stability of the balance of payments is surprisingly satisfactory despite the increase in the *commercial* surplus of the United States.

The remarkable thing is that despite the depression in the United States, and the loss of income which Britain's overseas suppliers suffered through the fall in their prices, British exports did not slump: they expanded and are well above their previous peak of 1950. Partly this is due to the notable stability of U. S. export prices despite the fall in production, a fact which contrasts sharply with even 1949 (and much more with 1937 or 1930–33). It seems, moreover, that though Britain's customers lost through a decline in the prices of their exports (which was bound to cut their incomes and demand) this loss was more than made up by the increase in their productivity and output. Demand for British goods in Australia, for instance, increased despite the marked decline in wool prices.

The improvement in the terms of trade, and the rise in domes-

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tic production, which could be managed in consequence without upsetting the balance of payments, together amounted to an increase in British real income of some 1 to 1.2 billion pounds in 1953–54 as compared with two years before. In contrast to the Labor Governments, which were hard pressed by the worsening of the international trading relations, the Conservatives have been fortunate indeed.

The question might be asked, of course, whether this windfall gain was used to the full.

In a certain sense the answer is undoubtedly in the affirmative: the timely reversal of the deflationary policy, the relaxation of taxation, clearly show that Mr. Butler was able to reassess his policy: as Britain's international position improved he succeeded in increasing domestic output to the limit. In this he was more successful than his American colleagues. Yet, in another sense, the policy pursued had the result of missing an almost unique opportunity to buttress Britain's economic strength.

We have seen that consumption in Britain has substantially increased and, at current prices, must have absorbed some £600–700,000,000 of the total gain. Total final consumption moved to a new high level, 3 to 4 percent above the previous record level of 1950. Who benefited? The answer is not very difficult to find. The real wages of the better-to-do working class have not risen above 1947 though they now enjoy the boon of "free" choice. The poorest 10–20 percent of the population on the other hand must have suffered an appreciable cut in their already exiguous standards which has only recently been made good by the increase in pensions and other social benefit payments. It should not be forgotten, however, that a large part of this was financed by an increase in flat rate contribution payments, *i.e.* by regressive taxation falling heavily on the lowest income earners. The higher incomes have been more fortunate. While working-class prices have risen by more than a quarter since 1949, the price level for the rest of the population has risen by only just over a fifth. The better-to-do benefited by a cut in purchase tax, while the poor bore the brunt of the cut in subsidies.

There can be no doubt that the inequality of actual consumption standards in Britain has substantially increased in the past two years. It is the large total increase in consumption which explains the comparative ease with which the process of abolishing controls was accomplished despite the resulting more unequal

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distribution. At the same time the recovery of the standard of the better-to-do working class to its previous high level explains the remarkably wide popularity of the government despite the partial loss of the social gains of the war and postwar years.

If the increase in consumption and consumption-investment (such as housing and vehicles) was considerable, it also exhausted much the greatest part, some £700–800,000,000 or more, of the total increase in available resources. Defense absorbed an additional £150–200,000,000 at current prices. There was also some increase in the stocks of commodities in the productive machine, and an equal surplus on international account used for foreign investment. *This means that little if anything was left over for the expansion of productive investment at home.* This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that factory buildings under construction fell from £183,000,000 in the middle of 1951 to £155,000,000 at the beginning of 1954. Factory building is not necessarily an accurate indicator of fixed investment. But the figures of deliveries of machinery and tools for the home market confirm its portent. It is doubtful whether productive fixed investment has substantially recovered from the cut in 1951–52. This contrasts with the continuous vast increase of investment in the United States since 1949.

III. THE PROBLEM OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY

Yet there is no dispute about the fact that British industrial investment is insufficient to maintain Britain's relative competitive power. Investment per head in the U. S. is a multiple of the British, and even the German is far higher. This explains why both American and German production could expand so much faster: the latter reached the rate of 7 percent annually even after 1951, when the first violent phase of reconstruction had been completed. The average American rate in the same period was 6 percent as against an average of 4 percent in the best period in Britain.

Here, then, is the Achilles heel of the British recovery: the large windfall gain due to exceptional good fortune had been used to increase consumption, and to permit the worsening of its distribution without too much unpopularity for the government. Should the British terms of trade worsen, or should demand for British exports shrink as a result of increased competition, the government has few, if any, weapons left in its economic

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armory to parry the consequences. It could, of course, run down the external surplus. This would, however, have grave consequences on Britain's position as the banker of the sterling area and thus on the future of the sterling area itself. The balance could be adjusted also by old-fashioned deflationary action, by cutting investment and demand indiscriminately. But this would solve current difficulties only by causing unemployment and by increasing the threat to the future efficiency and the standard of life because of the enforced decline in investment. It would also be suicidal politically. The continuance of under-employment in the United States inevitably would be regarded as an acute threat in this respect. The increasing pressure of Japanese and German competition is, in the longer run, even more disquieting. The British standard of life could be safeguarded only by a sharp rise in productivity. This, however, would demand an increase in investment.

Mr. Butler is well aware of this potential threat and is also aware of his weakened powers to take avoiding action. Despite the buoyancy of the position and obvious political temptations he has not given anything away this year. Moreover, he served notice (only to be reproved by the Labor Front Bench) that the British arms burden is intolerable in the long run.

This growing awareness of a potentially dangerous threat to Britain's international position explains also Mr. Butler's increased caution on the issue of the convertibility of sterling. Having freed commodity markets, and liberalized imports, he has gone some way towards *de facto* convertibility. But now he must keep a way open for retreat, and a formal, legal acceptance of convertibility would make this impossible. Thus any crisis, if it occurred, would then be manifest, and would invite political disaster. No Conservative Government could afford an exchange crisis within a short period before an election: the source of its most important electoral superiority over Labor would then be jeopardized. The United States Government has shown a much greater awareness and understanding of the problems of the present British Administration than its predecessor evinced to the Labor Governments of 1949 and 1951: no pressure was exercised to enforce convertibility immediately.

Should international economic trends remain favorable, Mr. Butler's policy of liberalization could easily be vindicated. For the current year (1955) there are, however, hopes that invest-

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ment will increase by £200,000,000, all but half of the expected total increase in output. Even this is still insufficient to make up leeway and it would be menaced by any change in the foreign outlook. The delay in armaments programs has resulted lately in a huge budget surplus which might be used to strengthen the basic position. If the drift towards dear money stimulated by the rampant stock exchange boom is causing misgivings, it certainly has not forced a reconsideration of the expansionist bias of policy. Personal savings have been sharply rising ever since the fall of the Labor Government—from below £100,000,000 before 1951 towards £900,000,000 in 1953. This increase was considerably in excess of the fall in the government Budget surplus. Now that consumption has been freed from its shackles and all pent-up demand is being met, it is conceivable that the tax concessions to entrepreneurial activity will bring about, not merely further increase in investment, *but also in personal saving*. The second part of the German "miracle" would then have been successfully reproduced in Britain. The transition to a "high-investment" economy would have been accomplished on a free-enterprise basis. This indeed is the portent of Mr. Butler's latest appeal to British industry to increase ploughed-back profits and equally of the appeal by enlightened Conservatives to go slow in using the budget surplus for concessions further increasing consumption. Whether the Chancellor can resist the pressure to grant such concessions in an election year remains to be seen.

Eventually, then, the supporters of the present policy might also hope that any additional pressure that might result from a formal restoration of convertibility, and the consequent unavoidable relative worsening of the terms of trade, would be offset by a spontaneous increase in British productivity. In addition, should an improvement in the American economy enable the United States Government to reduce the degree of its protection unilaterally—*e.g.* by a simplification of customs procedure—convertibility need not even involve a worsening of the terms of trade. Recent political changes in the United States should make such changes easier.

All this seems conjectural, but it is certainly not impossible. Assuredly it is not inconceivable. Should it succeed, Mr. Butler would have performed an incomparable service to his party. He would have purged it of the taint, still damaging, of being the party of big business and unemployment, of growing net profits

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and falling purchasing power for the mass of the population. The discontent of the submerged 20 percent (as contrasted with that of the 40 percent before the war) is politically not decisive. In any case so long as the world economic position remains fair, some concessions to this relatively small minority should not prove impracticable.

The consolidation of the success of the experiment in liberalization now depends mainly on the American economic prospects. The outlook for the British Conservatives is by no means a wholly comfortable one, but it is by no means a hopeless one either.

IV. THE LABOR PROGRAM

In the face of this obvious success of the moderate wing of the Conservatives under the leadership of Mr. Butler in cutting loose from their pre-election slogans, the Labor Party has manœuvred itself into an unenviable position. After a severe internal dispute it has first of all postponed proposals for any considerable advance towards national ownership. It has reaffirmed its intention to restore and expand social services and demanded an increase in productive investment, in order to be able to carry out its other promises through an increase and redistribution of national output. Finally it has reaffirmed its belief in planning.

So far so good. Unfortunately, there is little in the Labor Party program to justify, or even raise, the hope that it could in fact be carried out without plunging the country into a crisis. In the first place, the Labor Party has not merely come out for German rearmament and the consequential severe increase of defense costs and the drain on the balance of payments but also for the maintenance of British arms. (The Germans bore some £150,000,000 of the cost of the British troops in Germany which they will no longer have to meet.) Thus the one relatively easy way by which resources could be found for its program of increased investment and higher social services has been blocked. Yet resources for both have to be found: investment must be increased if the rest of the ambitious program, which the Labor Party accepted last year, and has since reaffirmed, could be carried out.

On the other hand, it would seem impossible to postpone pledges to increase consumption and social services. Indeed, since the loss of faith in Socialism of the old-fashioned sort, *i.e.* in the

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collective ownership of the means of production, the extension of the welfare state has increased in importance in the Labor program. Yet these welfare schemes are immensely costly. Even if the former relatively low level of protective foodstuffs prices, *e.g.* meat or milk, is not restored (and that alone, according to Mr. Butler, would cost £800,000,000), an effort to assure an adequate basic diet to the families of lower paid workers would certainly involve restoration of subsidies on a substantial scale. But this is not all: housing standards are to be raised, new schools provided, and the Health Service improved and freed from charges on patients. Though there may be room for manœuvre in actual budgeting, it seems a fair inference that the party is committed, by implication, to an increase in social benefits costing at least £600,000,000 a year at once, with progressive additions in later years.

Cutting armament is the least difficult way of meeting the cost of an accelerated increase in investment and welfare services, but it is not the sole escape route. Theoretically, at least, it would be possible to extract from the better-to-do families, *i.e.* those with more than £700 a year, part or the whole of their windfall gains, and to use this partly to accelerate investment and partly to finance the most urgent increase in social services and benefits. In practice, however, it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to obtain these resources by way of higher taxation, *i.e.* by a fall in the consumption of the rich. Personal savings, as we have seen, have increased tremendously since the defeat of Labor, and unless some completely revolutionary tax reform is adopted, for which there is little chance in the short run, a renewed fall in savings is certain to counteract any new tax measure. The Labor Party, indeed, will be very lucky not to have to contend with such a fall anyhow, and a concomitant foreign exchange crisis. Unless confiscatory taxation is envisaged (which poses the same problem of confidence) no solution is attainable in this direction.

By introducing direct controls on consumption and investment the Labor Party could of course restore a better distribution of income without prejudicing capital accumulation. This escape route, however, is equally firmly bolted. Not only are rationing (or even the limitation of home supplies) and other controls extremely unpopular, but the Labor Party seems in any case to be increasingly loath in principle to reintroduce them even if this were politically possible. Yet the conception that private capital

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will effectively provide the sinews for an extension of the welfare state seems an illusion: unless the Labor Party is prepared to permit an actual worsening of the income distribution, it cannot even do as much as Mr. Butler in fostering investment. With the victory of Labor, the risk of capital investment would automatically increase and thus profits after tax would have to be permitted to rise to maintain even the present inadequate pace. This is, of course, in flat contradiction to the aspirations and program even of the least radical wing of the party. Nor could the effects of the increase in risk be counteracted by cheap money policy. Dr. Dalton has had ample opportunity to learn what damage cheap money can do to the foreign balance under a Labor Government. Thus even if a foreign exchange crisis does not put a quietus on Labor's electoral hopes at the moment of the election, its domestic problems seem all but insuperable without a much greater degree of direct control than has recently been envisaged by the leaders of the party, apart from Mr. Bevan.

If the price mechanism cannot be trusted under the circumstances, if Consumption Socialism and entrepreneurial freedom do not go together, then it would first of all be necessary to devise machinery and put into effect a deliberate plan of action. This has never been done for all the lip-service paid to "planning." If the price-mechanism and the profit motive cannot deliver what the Labor Program envisages, a conscious, coherent and consistent set of measures must be substituted and personnel found capable and willing to carry them out. Otherwise the Labor Party will land the country in the same mess as in 1947, 1949 and again in 1951.

In the light of the experience even of 1946–50, it is generally a dangerous illusion to suppose that inflation and monetary disasters can be avoided if the full-employment policy is not supplemented by a national wage and price policy. The present Conservative policy might lead to serious labor unrest, especially if prices rose further. But the failure to replace wage-restraint by a more permanent policy threatened stability even while the Labor Government was in office. Yet there is no sign of an official awareness even of the existence of this problem.

The third problem arises in respect to investment. Even if the government were able to determine what kinds of investment it wished to stimulate, how is it going to get it done? Why should private enterprise expand? It did not expand sufficiently in the

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most urgently required directions when the postwar boom was unbroken, and capital taxation did not threaten. In some sections of industry, at any rate, it accumulated and sedulously hoarded orders at the cost of some goodwill and loss of markets—preferring this to the risk of being landed with excess capacity in the future. Is it anything but fantastic to expect an accelerated expansion, when Japanese and German competition is resurgent, and when the shadow of a renewed American stagnation is beginning to strike a chill of unease in Europe? And even if private enterprise were willing to take such unusual risks, where would the capital come from? Ploughed-back profits would not be sufficient. Nationalization, which might set free a gusher of risk capital by displacing equity investment in a widening section of industry by government obligations, is ruled out for the next Labor Government. It is difficult to see how its authors envisage carrying out their program.

V. THE DILEMMA OF THE LABOR PARTY

The Labor Party could, of course, pare down this program severely to what Britain could "afford" after a Labor victory, *i.e.* something less than at present. Instead of launching a far-reaching plan which might capture imagination and enthusiasm, it could hope that a crisis in America or some mistake in Britain (coinciding nicely with an unavoidable election) might put the "outs" in.

It is difficult to see much future in this "consolidation" or "realism." It also presupposes that the entrepreneurial classes will show as much confidence in a Labor Government as in a Conservative administration, and this in turn demands that a Labor Government should be able to resist in the longer run most of the aspirations of its own rank and file without forfeiting their allegiance. Neither assumption seems realistic.

The next Labor Government will be much more vulnerable than its predecessor of 1951. It will not have at its fingertips those levers which it held between 1945 and 1951. It then inherited an almost intact war economy, hardly distinguishable from a fully-planned system: this legacy of existing wartime controls far offset in value the handicaps due to war damage and losses. Even so, the means which the government possessed to discipline and direct private enterprise were far from completely effective. The control over capital issues did not prevent investment from

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differing widely and wildly from estimates. The powers taken under the 1946 Act over the banking system proved grossly inadequate. The government's instructions to restrict credit were ineffective, and the necessary cuts in imports could not be enforced for months. Conclusive proof was given, even in 1951, that the opponents of the Labor Party held the economic power to produce a political crisis for Labor. It is now clear that the balance of payments crisis of that year was brought about largely by a spectacular flight of capital and equally tremendous speculative purchases of imported goods. Government controls even then were inadequate to forestall or prevent a lack of confidence denuding the country's reserves and leading to the fall of the government.

Since then the liberalization, begun well before 1951 by Labor itself, has proceeded apace. Control over capital issues has been virtually abandoned, control over building has been largely dismantled, rationing has been ended, and freedom of the commodity markets completely restored. Thus a recurrence of the history of 1951—impotence combined with distrust and crisis—is only too likely. A further economic failure of Labor, however, would be fatal both to its future electoral chances and probably also to its unity. Either the left wing will take power, or the disillusionment might even lead to a strengthening within the Labor Party of fellow-travelling or even Communist extremism, now happily all but nonexistent. Recently the official leadership showed some signs of awareness of the general political impasse and tried to suggest an escape-route by sponsoring the idea of greater reliance on direct controls to ensure full expansion. It does not, however, seem to realize the far-reaching consequences of such a new departure for other parts of their program. As no other new elements (*e.g.* in the foreign economic field) for a constructive new program alternative to Conservative policy have yet emerged it is not likely that the electorate will show more enthusiasm for this dehydrated old mixture (which led to periodic financial upsets) than before. Thus the Labor Party is in an even more difficult position and the crisis in its policy-making is far more acute than that of the ruling Conservative Cabinet.

Yet basically both parties are much lacking in firmness and ultimate realism. Faced with the seriously weakened position of Britain at the end of the war, neither was willing to enforce a drastic retrenchment of consumption to restore productivity and

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safeguard the future. The Conservatives, in opposition, indeed railed against even such "austerity" as was imposed. Thus a unique chance was missed of transforming Britain into a high investment country capable of providing a steady increase in the standard of life without trenching on the future, as well as genuine advantages in the long run for all its foreign-trading partners.

It is just possible that the continuance of favorable conditions abroad might even at this late stage permit a sufficient increase of personal saving, and of investment, to enable Britain to face both domestic demands for an improving standard of life and the threat of foreign industrial competition—not the least of the United States and Germany and, eventually, possibly even of the Soviet Union. But it must be admitted that such a conjuncture of favorable circumstances is at least unlikely.

There is at the moment, however, little sign that either political party is willing to envisage the rather painful measures which would be needed to ensure an increase in investment in the absence of such favorable trends—when they would be most necessary. Yet there is the tempting promise that, once the transition to higher investment had been accomplished, the quickening of technical progress would enable Britain to face her problems—even a possible worsening of the terms of trade. Consumption Socialism and Guild Capitalism seem the only possible choices, and neither seems capable of dealing with any of Britain's basic difficulties.

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DENMARK'S CREEPING CRISIS

By Gunnar Leistikow

DENMARK is one of the weakest and at the same time one of the most exposed members of the North Atlantic alliance. Placed at the narrows of the Baltic like a cork in a bottle, her territory commands the straits through which the formidable Soviet submarine fleet would have to pass in a major war. An area of such strategic importance cannot possibly fail to attract the attention of the Soviet high command. As a matter of fact, the Russians showed their interest in Denmark in World War II. In 1940–41 they tried without success to talk their German friends into giving them control over the Danish straits, and they attempted, also in vain, to race their armies into the Danish peninsula before the British could arrive.

The territory of Denmark, consisting of a peninsular projection from the North German plain and a host of islands of varying size, is devoid of natural defenses. Her shallow inland waters, formerly an asset for defense, today offer an ideal road of approach for amphibious forces in landing craft. If war ever again comes to Denmark, the Danes can hope at best to carry on holding operations until friendly forces can come to their succor. Fear of the fate of Czechoslovakia, and the hope that participation in an enterprise for common defense with strong friends would avert it, decided the Danes to join the North Atlantic Powers in 1949.

The price for protection by NATO was a vigorous defense effort by the Danes themselves—something this unmilitaristic and pacifistic nation had not known for generations. And they had to start from scratch. The German occupiers in World War II had not only dissolved the modest Danish forces, but had also cleared out the military equipment down to the last blanket in the barracks. Assistance was soon forthcoming from Britain, Canada and, in particular, the United States under the Mutual Assistance program. But defense expenditure is very heavy by Danish standards: 14 times as high as in 1938 and three times as much as when the Danes signed the North Atlantic pact in 1949. It swallows up 40 percent of the state budget, an all-time high in recent Danish history. Also, defense means nothing but expense in a country like Denmark. There is hardly any defense industry that could profit from rearmament.

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What seems a great sum to this traditionally neutral nation is not necessarily overwhelmingly much by NATO standards. The nearly one billion kroner spent yearly for defense corresponds to 4.1 percent of the national income—about the lowest percentage among NATO member countries. For this billion a year, Denmark has still not been able to buy anything approaching national security. NATO headquarters figure that effective command of the air above Denmark would demand a minimum force of 14 fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons stationed on Danish soil. Today there are only eight. According to NATO, the security problem could be solved by stationing two Allied wings in Denmark until sufficient Danish pilots and ground crews could be trained to take over the 150 planes and equipment. But for the time being Denmark, like her sister country Norway, has declined NATO's offer to garrison foreign personnel on her territory.

The reasons for this are political and psychological rather than military, as Defense Minister Rasmus Hansen has admitted. One reason is concern lest stationing of American troops—and those are the only ones in question—might be considered a provocation by the Russians. Little Denmark, while remaining a member of NATO, still wants to maintain as friendly relations as possible with the nearby colossus. Another consideration is the lesson of the experience of other countries that garrisons of foreign troops—by comparison tremendously well paid—create strained relations between the soldiers and the civilian population. This is undesirable locally, and also creates bad feelings with allies. As long as any acute danger of war in Europe seems remote the Danes tend to put such considerations ahead of the military requirements for complete coördination with foreign forces in advance of an emergency. On the other hand, the Danish Government has repeatedly announced that it may change its mind about the stationing of foreign troops on its soil if there is increased tension in Europe. So far it is content with keeping Danish bases ready to accommodate considerably larger forces on very short notice—a policy undoubtedly in accord with popular feeling.

Eyebrows were therefore raised in NATO headquarters in September 1954 when the Danish Parliament, summoned to an emergency session, accepted a government proposal to cut down defense expenditure, reducing appropriations for the coming

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financial year from 1.19 billion kroner to 890,000,000, and at the same time shortening the period of ordinary military training from 18 to 16 months.

The NATO command feels that Denmark's defenses should be expanded, not reduced. The Danish Government, however, keeps telling NATO that the curtailment of the defense program is not nearly so bad as it looks on paper. True, the armed forces are going to induct 3,000 men fewer a year, but the Danes have been scraping the bottom of the barrel; one class plus one-fourth of a class have been called every year, and many unfit men have been inducted who had to be weeded out later—a costly and inefficient procedure. The smaller number of men called up is supposed to remedy that situation; from now on the psychologically unfit will be rejected before enlistment and not after they have had a chance to impair morale in their units. Also, the government says, the reduced training period will hamper the forces less than NATO fears. The men discharged after 16 months will be called back later for two additional months, and the Defense Ministry claims that this too makes for better efficiency. One of the main weaknesses of the Danish armed forces is the lack of well-trained officers and noncoms, a condition resulting partly from the smallness of the forces prior to 1939 and partly from the fact that training was suspended during the German occupation. On prodding by NATO, Denmark lengthened the training period from 12 to 18 months, but the inducted men could not be given proper training for lack of instructors. Finally, even the cut in appropriations is not supposed to reduce actual combat strength. It is said to touch mainly the construction and expansion of barracks and other facilities less urgently needed when fewer soldiers are called.

II

Even so, it is admitted that the cuts impaired military preparedness. The reasons for them were economic and political.

Last summer, Denmark suddenly found herself in the midst of an acute foreign exchange crisis. Her control of foreign currency is very tight; holders of foreign assets are bound to sell them to the National Bank within a limited period of time, and anybody who needs to make payments abroad has to obtain a permit to buy the necessary dollars or sterling from the National Bank. In this way, the National Bank has become the sole legal owner of for-

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eign currency. Usually it holds a modest portfolio of several hundred million kroner in foreign currency drafts and exchange. This holding was reduced from the equivalent of 390,000,000 kroner (about $55,700,000) on September 30, 1953, to a deficit of 164,000,000 kroner a year later, and by October 31, 1954, the deficit had reached 257,000,000 kroner.

Early in September the Danish Government felt that extraordinary measures were necessary to reverse this trend. An emergency session of parliament enacted many bills aimed at reducing the expenditure of foreign currency. Excise taxes on beer, liquor, cigars and cigarettes were increased; instalment purchases of what are considered luxury items in Denmark, such as motor vehicles, radios and refrigerators, were limited; government support for housing and other civilian construction purposes such as schools were reduced; fares on the state railroads were increased; credit facilities for exporters were expanded; and certain taxes were reduced as a premium for personal savings.

For political reasons explained below it was not felt possible to exempt the defense establishment from the general curtailment in expenditure. Appropriations for the armed forces therefore were cut and the training period was reduced as part of the comprehensive economy program.

A foreign exchange crisis like this is nothing out of the ordinary in Denmark, although the situation seldom deteriorates quite as rapidly. Ever since liberation, Denmark has had a precariously narrow edge of foreign currency reserves—the result of a much tighter export situation than before World War II. In the twenties and thirties the country's agricultural products were very much in demand by its two big neighbors, Britain taking about three-quarters of the agricultural export and Germany most of the rest. Denmark could normally expect to sell what it was able to produce of butter, bacon and eggs and could demand and get good prices in a seller's market.

Today the situation is quite different. The Germans have sharply reduced their imports of food so as to benefit the German farmers, and the impoverished British middle class, formerly main customers of Denmark's products, have gotten used to a more frugal breakfast table. Still, 90 percent of the bacon, 75 percent of the butter and 70 percent of the eggs go to the United Kingdom, while Western Germany absorbs 80 percent of Denmark's export of live cattle. The rest is spread among a number

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of lesser markets. This means that in four main food items Denmark is dependent on the good graces of one big customer, and must take what that customer is willing to pay.

However, sell the Danes must. The whole economy of the country is based on foreign trade. Denmark is practically devoid of any raw material; her chief asset is the traditionally high skill of her inhabitants. Not only must her imports satisfy the demands of a population used to the Scandinavian high standard of living, but in addition Denmark must purchase abroad whatever feed, fertilizer, fuel, agricultural machinery, tools, raw materials and semi-finished products her agriculture and industry need. And in order to pay for its imports the country must export.

Denmark was able to resume commercial ties immediately after the war, when there was a tremendous demand for food all over war-ravaged Europe. The Nazis had exploited Denmark's resources for their own purposes, but they left the production machinery nearly intact. Denmark's recovery was a spectacular success. Some $300,000,000 in Marshall Aid enabled the Danes to import scarce raw materials available only for dollars, and also made possible much larger importation of feed and fertilizer. Production soared. The number of pigs, for instance, which averaged 3,100,000 in the late thirties and was down to 1,500,000 in early 1948, now exceeds 5,000,000. Export earnings from all farm products were tripled between 1947 and 1951; in 1954 they increased to over four billion kroner.

However, in 1949–50 Denmark's economy was rocked by a double calamity. The pound was devalued almost immediately after Denmark had entered a long-term agreement with Britain which bound the Danes to deliver huge quantities of butter, bacon and eggs at fixed prices—in sterling. The other adverse factor was the international commodity crisis after the outbreak of the war in Korea. So Denmark had to cope with a reduction of income from devaluated pounds, and had at the same time to pay more for the necessary raw material at sharply rising prices. The effects of this price scissors were particularly painful because the Danes had abolished many direct controls on production and imports just before the international inflation. It has been estimated that the total cost of all this amounted to just about as much as the total of the Marshall Aid received.

The benefits of the Marshall Plan were not wiped out, however. Denmark had been enabled to double the volume of exports be-

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tween 1946 and 1950; and from 1951 on, she again increased agricultural exports and offset her losses. When Marshall Aid ended in 1953, Denmark no longer had a dollar shortage. Indeed, she had a surplus, partly because it had become possible to shift many imports like coal, oil, grain and feed away from the dollar countries, partly because of the increase in exports to the dollar area. Of great importance was the fact that Denmark was able to furnish large quantities of eggs and milk to the United States Army in Germany.

But even today the bulk of Denmark's foreign trade is with her traditional trade partners. The O.E.E.C. area accounts for four-fifths of her imports and three-fourths of her exports. The United Kingdom alone buys about half of what she has to sell and sells her half of what she has to buy. She has a considerable yearly surplus in her trade dealings with Western Germany, Sweden, Benelux and France. This situation, which has prevailed since the last war, has prevented Denmark from building up a substantial reserve of foreign exchange. It has also made her exceptionally vulnerable to irregularities in the movement of foreign currencies.

Many different explanations have been offered for the exchange crisis of 1954. Among other things, it is stated that Danish leaders shared the general European view that a depression was imminent in the United States. So the government applied measures to soften its expected repercussions that never came. When no depression occurred, these measures added to the difficulties. Another contributing factor was a substantial decrease in the foreign earnings of the Danish merchant marine in the early part of the year. But the main cause undoubtedly was a considerable buying spree by the Danish public. The government has been severely criticized in business circles as well as by the political opposition for not having realized the dangers of the situation earlier and for not having taken steps to counteract it before it was too late.

Many more consumer goods were imported during the first five months in 1954 than in previous years, in particular automobiles and motor bikes. Increased income during prosperous years had enabled the Danes to spend more, and a great part of this additional spending was used for long-desired commodities from foreign countries. During the first eight months of the year imports soared by 600,000,000 kroner (about $86,000,000) com-

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pared to 1953, while exports rose only by 250,000,000 kroner. When foreign exchange balances dwindled accordingly, emergency legislation became necessary.

III

The reduction of the defense appropriation was the result of a deal between the ruling Social Democratic Party and a much smaller middle-class party called the "Radical Left," although it is neither radical nor Left in the American sense. These two parties had shared the government during most of the period between the world wars, and were responsible for reducing the national defense almost to zero. Both parties felt that an efficient defense establishment was a costly pipedream for a small isolated and open country. Their slogan—"What's the use?"—reflected the opinion of most Danes in those days.

But having experienced an enemy occupation, the Social Democratic Party changed its views when a new danger arose in the East: the lesson of the last war seemed to be that a weak and exposed country could not hope to be neutral. Under Social Democratic leadership the Danish workers had achieved a high standard of living and developed a strong union movement. They had a lot to lose from Soviet overlordship, as the case of Czechoslovakia proved, and the only realistic protection in the postwar world seemed to be an alliance with powerful nations that might discourage future aggressions by possessing overwhelming force. When such an alliance was offered, Denmark joined. Adherence to the Atlantic Pact was ratified with the votes of the Social Democrats along with those of the other two major parties.

But many members of the "Radical Left" have never changed their neutralist views. They alone voted with the Communists against the Pact, and though later they accepted it as an established fact, they still do not like the idea of spending huge sums for armaments which can be only a contributing factor toward the defense of the country. Their attitude on this point is quite in tune with popular feeling. The idea of coöperation for mutual benefit—the basic principle of the social insurance so extensively developed in Denmark—seems perfectly natural to them. They look upon defense expenditure as a sort of insurance premium which has to be paid. But as with other insurance premiums, they just cannot help wishing that it did not have to be quite so high. There also is a feeling that a small country like Denmark can do

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extremely little to implement NATO's primary purpose: to discourage aggression by facing a potential aggressor with overwhelming force.

IV

The measures enacted in September 1954 were expected to add revenue of 400,000,000 kroner in income and excise taxes over the next 18 months and to reduce government spending by 200,000,000 kroner. The great question, of course, is whether this is sufficient to remedy the situation or whether further measures will become necessary.

Nobody is able to answer this question for sure. The result will depend largely on developments over which the government has no control, like price movements abroad or a bad harvest which would make it necessary to earmark large sums of foreign assets for emergency purchases of grain for human consumption as well as for feeding livestock. By the first part of 1955 the problem had become the main bone of contention on the political battlefield. The opposition maintains that the emergency legislation was too little and too late, and that it is necessary to spread the burden over the whole of the population, which the Social Democrat government had tried to shield, rather than to hamper economically active groups by the too stringent curtailment of credit. At the turn of the year, the foreign currency deficit had been reduced to 172,000,000 kroner; but this, of course, was still a far cry from the customary surplus. On the other hand, it is generally agreed that the situation is far from desperate. The crisis arose while Denmark was in the midst of a period of general prosperity, with high production (particularly in industry) and very slight unemployment.

What is really serious is that the Danes see no solution for their long-range economic problem. Through generations agricultural exports have been the mainstay of the nation's economy. As long as these exports could be expanded, the country's wealth and well-being seemed secure; but now a point has been reached where no further substantial growth can be expected.

There is only very slim hope that Denmark will be able to expand her exports of butter, bacon and eggs to England in the future. She is not the only country that sells these products on the British market. So far, Denmark has been able to maintain her position because of the exceptional quality of Danish products

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and her ability to fit them exactly to the particular taste of the public to which she caters. But the British use the sharp competition to press the Danes hard for lower prices.

The German market also looks less and less promising. The Germans use protectionist measures to try to keep out Danish products, while continuing to be Denmark's second largest provider of industrial goods. Danish exports of food to Germany have declined sharply since the war with the exception of beef-on-the-hoof, and they threaten to decline even further. Food exports have taken the same course in several other Western European countries which welcomed Danish products during the lean first postwar years but now tend to become self-supporting. And the likelihood of large-scale expansion of agricultural products to overseas areas seems small in view of the agricultural surplus in the United States and elsewhere.

At the same time Denmark does badly need to expand her foreign trade. As a result of the low birth rate in the twenties and thirties, the growth of the active population decreased to about 3 percent for each five-year period between 1940 and 1955. But many more children were born in the forties, and soon these will begin to appear on the labor market. The active population is expected to grow by about 1 percent annually, or almost twice as fast as before. This situation will be further aggravated by diminishing employment in agriculture, because farming is becoming more and more mechanized.

Some relief has been found in increased export of farm products to countries behind the Iron Curtain, but the Danes have found it hard to rely on any kind of regularity from these customers. In 1953 the Soviet Union suddenly became Denmark's second best customer for butter and bacon, purchasing 6,000 tons of butter and 5,000 tons of bacon, and the third largest for beef and veal, with purchases of 6,000 tons. But when negotiations for a new trade agreement were almost concluded last summer, Moscow threw in a demand for two tankers to be built by Danish shipyards. When the Danes declined, the Russians refused to sign. Negotiations were broken off and have not been resumed.

The Russian action obviously had the political aim of stirring up trouble between Denmark and her allies, and was not quite without success. A couple of years ago the Danes had built two tankers for the Russians over the protest of the United States Government, which pointed out that tankers were on a list of

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strategic goods that the NATO members had agreed to deny Iron Curtain countries. However, the Danes held themselves bound to deliver the ships, because they had been ordered before there was such a list. Now the situation is different. As subscribers to the agreement, the Danes feel unable to build more tankers for the Russians, although it means trouble with a potential customer and Denmark needs all the customers she can get. But there is also another side to the incident. The NATO list has recently been revised and the export of many oil products to the East is no longer barred. Tankers, however, stayed on the list. This created bad feeling in Denmark. It does not make sense to the Danes to permit the sale to the Soviets of petroleum products, which can after all be used for aggressive purposes, while forbidding the building of tankers which are mainly used to carry Russian oil away from Russia.

Denmark's foreign-trade balance might possibly be improved by an effort to increase industrial exports. Success in that would ease the strain on foreign exchange, since the prices for industrial commodities fluctuate considerably less than those of farm products. This way out, which has been taken by the Netherlands and Switzerland, for example, has been widely discussed in Denmark. It is also strongly recommended by American observers like George Alexander Marshall, former E.C.A. administrator there.

During the last hundred years Denmark has managed to build up a considerable industrial plant, in spite of an almost complete lack of raw materials. This was made possible by Denmark's ability to take advantage of the cheapest of all means of transportation, the sea. For a long time her industry catered mainly to the domestic market, furnishing it with all kinds of consumer goods fabricated with Danish skill from imported raw materials and semi-finished products. But during the last 50 years many Danish manufacturers turned more and more to foreign markets, and Denmark became a leading exporter in certain specialized fields where quality counts. Her industrial exports include a wide variety of products—ships, Diesel engines, machine tools, agricultural, dairy and slaughterhouse machinery, electrical appliances, cement, pharmaceutical products, canned goods, fine textiles and furniture.

Britain takes one-fifth of the industrial exports, and the Scandinavian sister nations, Western Germany, France, Belgium and

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the Netherlands are also important buyers. The United States market has expanded rapidly in recent years. In 1954 this country became Denmark's third best customer, buying Danish products to the tune of almost half a billion kroner (about $63,900,000) against only 22,000,000 kroner as recently as 1948. Trade with Canada and with Argentina, Brazil and other Latin American countries is also developing very favorably. Almost half the sales to the continental United States (in contrast with sales to the U.S. Army in Germany) are canned food, mostly ham and fish, while about one-fourth are iron and such things as office machines. Exporters are particularly hopeful about expanding the American market. Most Danish products are goods of high quality particularly suitable for a public willing to pay a little more for a better product. Such a public is primarily to be found in the United States.

It was with a feeling of uncertainty that the Danes greeted the new year of 1955. On one hand, there was a general feeling of relief that the nadir had been passed in the foreign exchange crisis. On the other hand, no solution of the deeper causes was in sight, and even the government said that further emergency measures would soon become necessary to cope with the economic situation. Yet neither the government nor the opposition seemed to have any clear conception of how to tackle the roots of the creeping emergency. As so often before, the Danes felt rather helpless amid rapidly changing world conditions on which a small country like theirs could exert only a slight influence.

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REPORT ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA

By Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart

ON February 25 of this year the Communists of Czechoslovakia celebrated the seventh anniversary of the coup d'état which enabled them almost overnight to turn what in the twenties was acclaimed as an exemplary democracy into a dictatorship modelled on the Moscow pattern. Although the coup had been long prepared, it is typical of Communist tactics that the Czechoslovak Communists should continue to describe their action, not as an aggression, but as a successful defensive effort to forestall and prevent a bourgeois putsch. It is true that the ineptitude and unpreparedness of the bourgeois parties facilitated the coup, but the determining factor in its success was the proximity of the Soviet armed forces.

Today the Communists still rule in Czechoslovakia by the will and through the strength of Moscow. The break with the West has been as complete as tyranny can make it. National independence now dates, not from October 28, 1918, but from May 9, 1945, the day on which the Red Army is alleged to have liberated Prague. This myth has no foundation, for the fighting was over before the troops of Marshal Konev reached the capital, and the only Russians who helped in the liberation of Prague were the soldiers of General Vlasov, a Soviet commander who, after his capture by the Nazis, recruited an army for Hitler from Russian prisoners-of-war.

Both the wise and gentle Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Beneš are now denounced as agents of Western imperialism, lifelong enemies of the Soviet Union, traitors to their country and betrayers of the Czechoslovak people. It is curious that the Communists should now denounce Masaryk and Beneš as enemies of Moscow. Towards the end of the Second World War Eduard Beneš was the first person to accept "peaceful coexistence" and to suffer the kiss of death from the embrace. In 1918 Thomas Masaryk was opposed to the policy of Allied intervention in Russia. Moreover, in March 1948 the Communists tried to assert that if he had been alive he would have approved their violence. When this lie failed to win credibility, they changed their tactics and began to revile him. In 1953 the attacks increased both in number and in venom. *Rudé Právo,* the official newspaper of the

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Communist Party, published two long articles denouncing the "false humanism" of Masaryk and accusing him of being the friend of the enemies of the people. The Communist Government went even further, for it issued an official book containing alleged proofs that Thomas Masaryk had given large sums to anti-Bolshevik Russians for the assassination of Lenin.

The recent intensification of the attacks on Masaryk indicate that what the Czechs call "Masarykismus" has still a strong hold on the Czechoslovak people and that today his name is the symbol of freedom for all those who seek to escape from their present thraldom.

Seven years make an appropriate climacteric for taking stock of a difficult situation and of studying the reactions of the Czechoslovak people to the asperities of a harsh régime. One of the first questions which Western inquirers always ask is: What percentage of the population is anti-Communist? No one knows the exact answer, and the problem itself must be looked at from several aspects. We have to consider active anti-Communists and potential anti-Communists. We have to ask ourselves how many people make a pretense of accepting the régime solely for a bread-and-butter existence. We have also to gauge how quickly the Communist régime in Czechoslovakia would begin to collapse if by some fortuitous circumstance the Soviet Union were to withdraw from Central Europe. In the absence of positive proofs there is only the evidence of the behavior of Czechs and Slovaks during previous periods of oppression such as the First World War and the Nazi occupation during the Second World War.

Two generalizations can be made. Both Czechs and Slovaks are by nature individualists and submit unwillingly to collective discipline. Recent refugees who have escaped from Czechoslovakia give an optimistic report of anti-Communist resistance which they say is much more widespread than in February 1948. Nevertheless, both Czechs and Slovaks have a more practical sense of realities than, say, the more romantic Poles, and in both races there are people who in times of oppression tend to submit to what seems the inevitable and to accept such benefits as the régime can give them. This quality is not confined to Czechoslovaks, but it must be taken into account. The passive acceptance of benefits does not mean agreement with the régime, and the more the régime increases its pressure the more likely is passivity to turn to unrest. On the other hand, good economic conditions

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increase passive acceptance of the régime. It is safe to say that up to the present there are in Czechoslovakia incomparably more people who have reason to be dissatisfied with the economic conditions than people who benefit from them.

There are also certain classes of people—doctors, chemists, technicians and scientists—who in a sense work for the régime because they are working for the whole nation. They do not regard themselves as supporters of the régime. Excluded from normal activity are those industrialists who refuse to accept Communism. Representatives of ideological movements like the Church, the Sokols, the Boy Scouts, the Rotary Clubs, the Freemasons and others are also debarred from their normal pursuits. More recently the Communists have relaxed their severity towards *individuals* of these groups. Unpardoned and condemned to idleness are former officers of the Czechoslovak Army and Air Force, especially those who served in the West.

In these circumstances it is difficult to estimate resistance in percentages of "for" and "against." Nevertheless I think a reasonably accurate picture can be given.

In one category I would group convinced Communists who are ready to die for the Party (1 percent); Communists who accept the Party dogma, but are not ready to die for it (3 percent); and Communists who pose as passionate Party members but lack full conviction (5 percent), in all 9 percent. In a second category I would put absolute opponents of the régime who are removed by the régime from all activities (10 percent), and people accepting the economic benefits but whose loyalty to the régime depends on the continuation of these benefits (20 percent), together 30 percent. In a third category I would put passive opponents among the farmers (30 percent); passive opponents among the industrial workers (20 percent); and other elements disagreeing with the régime but pretending to accept it (11 percent), in all 61 percent.

This is somewhat complicated. Moreover, the Czechoslovak Communist Government publishes no statistics showing the percentages of people employed in industry and agriculture. I believe, however, that the division is about as follows: employed in agriculture, 33 percent; in industry, 40 percent; in commerce and transport, 7 percent; in public works, 8 percent; otherwise employed or unemployed, 12 percent.

Supporters, opponents and passive adherents of the régime are

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found in all these branches of employment. Opposition has been strong in agriculture, where the Communist policy is to rouse the poorer peasants against their richer neighbors, and also among the miners in the Ostrava district.

Organized active resistance such as existed during the German occupation is no longer possible on a large scale. In the days of the Protectorate everyone knew who was a German, and among the Czechs there were few traitors. Today brother betrays brother, and children are taught to denounce their parents. The régime, too, is ruthless, treats the most harmless talk as espionage, and spares neither woman nor child.

Moreover, resistance suffers undoubtedly from the lack of any outstanding Czechoslovak leader either at home or abroad. There is no Masaryk, no Beneš, to give courage and inspiration to a people who have suffered much from the buffets of friend and foe alike, and in Czechoslovakia itself the Communist propagandists make rich capital out of the endless wranglings of the Czechoslovak émigré *Rada* in the United States. Both the Czechoslovak people in Czechoslovakia and the 60,000 or so émigrés who left the country after the Communist coup would welcome a positive policy from an authoritative and representative Council abroad. So far the *Rada* has not fulfilled this rôle, and I fear that its influence in Czechoslovakia is small.

Nor does it carry much weight among the émigrés as a whole. These, however, must be divided into two classes: the genuine emigrants who seek a new life and a new allegiance, and the exiles who live solely on the hope of a return. The first class is composed mainly of the young, many of whom have found a new home in countries as far off as Australia and New Zealand. The second class consists almost entirely of the politically minded and older people who, if they can find the means, prefer to live in Europe and regard the *Rada* in Washington as too remote from Czechoslovak problems to be effective.

Another theme which the Communist propagandists exploit with great energy is the treatment given by the West to refugees who escape from Czechoslovakia in the hope of starting a new life. The two main grievances—and they are real grievances—are the wretched conditions in the refugee camps in Germany and the reluctance or inability of Western bureaucracies to provide suitable employment for men and woman who, not unnaturally, think that they have risked much for the sake of that almost

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indefinable word, freedom. The refugees know at least what is *not* freedom. In Europe all too often their escapes make headlines in the press but their subsequent welfare is neglected. As for the camps, they are controlled by Germans. The conditions are degrading and the delays interminable. Screening is the more necessary because the Czechoslovak Communist Government sends abroad agents—provocateurs who, in the guise of escaped refugees, find a place in the camps, study the conditions and then make their way home to report exaggerated details to the Communist authorities. The problem is a difficult one, but it seems unwise on the part of the West to spend large sums on radio propaganda and to neglect the well-being of those who, in response to this encouragement, make their way to the West. In this connection it must be said that Western Europe is the chief culprit, for it does little to help the refugees, virtually all of whom seek to go to the United States.

What is remarkable is that, in spite of these conditions, the escapes continue. If they have diminished recently in number, it is not on account of Communist propaganda but because the Communists have taken the most elaborate precautions to fortify and guard the frontiers. These precautions make it virtually impossible for anyone but a young and active person to escape, and it is the young Czechoslovaks who make these daring attempts and who often succeed. I have met some of them—young airmen of 21 and 22—and have spoken to them in their own language. To them Thomas Masaryk was merely a name. They came away because they were sick to death of Marxist indoctrination at every hour of their work and play and because they were tired of being constantly told to do this and not to do that. Wholly ignorant of what went on in the outside world, they, too, knew what was *not* freedom.

Compared with other satellite countries, Czechoslovakia has a good record for escapes, partly because she lies nearest to the West, and partly because ever since the battle of the White Mountain in 1620 the Czech has been taught to cry when internally he is laughing and to laugh when in his heart he is crying.

In September of 1953 Mr. Desmond Donnelly, Labor Member of Parliament for Pembroke and then a Bevanite, visited Communist Poland, the East German Communist Republic and Communist Czechoslovakia. To such an extent was he impressed by the manifest dislike of the Czechoslovak people for Communism

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and by the tyranny and incompetence of the régime itself that he abandoned his Bevanism and, indeed, rebuked his former leader for minimizing the dangers of Communism.

II

In any estimate of physical and even moral force the strength or weakness of a movement is determined by the corresponding strength or weakness of what is opposed to it. I have not sought to overestimate the strength of anti-Communist resistance, nor shall I allow wishful thinking to encourage me to exaggerate the weaknesses of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, like other violent revolutions, the Communist revolution in Czechoslovakia has already devoured many of its children.

Every régime which rules by terror and through secret police is beset with suspicion, and in the struggle for power colleague mistrusts colleague and lifelong friends betray each other. After the February coup of 1948 the struggle for power was prolonged and bitter, mainly because the Party contained more strong personalities than a totalitarian dictatorship can support. Among the Czech Communists the two outstanding men were Klement Gottwald and Rudolf Slansky. Both had spent the war years in Moscow, and Slansky had shown personal courage by taking part in the Slovak rising of 1944. Of German-Jewish origin, he was recognized by all his colleagues as a brilliant organizer. Moreover, as General Secretary of the Party he was believed not only to hold the key post, but also to enjoy the special favor of Moscow. Klement Gottwald, however, was a man of exceptional ability and, so far at least, must rank as the ablest Communist that the satellite countries have produced. Like Stalin he knew how to wait and, while waiting, to conceal his hate with a smile. But when he acted he struck hard and quickly.

The dualism of Gottwald as President and Slansky as General Secretary lasted for nearly three years and was doubtless repugnant to both. Nevertheless, in July 1951, Slansky's fiftieth birthday was celebrated with the highest honors. President Gottwald conferred on him the Order of Socialism, and M. Kopecky, the Minister of Information and an intimate associate of Slansky, wrote an extravagant eulogy in which he attributed to his boyhood friend the success of the February coup.

Four months later Slansky was arrested on a series of charges of which the most flamboyant was the allegation of conspiring to

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murder Gottwald. After a year's physical and mental torture he and 13 other well-known Communists were brought to public trial, and Slansky confessed abjectly to crimes which he could never have committed. Inevitably they included espionage for Western governments and conspiratorial relations with Tito. For the first time in a trial of Communists by Communists, anti-Semitism raised its head, and in the indictment Slansky and ten of his fellow-victims were described after each name as "of Jewish origin." Among the 11 who were executed were not only Slansky himself but also Geminder and Reicin, both of whom were originally nominees of Moscow. It was in all but geographical location a Moscow trial, and Gottwald would never have dared to stage it without Stalin's approval. Even before Slansky's arrest there were many indications that Moscow was dissatisfied with the slowness of Czechoslovakia's deliveries to the Soviet Union, and presumably Gottwald had succeeded in persuading Stalin that Slansky was mainly to blame. By this time, too, the Soviet revolution had so far stabilized itself that Stalin ranked good bureaucrats far above revolutionary hotheads. It was this consideration which probably induced him to prefer the comparative moderation of Gottwald to the more violent fanaticism of Slansky.

In Slovakia, where the Communists were weakest, there was a similar but less sensational elimination of rivals, and from the small group of intellectuals who led the movement M. Siroky emerged as the leader. The Slovak Slansky was Dr. Clementis, a not unpleasant intellectual who had spent the war years in Britain.

The Slansky trial was a triumph for President Gottwald and for Prime Minister Zapotocky, and when Gottwald died very suddenly after attending Stalin's funeral Zapotocky became not only President, but the virtual leader of the country.

So long as he remains at the head of the state and of the party, it is unlikely that we shall see further struggles for power or fresh trials. By trade a stonemason, who has carved gravestones for many of his countrymen, he is not disliked by the anti-Communists so violently as are his colleagues. Moreover, his father was one of the founders of the Czech Social-Democratic Party. He is therefore well known to the workers. What stands him in better stead is the fact that he has at present no visible rival possessing anything like the same authority and popularity. Such a rival might emerge if Zapotocky were to remain head of the

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state over a longish period. He is, however, over 70, and if he dies soon there will almost certainly be fierce competition for his presidential throne. But the party is short of leaders. Men like Čepička, a careerist who married Gottwald's daughter, and Novotny, the Secretary of the Central Committee, are brutal and ruthless enough to seize power, but lack the influence and support to hold it. In totalitarian states only a real leader can command the support of the army and of the secret and security police forces.

Relations between Czechs and Slovaks have always presented difficulties to Czechoslovak governments, and in this respect the Communists can claim some successes and should admit some failures. Since 1948 the Communist régime has gone ahead rapidly with the industrialization of Slovakia, a country somewhat neglected by previous régimes, and Slovaks acknowledge the services of Communism in this connection. On the other hand, the Communists have failed even worse in Slovakia in cultural and religious matters than in the Czech lands, for in Slovakia opposition to Communism has always been stronger because Catholics and peasants are comparatively more numerous than in Bohemia and Moravia.

In general, however, it is difficult to write anything positive about Czech and Slovak relations apart from the fact that both peoples suffer from the same deprivation of liberty. Indeed, it is just possible that shared suffering will bring them closer together and unite them in a common effort to free themselves. It must also be said that Czech and Slovak relations are today certainly no worse than they were before the Nazi occupation which certain Slovaks exploited in order to set up an autonomous state.

In estimating the strength and weakness of Communism in Czechoslovakia, we must never lose sight of the fact that the political development of a small country depends very largely on its economic development. By harnessing its economy to that of the Soviet Union and by concentrating its efforts, again at Moscow's request, on heavy industry at the expense of other industries and of agriculture, the Czechoslovak Communists have made a cardinal mistake which they cannot rectify. Economic conditions in the two countries are diametrically opposite and what may suit the Soviet Union can lead easily to pauperization in Czechoslovakia.

The destruction of the economic balance which has resulted

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from the almost total abandonment of the light industries adapted for years to the interests, needs and skill of the Czechoslovak people cannot be repaired for a long period, and then only after enormous losses. But the Communists cannot do even this, for they are tied to another system and are continuously under Soviet pressure and Soviet demands. The Czechoslovak Communists, in fact, have sacrificed the economic interests of the state to their own political aspirations and to the political interests of the Soviet Union. This sad state of affairs has created a serious economic crisis. The exaggerated concentration on industry has been disastrous for agriculture, and the farming community is in perpetual passive resistance to the attempts to collectivize the land. Agricultural production is immeasurably lower than it was in the times of a free economy and of individual enterprise.

Although their enslaved economy is the Achilles heel of the Czechoslovak Communists, they have made many changes in the economic structure of the country. Most old factories have been nationalized. Some have been destroyed for strategic reasons and rebuilt elsewhere. New factories have gone up with great speed in order to supply heavy industry and to fulfill the orders of the Soviet Government. If the régime were to collapse one day—and, although I am steadfastly opposed to wishful thinking, such an event is not unthinkable—these changes would undoubtedly make a rapid return to individual enterprise very difficult, if indeed not impossible. This is a factor which arises almost inevitably from seven years of Communism and which Western economic planners will have to consider seriously.

No account of the Communist régime in Czechoslovakia can be complete without some reference to its subordination to the Soviet Government in Moscow. Today the total dependence differs greatly from the relationship which existed before the February coup of 1948 and in the years immediately following it.

Before 1948 the Czechoslovak Communists received orders and suggestions from Moscow how to conduct their policy and how to impose a Communist ceiling on the sociological structure already accepted by the democratic Parties. Moscow, too, prescribed the tactics by which the Communists should capture the state machine: by democratic elections if possible, by violence if necessary. During this period Moscow provided the Czechoslovak Communist Party with large funds which were intended to help the Communists to win elections and were to be repayed later to

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Moscow in the form of goods, machinery and economic privileges.

After the February coup of 1948 the Soviet Government began gradually to subordinate Czechoslovakia to its own political, economic and military systems. The conversion of Czechoslovakia into a satellite was completed without hindrance. Today the Czechoslovak Army is trained, equipped and armed on the Soviet model. The Czechoslovak troops learn the Russian words of command, and indeed the whole population is urged constantly to learn Russian. Soviet experts control the Czechoslovak economy and convert Czechoslovak production to the Soviet system. In Czechoslovak factories Soviet permanent commissions supervise the output of goods destined for the Soviet Union. Visits of all sorts of Soviet experts occur almost weekly, and Czechoslovak students and Pioneers—the Communist imitation of Boy Scouts —go regularly to the Soviet Union to study. Soviet professors teach at the Czechoslovak high schools, and Russian methods and Russian textbooks are being introduced into the whole educational system. Needless to say, not only Czechoslovak, but also world history is being falsified according to the Soviet method, and today the Czechoslovak pupil is told that the first Czechoslovak Republic was founded, not by Thomas Masaryk or President Wilson but by one Josef Vissarionovich Djugashvilli, who at the time was known as Stalin to only a tiny percentage of the Russian people.

I am assured by recent refugees from Czechoslovakia that neither old nor young people accept these historical falsifications because no one believes anything that the Communists say or write. It may be true that the bulk of the population is still immune against these lies, but the Communists are not interested in the old, and they persevere with the young. Moreover, they write reams and suppress all news from outside.

Indeed, the subservient and sycophantic flattery which Government and press lavish on everything Russian is almost unbelievable. On the part of the Government the motive is fear, for the promotion or disappearance of a Czechoslovak minister depends on a nod or a wink from Moscow. The official newspapers follow the Government's lead and, indeed, seek to outdo it. Translations of articles from *Pravda* and *Izvestia* are to be found in every issue of every Prague periodical. In October of last year Khrushchev went to Peking to represent the Soviet Union at the fifth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Republic. His speech, translated

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into Czech, filled the whole of *Rudé Právo,* the leading Prague newspaper, to the exclusion of all else, apart from a few paragraphs on sport on the back page.

In all cultural matters Soviet art, music and literature are supreme. Translations from the Russian exceed the output of domestic literature, and such serious books as are written about the United States or Great Britain have titles like: "American Bourgeois Philosophy and Sociology in the Service of Imperialism" or "The Crisis of the Colonial System Deepens."[1] Extravagant praise is given to all Soviet writers who enjoy the favor of Moscow, and curiously enough, although Stalin's name now figures rarely in the Soviet Press, the Prague newspapers continue to extol him. By the time this article appears, the huge statue which the Czechoslovaks have erected for him in Prague will presumably be unveiled. In September 1954 his massive form appeared above the scaffolding and was seen to be followed by three rather sad figures in Indian file. The young men of Prague, hit by the economic crisis, polished their wit on the statue. "Why has Stalin such a self-satisfied smile on his face?" asked one. "Because he is at the head of the meat queue."

The Communists do not waste much time on jokes about the Americans and the British. A fierce propaganda denounces American comics and Hollywood as proofs of a debased and inhuman people and the British are denounced for their obsession with detective stories. A Communist journalist goes to Stratford prepared to worship Shakespeare. He visits a bookshop in order to buy the master's works and finds only "Murder on the Race-Course," "Death in the Air," and 20 similar titles.

All this unrestrained propaganda would be more dangerous if, under Communism, life itself were not so restricted. As it is, young men have risked their lives to escape from the Communist paradise because they were not allowed to dance American dances to American music.

It remains to be added that Communist Czechoslovakia is ruled in the same manner in which the Soviet Union is ruled, that large numbers of secret and security police are maintained, that slave labor-camps exist, that citizens disappear without trial and without notice to their relatives, and that the most popular man in the country is Archbishop Beran who five years ago was removed from public life but whose place of confinement has never

[1] *Literární Noviny,* October 9 and 16, 1953.

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been revealed, probably because it has been changed more than once. Like many other Czechoslovak patriots, Archbishop Beran has been persecuted both by the Nazis and by the Communists.

III

If my analysis of the régime and of the opposition is correct—and it is the result of years of the closest study—two problems require the constant attention of those who are responsible for Western policy or, to be accurate, Western policies: (1) What are the prospects of liberation? (2) What policy or policies can or should the West adopt during the period of waiting?

Taking first the factors favorable to liberation, we can claim with some certainty that the Czechoslovaks and, in particular, the Czechs, are the most Western of the Slavs, have been imbued for centuries with a strong Western tradition, and have by far the highest standard of literacy of all the satellite states. It can be taken for granted that in the vast majority of the people the desire for freedom remains strong.

Factors unfavorable to liberation are the somewhat bitter memories of indifferent treatment at the hands of Western democracies. Among these the Munich Agreement comes first, followed closely by General Eisenhower's refusal to allow General Patton to relieve Prague when all the conditions were favorable. Another awkward subject is the rearmament of Germany. While this is a necessity in the interests of Western unity and for the defense of the West, it is a propaganda liability as regards the Czechs who have not forgotten the horrors of the Nazi occupation.

These, however, are minor handicaps compared with the main obstacle to liberation; namely, the power and omnipresence of the Soviet Government, which is the absolute master of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and, therefore, of the whole country. The Czechs are a practical, hard-headed people who are not given to running their heads uselessly against an immovable wall of steel. So long as the Soviet power remains, liberation must be a long-term hope. For a year or two after the February coup there were Czechoslovaks who longed for a third world war. The hydrogen bomb has modified this desire, and today they pray for a miracle.

How would the miracle happen? Speculation about the future is perhaps more pleasant than profitable, but three developments

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seem to me possible. First, if the Soviet Union felt itself obliged, either by reasons of policy or by force of international opinion, to give greater freedom to one of its satellites, the effect on the other satellites, and not least on Czechoslovakia, would be strong. The satellite which I have in mind as the possible recipient of this extra freedom is the East German Communist Republic.

Secondly, if for some unpredictable reason the Soviet Union were to abandon all its positions in the satellite countries, the satellite Communist governments would lose immediately their main supporters. Taking Czechoslovakia alone, I think that 50 percent of the people would organize an immediate revolt, 40 percent would wish them well, and of the remaining 10 percent the majority would hasten to conceal their Communist sympathies and to climb on to the democratic band wagon.

There remains the third and less pleasant prospect that the Soviet Union will retain its forward positions in Europe for an unforeseeable time to come. In this event, the stability of the Communist régime in Czechoslovakia would depend largely on the ability of the Government to improve the economic conditions of the people. The more successful the Government might be in this regard, the more passive the resistance would be likely to become. But even in these circumstances the longing for freedom would not die, and in my opinion even minor economic difficulties and, still more, international tension would renew immediately its strength.

It is also wise and, indeed, essential to consider how the Communists look on their stewardship during the past seven years. On this aspect I can write not with authority, but only from conjecture. I surmise, however, that, quite apart from their propaganda, they regard the results as rather better, from their point of view, than they could have expected. At the expense of "liquidating" some of their colleagues, they have survived. Inside the country they have destroyed some of their opponents and forced others to accept the régime or to remain passive. As far as the émigrés are concerned, their quarrels and disunity have helped rather than hindered the Communists who today probably consider themselves comparatively safe under the protection of the army and the police which are well paid and both of which are under men trusted by the régime. It is also probable that the military strength of the Soviet bloc and Moscow's handling of international affairs give to the Czechoslovak Communists a

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temporary feeling of collective, if not entirely of personal, security.

Nevertheless, they are well aware of the silent hostility of the vast majority of the people, and personally I feel confident that they do not underestimate the strength of this passive antagonism. Moreover, they are faced with growing dissatisfaction caused by the economic crisis and by the shortage of food and of consumer goods. To some extent, too, they are more liberal than the other satellite Communists, not so much in their treatment of their own people as in their attitude towards Communist foreign policy. They certainly rely on the might of Russia. They also follow the Soviet line by trying to drive a wedge between Western Europe and the United States. On the other hand, they want and need to trade with the West and rely on the possibility of "peaceful coexistence" between East and West as the safest guarantee for the continuation of their own régime.

I have the feeling that the Czechoslovak Communists would like to liberalize the régime a little, and such a development is not wholly impossible. It would be very dangerous, however, and therefore is improbable. To be popular, liberalization must mean the end of police persecution, and if the Communists were to go so far they would find it difficult, if not impossible, to reëstablish their authoritarian methods if the situation got out of hand, as it might very easily do.

In conclusion, it seems to me obvious that there are no clear-cut divisions among the people in Czechoslovakia and no certainty about the future, and this state of affairs is probably true of the other satellite states. Two things can be said with confidence. In all the satellite countries there are a large number of people who detest the tyranny of Communism and long for liberation. In Western Europe, at least, there is no one who is prepared to set them free by force. To be more brutal, it is fair to say that in Western Europe there are many people who are prepared to abandon all interest in the freedom-loving peoples behind the Iron Curtain in order to buy what they think will be peace in their time. Nevertheless, the struggle between the closed world and the free world is one of ideas and will be settled by the triumph of one ideology over the other.

What we say over the air to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain is therefore of supreme importance. Obviously the Communists also regard what we say as of great significance, for they

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spend large sums of money in trying to "jam" all Western broadcasts. And the broadcasts have a large audience, mainly because they are "jammed" and because forbidden fruits are sweetest.

As the jamming is not wholly successful, the Communists have been introducing for some time past "wired radio" which for a radio set substitutes a loud-speaker connected directly with the Communist propaganda center. In a country like Czechoslovakia, however, they will find it difficult, if not impossible, to confiscate the radio sets.

Of all the Western broadcasting stations, Radio Free Europe has by far the largest audience, partly because it broadcasts most frequently and varies its programs skilfully and partly because it raises greater hopes. But if, as I think, liberation is still a remote possibility (though I believe it will come), there is a danger that deferred hope will provoke not action but apathy.

Obviously it is fitting and necessary that in their talks to the satellite countries Western speakers should expose Communist lies and exploit any incident in the international situation which is to the discredit of the Communist régimes. But in my opinion all Western policy in these matters should be guided by two principles: 1, to explain constantly the ideals of Western democracy and of Western freedom and to contrast them with Communist dogma and Communist authoritarianism; and 2, to keep the spark of hope alive without fanning it prematurely into a short-lived flame. The last is the more difficult and the more important part of the task.

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TRIBULATIONS OF A PARTY LINE

The French Communists and Indo-China

By Bernard B. Fall

THE varying positions taken by the French Communist Party towards the war in Indo-China have provided a striking example of the difficulties and contradictions which a party encounters when it tries to conciliate its local political objectives with the over-all grand design of proletarian revolution woven by the Soviet Union. Its actions, of course, also created a dilemma for the other parties in the French Parliament. As Léon Blum said: "We always find ourselves face to face with the insupportable anomaly represented by the insertion into the French body politic of a foreign nationalist party."[1]

Actually, the French Communist attitude as regards Indo-China was far from clear until the abortive Moscow Conference of the foreign ministers in April 1947. Until then, "tripartism" had been the watchword in France. The Communist chieftain, Maurice Thorez, was Vice-Premier and Minister of State, another Communist was Minister of Armaments, and other Communists, under one governmental combination or another, held important levers as Ministers of Labor, Reconstruction, Public Health. Indeed, the whole political outlook in 1946 and early 1947 seemed ideally suited to the eventual peaceful and orderly inclusion of France into the ranks of the "People's Democracies." Naturally, she would also have brought the French overseas territories into the Soviet orbit, thus permitting them—like more backward Soviet Central Asian areas—to "reach Socialism while bypassing capitalism."

This explains the quasi-colonialist enthusiasm of the French Communist parliamentarians when, in the Constituent Assembly of 1946, Edouard Herriot insisted upon tight French control of outlying French imperial bases in Africa and Indo-China.[2] The French parliamentary record of Blum's speech of December 23, 1946, asking for strong measures against the Viet-Minh to reëstablish order in Indo-China, mentions "strong applause . . . to the extreme left"—in which, in fact, the generally colonialist right wing did not share. Better (or worse) yet, a mission to France of the puppet-government of Cochin-China, which was met coolly or noncommittally by most other French political party leaders, had received an enthusiastic welcome by Maurice Thorez at a time (April–May 1946) when the French Government was still engaged in negotiations with Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic. In the words of the head of the mission as he stepped off the plane in Saigon on May 26, 1946:

> But it is Monsieur Thorez, the first [political figure] with whom I could enter into contact, who expressed to me the most remarkable opinion: the Vice-Premier

[1] *Débats Parlementaires,* Assemblée Nationale, March 11, 1947, p. 905. (Further quotations given here from parliamentary debates are from the same source.)

[2] Herriot then stated, to applause from all benches: "In matters such as national defense we must, just as the Soviets did, foresee centralized means; and you know very well that on such matters Russia does not compromise—and she is right."

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has affirmed to me that the Communist Party under no circumstances wished to be considered as the eventual liquidator of the French position in Indo-China and that he ardently wished to see the French flag fly over all the corners of the French Union.[3]

A remarkable statement, sounding something like the Churchillian: "I have not become Prime Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." We must remember, however, that for Vietnam to break away from French influence would have been a step backward in view of the apparently imminent integration of France herself into the Communist orbit; and this would have been so even if the Ho Chi Minh régime had been 100 percent Communist. It would have been comparable to what Tito did later in Jugoslavia, for it would have separated the Vietnamese and French Communist Parties and set them on divergent paths. The fact that unity actually existed and was considered important by the Communists is clearly brought out by Paul Mus, a French expert on Asia:

I remember how, upon our arrival in Saigon in 1945, General Leclerc met the local group of French Marxists and asked them about the feelings of the French Communists in Indo-China towards the "Annamite" Communists. We were answered: "There are no French and Vietnamese Communists. There is *one* Communist Party, and here we [happen to be] in Indo-China."[4]

In fact, the French Communist group in Saigon apparently issued a document on September 25, 1945, two days after the entry of French troops into that city, urging the Vietnamese Communists to make sure that their actions met the criteria of what was then Soviet policy.

It warned that any "premature adventures" in Annamite [*e.g.* Vietnamese] independence might "not be in line with Soviet perspective." These perspectives might well include France as a firm ally of the U.S.S.R. in Europe, in which case the Annamite independence movement would be an embarrassment. . . . It advised them in particular to wait upon the results of the French elections . . . in October, when additional Communist strength might assure the Annamites a better settlement.[5]

It is still not clear whether Ho Chi Minh's dissolution of the I.C.P. in November 1945 was, as has been suggested[6], a sign of displeasure with such "go-slow" orders and whether his subsequent rebellion of December 1946 was not at first just as much a rebellion against Communist (Soviet) "perspectives" as it was against French imperialism. If so, the approval by the French Communists of a "hard policy" in Indo-China was quite in keeping with Soviet political objectives of the time and thus perfectly logical.

The solidarity of the French Communist Party (P.C.F.) held firm in the French parliament throughout the first three months of the Indo-Chinese war. The Communist ministers and the Communist members of the Armed Forces Committee sought in no way to block the reinforcement of the French Expeditionary Corps in Indo-China in arms, men and equipment—

[3] *Paris-Saigon*, Saigon, No. 19, May 29, 1946.
[4] Paul Mus, *Viet-Nam, Sociologie d'une Guerre*. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952, p. 342.
[5] Harold Isaacs, "No Peace for Asia." New York: Macmillan, 1947, p. 173.
[6] *Cf.* Department of State, OIR Report No. 3708 (declassified), *Political Alignments of Vietnamese Nationalists*, Washington, 1949, p. 92.

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a fact which non-Communist members of parliament now are happy to recall. Indeed, the Socialist Premier, M. Ramadier, on March 20, 1947, showered particular praise upon the head of his Vice-Premier, M. Thorez, during the discussion of the 1947 war budget for Indo-China:

Permit me to give a share of the credit particularly to Vice-Premier Maurice Thorez. He has had the courage to put into words our will, our unanimous will. It was not a partisan idea that inspired us, him and us, but the feeling of France's needs, the will to save France, to safeguard French unity, which is indispensable at the present hour.

Incidentally, this war budget bill which was fully endorsed by the Communist ministers in the Ramadier government even included an item of $6,800,000 for purchases of arms and equipment abroad, spent entirely in the United States and Britain.

Nonetheless, the Communist Party (as also, as it turned out, the Socialist Party) was faced with an anti-colonist ground swell among its rank and file. They still were somewhat unruly after the years of rather lax party discipline under the German occupation and underground coöperation with Frenchmen of all walks of life, and apparently took little heed of Soviet "perspectives" in the matter.

For a time, then, the French Communists found themselves in a situation which, by all known rules of the book, must have appeared as rank party heresy: on one hand, Communist ministers approved of a governmental policy which the Communist parliamentary bloc disapproved of on the record and had abstained from voting for; and on the other hand, the Central Executive Committee of the French Communist Party performed the veritable *tour de force* of approving of both! This rather peculiar situation came about in the middle of March 1947, at the time of a policy and budget debate.

It is interesting to note that throughout the debate the Communists and members of their satellite group, the Union and Resistance Group, advocated a policy in full accordance with French national interests. The first speaker, Pierre Cot, developed the point of view as follows:

First of all, no one among us, and we must affirm it, thinks of a policy of abandonment or renouncement. France has a task to accomplish there and, without wanting to use big words, a mission to fulfill.

Mr. Paul Ramadier, Prime Minister: Very good!

Mr. Pierre Cot: It is necessary to say so in order to discourage both the illusions of certain Vietnamese extremists and the foreign manœuvres which might give rise to such illusions. (*Applause to the extreme left, to the left and in the center*) . . . France's departure from Vietnam would not serve the cause of freedom; quite the contrary. (*Applause to the extreme left and on various benches.*)

It remained for Jacques Duclos, the Number 2 man of the P.C.F. after Thorez, to formulate Communist policy as regards Indo-China in completely unequivocal terms:

We are for the presence of France in the Far East, but we have the deep-down conviction that the policy which is being pursued will result sooner or later in our being thrown out rather than being able to hold on. (*Applause to the extreme left.*) . . . We are for the presence of France in the Far East, contrary to what is asserted by the newspaper *Le Monde* . . . which pretends that there are groups in

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the National Assembly that are hostile to the presence of France in the Far East . . . We have understood only too well . . . that our departure from the Far East would result in the arrival of certain other elements of a not-too-democratic character.

The next day, March 19, 1947, the Central Executive Committee of the P.C.F. held a plenary meeting, which decided that it was "impossible" for members of the Communist parliamentary bloc to "vote the military credits for the prosecution of the war against Vietnam," but which advised them merely to abstain from voting. And so they did on the following day, despite the fact that even the Communist members of the Armed Forces and Finance Committees had favorably reported out the budgetary bill. The bill was passed, 421 to 0, with the Communists and their affiliates abstaining. What had happened?

Must one look for an explanation of this sudden change in [events] outside France? . . . Or are the motives of an internal nature: pressure of the militants . . . discontented with the too-governmental policy of the Party? Ideological loyalty to an anti-militarist and anti-colonialist tradition? Desire to appear abroad as the defender of the colonial peoples? Hope to attract the Socialists and their left-wing followers? All of those factors undoubtedly come into play, but more determining, perhaps, is the will to react against the anti-Communist provocations which they had had to face since the beginning of the Indo-China debates.[7]

There is some truth in the latter statement. The Communists in Parliament, who had been "on their best behavior," had indeed been subjected to a concentrated barrage of taunts from right-wing elements. Thus, Communist abstention could well have been designed in part, along with the crippling strikes in French industry, as a public show of force to prove that one could not govern without them.

Two days after that first break in governmental solidarity, the Politburo of the P.C.F. met for a plenary session to hammer out a new party line which would reconcile the irreconcilable:

The Political Bureau, on the proposition of the Secretary-General of the Party [*i.e.* Maurice Thorez, who had voted *for* the budget], confirms the mandate given the parliamentary group by the Central Committee which "does not believe possible the vote on military credits for the prosecution of the war against Vietnam." Nevertheless, considering that the vote taken by the parliamentary group would in no way endanger the other aspects of the general policy of the Government, the Political Bureau decides that there is no reason for the Communist Ministers to break ministerial solidarity.[8]

This compromise solution could not be considered a satisfactory long-range policy, the more so as it apparently ran counter to the desires of a large majority of the Party's rank and file. Hence it is likely that such a policy was motivated by events abroad, or, more precisely, in the Soviet Union.

It is clear that the French Communists' conciliatory attitude in March over the Indo-China question was due to their desire to remain in the government as

[7] André Siegfried *et al.*, "L'Année Politique 1947." Paris: Editions du Grand Siècle, 1948, p. 41.

[8] Comité Central du Parti Communiste Français, *Cahiers du Communisme*, editorial by Jacques Duclos, "Notre Politique," March 1947, p. 108.

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long as that would enable them to influence French foreign policy in a direction favorable to the Soviet point of view. But at the end of April . . . the Moscow Conference had ended with a break between the U.S.S.R. and France and with an unquestionable *rapprochement* between France and the Anglo-Saxon Powers. As the participation of the Communists in the government had not produced the diplomatic consequences which they regarded as of major importance, they no longer had . . . reasons . . . for preserving at least the appearance of ministerial solidarity.[9]

The time had come for a new twist in the party line. The P.C.F. had to make its exit from the government. There remained only to find a good occasion that would enable the P.C.F. to appear as the victim of a reactionary cabal. Meantime, as one source remarks, "Had the Communist Ministers abstained—not even voted against—from voting the military credits, there would have been a governmental crisis and, for all we know, the war might not have continued in Indo-China."[10]

From the point of view of party discipline, the P.C.F. performance had been remarkable. However, it had been poor politics.

In the following days, Communist policy was merely to liquidate current problems in preparation for openly entering the opposition—"of going back into the *maquis*," as some politicians said jokingly. The final break occurred on a home issue of great electoral importance: wage-freezing and price control. The government motion supporting such a policy was passed on May 4, 1947, by 346 votes against the 186 of the Communists—including, this time, their ministers. This gave the P.C.F. the desired propaganda headline that the "eviction of the Communist ministers" had taken place "under American pressure."

"Tripartism" and Communist hopes of being able to get control of France and her overseas possession in one swift sweep were ended. The old tactic of "Communism in one country" came again to the fore, and now the country in question was Vietnam and not France. By August 1947 the French Communist Party had set the new course.

Now the Ho Chi Minh government became the "First Democracy in Asia,"[11] and the Indo-China issue became rapidly involved in the broadening rift between the Soviet Union and the West following the creation of the Marshall Plan and the beginning of American military aid to Greece under the Truman "containment policy."

As the battlelines began to form in what now became the "cold war" the P.C.F. line rapidly took on consistency and found the desirable black-white focus. In December 1947 the war in Vietnam now had definitely become an "imperialist" war and the Soviet Union apparently had now become the leading champion of the "anti-imperialists." The new course was expounded by Maurice Thorez as follows:

Two camps have been formed; on one hand, the imperialist and anti-democratic;

[9] François Goguel, "France Under the Fourth Republic," Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951, p. 25.

[10] Mahdi Elmandjra, unpublished manuscript on the P.C.F., 1946–1949, Cornell University, 1954, p. 20.

[11] For home consumption, the P.C.F. conveniently overlooked the existence of Communist régimes in China and North Korea, unless it did not consider them as "democratic."

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on the other, the anti-imperialist and democratic. . . . The Soviet Union and the countries of the new democracies [*i.e.* the East European satellites] form the basis of the anti-imperialist and democratic camp. To it also belong Vietnam, Indonesia and countries like India, Egypt and Syria.[12]

It is at least noteworthy that this enumeration includes Egypt, then still under the rule of King Farouk. However, the break was consummated now and the new course began to take shape.

The "Peace Offensive" which began in late 1948 and reached full-blown proportions in 1949 merely broadened the front of Communist attacks against French governmental action in Vietnam. Now in addition to being "imperialistic," "anti-democratic" and "Washington-inspired," the war became a "dirty war" (*sale guerre*), for it was waged against the "forces of peace." Indo-China was a pawn on the international checkerboard of the "struggle for peace" and the preparation of "Western aggression" against the U.S.S.R.:

. . . the prosecution of the war in Vietnam is integrated in the plans of the imperialist camp to oppress peoples and to prepare war against the Country of Socialism.[13]

However, pious speeches were not enough to bring an end to the war in Vietnam, the more so as the Communists now found themselves both isolated in the National Assembly and outnumbered at the polls. They were still formidable opponents, but their popularity was somewhat dimmed, as evidenced by the failure of the various Communist-staged mass strikes and walkouts with political objectives (NATO, the arrival of General Ridgway in Europe, etc.).

From now on, the Party advocated a "hard line," including sabotage and subversion, as clearly expressed in the official organ of the Central Executive Committee in September 1949. The writer first proceeded to restate the historical "fact" that it was "the blows struck by the U.S.S.R. in Manchuria" against the faltering Japanese in the last six days of World War II "which made possible the national insurrection" in Vietnam, and that as it was a "war of national liberation" it was "a just war." He then cited examples of Communist overt acts in various parts of France as examples of what should be done throughout the country:

We should not remain at the mere stage of propaganda and agitation . . . Action is more important . . . There are good examples in France and Algeria which ought to be attentively studied, so that the whole Party may profit from them. . . .

At Quimper there was a battalion of paratroopers . . . [the local Communist group] has found a way to win over the soldiers to the cause of the struggle for peace . . . On the eve of their departure, an important distribution of leaflets, captioned "Enough Dead in Vietnam," took place. . . .

On June 27, 1949, 800 Algerian soldiers embarked at Oran in the midst of a riot and to the cries of "cease-fire." At the 2nd Air Base Company at Oued Sinar, 132 young soldiers had enlisted for Vietnam. . . . As soon as this was known, soldiers from another unit discussed the dirty war with the "volunteers." The result: a few hours later, 72 of them asked that their enlistment be cancelled. . . .

[12] *Cahiers du Communisme, op. cit.*, December 1947, p. 1101.

[13] Jean Lautissier, "La Campagne Contre la Guerre du Vietnam," *ibid.*, April 1949, p. 491.

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To stop the war, acts are needed. This requires that the whole Party consider the Vietnam war from a Communist viewpoint. . . . By such effective actions the French working class will win the confidence and esteem of the colonial peoples. . . . Thus it strengthens its own struggle for freedom, national independence and peace.[14]

Official reports, such as the once top-secret Revers Report (written by France's former chief of staff, General Revers, after an inspection tour of Indo-China), show that such statements were not empty threats. In fact, the Revers Report explicitly states that 40 percent of the French equipment that went to Indo-China in 1949 was sabotaged.[15] French trucks for Indo-China arrived with their tires slashed, tanks with loose bolts in their gear-boxes. Communist sources in Eastern Europe even boasted that one of France's biggest transport ships on the Indo-China run, the *Pasteur,* smuggled weapons and equipment for the Viet-Minh while it carried reinforcements for the French Army, and even that equipment directly shipped from the United States had arrived in sabotaged condition in Indo-China.[16] Not only did the French Communist Party advocate the perpetration of such acts but it openly admitted the authorship of them. This was clearly stated by a Communist member of the French Union Assembly, replying to an accusation that subversive acts were committed by the P.C.F.:

The war in Vietnam being against the Constitution, any act which tends to stop it is legal. (*Applause to the extreme left*).

In less than three years the party line of the P.C.F. had gone full circle, from all-out support of a French Union in its narrowest colonial interpretation to outright sabotage of French governmental actions aimed at maintaining the integrity of the French Union, even in the diluted version of a loose association with the Indo-China states. Henceforward until the cease-fire, changes in the Communist party line were more tactical than fundamental.

Nonetheless, the tactical changes are interesting. Until late in 1952, the "hard line" (open sabotage or delay of war supplies for Indo-China, demonstrations by women, students, "peace groups," etc.) appears to have been the only one compatible with party orthodoxy. Later, and particularly after the Peace Resolution of the World Peace Congress at Vienna in December 1952, the Communist Party again took up a more conciliatory approach, the more so as the "hard line" had alienated many parliamentarians (particularly among the Socialists) who now were in favor of a cease-fire but were reluctant to find themselves aligned with what now had become beyond dispute "a foreign national party."

The Vienna Peace Congress had, in fact, presented three resolutions for the "Cessation of the Present Conflicts" of Korea, Malaya and Vietnam which were trial balloons for later negotiations, two of which—first in Korea, then in Vietnam—materialized. In both cases (and particularly in the case of Vietnam), the eventual settlements contained a good many points which could have been borrowed from that resolution. This strongly suggests that

[14] Jean Guillon, "La Lutte Contre la Guerre du Vietnam," *ibid.,* September 1949, p. 1111.
[15] *Débats Parlementaires,* November 22, 1950, p. 8006.
[16] Guenther Halle, *Légion Etrangère,* Verlag Wolk und Welt, Berlin (Soviet Sector), 1952, p. 129, 210.

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the resolutions of the World Peace Congresses should be given serious consideration in the West, for often they express what later on materializes as Soviet policy.

Indeed, P.C.F. members placed the Vienna and later similar resolutions or proposals in the French parliamentary record, with additions of their own, as for example:

> The resolution of the Vienna Congress brought the precise indication that it would be possible . . . *to negotiate between the general staffs certain accords*. . . .

Since no suggestion of such general staff conversations appears in the Vienna resolution, this new and more precise offer clearly emanated from more official circles than those of the Peace Congress or even of the French Communist Party. As a matter of fact, it was made even before the peace offer made by Ho Chi Minh on November 29, 1933, via the Swedish newspaper *Expressen*. Before that date, also, the Viet-Minh had again made overtures to the effect:

> that after the conclusion of the armistice in Korea, nothing can really justify the refusal to end, *by direct and precise offers* to Ho Chi Minh, the shedding of blood in Vietnam. . . .

This, of course, was one thing which the M.R.P. leaders who controlled both French foreign policy and Indo-China policy steadfastly refused to do; while on the other hand, the Soviet Union—having recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the official name for Ho Chi Minh's régime) as an independent and friendly nation—could not negotiate on Ho Chi Minh's behalf. The United States Government had plainly recognized a similar situation in Korea when it did not refuse to sit at Panmunjom with military representatives of North Korea and People's China "Volunteers" despite the widely-proclaimed American policy of nonrecognition of Red China. This point, too, had been made clear by French Communist or affiliated sources:

> The Soviet Government would very probably reply that, having recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the respect of international law [*sic*] does not allow her to discuss problems concerning only [the D.R.V.N.][17]

Hence, there can be no doubt that over a period of three years, from 1950 until 1953, various French Communist or affiliated sources put forward proposals toward a settlement in Vietnam that accurately reflected the policy of the Soviet bloc, inasmuch as the settlement in Geneva in July 1954 can be considered—with minor variations—as following the proposals put forward by the Soviet bloc.

Retrospectively, it can remain only a matter of regretful speculation as to what might have been achieved by direct negotiations between the French and Ho Chi Minh in the fall of 1953, following six months of continuous if not spectacular French Military successes in Indo-China. There can be little doubt (and the Korean settlement supports the view) that for a time at least the prosecution of such wars in the Far East did not fit in with Soviet political "perspectives." By then, however, the French governing coalition was again riding the crest of an unjustified wave of optimism that the Indo-China con-

[17] Gilbert de Chambrun, "Sur quelles Bases négocier?" *Paix* (monthly of the French Peace Movement), Paris, June 1953, p. 23.

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flict could be settled militarily by a fairly clear-cut French victory, the more so as the new trend in American foreign policy appeared to favor a "hard" policy in the Far East. The United States was promising a vastly increased military aid program for Indo-China and eventual direct American naval and air support appeared a distinct possibility.

The rapidly worsening situation in the spring of 1954 merely increased the weight of the Communist arguments. Large segments of the French population were tired of the Indo-China affair and so were many elements outside of France, particularly after the not precisely victorious turn events had taken in Korea. This permitted the Communists to put the Indo-China problem back into a specifically French context. Now the P.C.F. appeared, so to say, as the *amicus curiae*, concerned above all with the effects of the Indo-China war upon France:

> it is contrary to the article of the Constitution[18] according to which the French Republic shall never use its arms against the freedom of any other people. . . .
>
> it is contrary to the United Nations Charter which, in its Article 2, invites the development of friendly relations between nations. . . .
>
> it has become the mere instrument, in Asia as well as in Europe, of our absolute dependence upon the United States. . . .
>
> it is extremely costly in human lives . . . notably the yearly loss of officers the equivalent of at least one graduating class from St. Cyr. . . .
>
> with us, all honest Frenchmen suffer from whatever degrades and mutilates our country, from everything that humiliates it.[19]

In the diplomatic lull between the Berlin Conference of February 1954 and the Geneva Conference of April–July 1954 the P.C.F. and its affiliates exploited to the full the fact that, for a time at least, the party line ran almost parallel to that of the non-Communist French Government. In comparison to 1946–47, when this also had occurred, the new situation was even better, for now the P.C.F. had no share in government responsibility and could afford to sit back quietly with an "I-told-you-so" air while the coalition parties as well as the "national opposition" groups (*e.g.* the Socialists and some smaller splinter groups) finally were compelled to come to grips with a desperate situation which the Communists had foreseen and prophesied.

The Communists were prepared to make the best of this. The XIIIth Congress of the P.C.F., held from June 3 to 8, 1954, just in time to set the party line for the last act of the Geneva Conference (and for the end of the Laniel government), was the occasion for the first public appearance and speech of its chieftain, Maurice Thorez, following his return from the U.S.S.R. The new line, in fact, was not very new, but merely an authorization for the Party to depart from its intransigent stand and to return to a more opportunist policy. Thorez stated:

> By demanding an immediate cease-fire and a negotiated settlement in Indo-China, our people will find a solid support in the generous and equitable proposals . . . of the D.R.V.N., supported by the Soviet Union and China . . .
>
> By working with all its energy to unite for the defense of peace and of national independence . . . the French Communist Party shows itself faithful to the

[18] The speaker errs here. It is part of the preamble to the 1946 Constitution.

[19] *Débats Parlementaires*, March 5, 1954, p. 709.

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teachings of the masters of Marxism. Lenin, in particular, has constantly insisted upon the necessity of the working class and of its party to take interest *in any democratic movement* and not to fear *temporary agreements* even with *unreliable allies* . . . providing that such compromises and agreements really help the working class . . . to carry forward the general democratic movement of the masses.[20]

Needless to say, such advice (in Thorez' own words, "the law of the whole party") was immediately heeded when the collapse of the Laniel government on June 12, 1954, reopened the thorny problem of finding a premier with a working majority to back him up in the stormy days ahead. Here again, the French Communist Party showed its amazing coördination with Soviet policy objectives. The prerequisites for the new premier were, in the words of the spokesman of the Communist parliamentary group:

> The Communists are ready to support any candidate who is decided: 1. to refuse to ratify the Bonn and Paris treaties; 2. to implement an immediate cease-fire in Indo-China so as to put an end to a situation that is extremely menacing to world peace; 3. finally, to satisfy the demands of the working class and to assure the effective defense of democratic freedoms.

The set of priorities is noteworthy. France was in the middle of a crisis involving her opposition in the Far East. However, as the Communists well knew, a solution to the Indo-China problem either by a total French military defeat (by now American intervention was out of the question and would have come too late anyway to save the vital Red River Delta) or by a negotiation on terms ultimately favorable to the Soviet bloc was assured even without the aid of the P.C.F. Hence, the P.C.F. immediately set its sights on a political issue that was of far greater importance to the U.S.S.R. than was the Indo-China problem. The third demand was, of course, pure window-dressing for home consumption.

This opportunistic attitude of the P.C.F. became even clearer when it threw the weight of its 100 votes (96 P.C.F. and 4 "Progressives") behind Pierre Mendès-France at the latter's investiture on June 18, 1954. Mendès-France's program had not changed since June 5, 1953, when he had presented himself for the first time to the same legislators and had been defeated by a lack of 13 votes. At that time, the 100 Communists and affiliates had solidly voted against him. Had the P.C.F. ever been the stout defender of peace and democracy it so loudly proclaimed to be, it could, perhaps, have shortened the Indo-China war by a full year and thereby saved thousands of French (and Communist Viet-Minh) lives. However, the time had then apparently not been ripe as yet for "temporary agreements even with unreliable allies." Now, apparently, this time had come, and Communist parliamentary behavior—matched to a certain extent by the party press—showed considerable restraint throughout the whole period.

Only once during the period of negotiations at Geneva did the P.C.F. depart from its newly-acquired decorum and committed a slight faux pas. When former Premier Joseph Laniel announced the fall of the fortress of Dien Bien Phu, the National Assembly rose to its feet to pay homage to the fallen defenders—with the exception of the Communist members, who remained seated in stony silence. The ensuing uproar even in circles hostile to

[20] *Le Monde*, June 9, 1954 (emphasis supplied).

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the Indo-China war definitely worked against the new party line of coöperation, and the error was not repeated when Mendès-France returned from Geneva on July 22, 1954, with the signed cease-fire agreement. Before beginning his report, he asked the National Assembly to rise in homage to the combatants of the French Union Forces who had fought and died for the cause of France and of the Associated States since 1946. The Communists and their affiliated members rose along with all the others and "listened without a movement to the President as he expressed to our American and British friends the gratitude of the National Assembly" for their help during the war and at the conference table in Geneva.

As the year 1954 drew to a close and it became apparent that Premier Mendès-France was unwilling to go along with an Indo-China policy of full collaboration with the Viet-Minh régime in North Vietnam—a policy which the P.C.F. defined as the only one which would be "realistic and in accordance with the interests of France and of peace"[21]—the P.C.F. shed any last remnants of cordiality for the Premier whom it had hailed so loudly in July. Nonetheless, in accordance with the new soft-toned line adopted since Geneva, the party's intervention in the December 1954 debate on the French budget for Indo-China was markedly moderate and sprinkled with citations from Western non-Communist sources. The moderation of the P.C.F. speaker, Pierre Villon, probably was due to the fact that the Soviet bloc's present main target, the debate on the ratification of the Western European Union accords, was to follow on the heels of the Indo-China debate and that the P.C.F. was badly in need of making once more "temporary agreements with unreliable allies" to bring about that measure's defeat.

Once more, the P.C.F. showed that it was an effective mouthpiece of Soviet foreign policy objectives. Villon's approach alternated between promises of expanded economic intercourse and threats of a military nature. His first speech ended on a menacing note well worth pondering, for, as many times before, it seems to outline what might be the Soviet response to a further strengthening of South Vietnam by increased American commitments:

> This policy [of the French Government], . . . if it were to go to its logical conclusion—to the sabotage by the Americans and by their agents of the expected elections—would, in the end, let France again bear the heavy burden of its consequences.

This menace was immediately followed by a recitation of the advantages France would derive if she would align her Far Eastern policy with that of the Soviet orbit, and here, too, the arguments used were designed to appeal to right-wing "unreliable allies" who in the course of the same debate had decried the increasing American economic penetration in South Vietnam:

> France would appear as a great peaceful power in the eyes of the Asian peoples by developing, in full accord with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [*e.g.* the Viet-Minh], her educational establishments and the propagation of her culture.

This argument, embodying the old theme of the *mission civilisatrice* which marked French colonial expansion just as "the white man's burden" or "manifest destiny" marked that of France's allies, was supplemented by a

[21] *Débats Parlementaires,* December 18, 1954, and following days.

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more down-to-earth proposal of economic advantages in the case of full French acceptance of "coexistence" with Ho Chi Minh's régime:

> Above all, France could, by agreements concluded on a basis of equality, establish fruitful economic exchanges [with the Viet-Minh] which would let us forget about the piastre smugglers and about the ideas that have prevailed in the war policy of this country.

In the ensuing test vote, the budget for Indo-China was voted down by a slim majority which included all the Communists and affiliates as well as representatives of practically all other parties. The fact that once more the issue at stake was not Indo-China alone but France's general attitude toward the Soviet bloc became apparent on December 20 when a speaker for the "Progressive" group affiliated to the P.C.F. bluntly stated:

> What will be voted upon? Will it be Indo-China? Will it be, *in advance,* the [W.E.U.] accords of London and Paris?

During the same debate the P.C.F. again attempted the approach of alternating menaces and cajolery: the threat of reopening the hostilities and the bait of advantageous economic treaties with the Viet-Minh régime. However, it apparently had overplayed its hand—or perhaps, contrary to Communist expectations, no group in the National Assembly wished to assume the responsibility of taking over the reins of government before the forthcoming debate on the ratification of the London and Paris accords. The final vote on the Indo-China budget was 310 against 172.

As the preceding pages show, the changes of the foreign policy line of the French Communists on the vital Indo-China problem have been far more responsive to actual international conditions than those of any other French party. It must be considered as one of the most serious errors of successive French governments not to have been more aware of the fact that such changes reflected quite accurately concurrent changes in Soviet foreign policy. The French Communist reaction to governmental Indo-China policy was substantially more realistic at any given moment than that of most of the other parties. The United States as well as the other allies of France could have put to excellent use the existence of this "direct line to Moscow" to adjust their actions accordingly.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

POWER THROUGH PURPOSE. By THOMAS I. COOK AND MALCOLM MOOS. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1954, 216 p. $4.00.

After giving the setting of the present bipolar international conflict, the authors, professors of political science at Johns Hopkins, develop their criticism of certain features of the American approach to foreign affairs—isolationism, individualism, legalism and the idea of an exclusive national interest. In conclusion they recommend as the guiding strategy "encouraging germs of discontent within the Soviet Union and its satellites wherever possible, and to the extent possible."

CIVILIZATION AND FOREIGN POLICY. By LOUIS J. HALLE. New York: Harper, 1955, 277 p. $3.75.

Mr. Halle joins the increasing number of former members of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff in giving his views of the principles that should guide American foreign policy. The book, while thoughtful, does not quite fulfill its promise of establishing a body of theory as an aid to practice.

A PHILOSOPHY FOR OUR TIME. By BERNARD M. BARUCH. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954, 49 p. $2.00.

Some reflections on the contemporary world and its challenges by the man who has become the elder statesmen's elder statesman.

ESSAYS IN THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY. By WALTER LIPPMANN. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1955, 189 p. $3.50.

Mr. Lippmann is here concerned with correcting what he regards as the present "functional derangement of the relationship between the mass of the people and the government." In good part the study is an attack on Jacobinism and its contemporary descendants.

THE EVOLUTION OF DIPLOMATIC METHOD. By HAROLD NICOLSON. New York: Macmillan, 1955, 93 p. $2.25.

Four polished lectures by an eminent British historian dealing with diplomacy in Greece and Rome, Renaissance Italy, seventeenth century France, and the twentieth century.

POPULAR DIPLOMACY AND WAR. By SISLEY HUDDLESTON. Rindge (N.H.): R. R. Smith, 1954, 285 p. $3.50.

A quite polemical treatment, by an experienced journalist, of the important issue of "expert diplomacy versus popular diplomacy." The author is wholly in favor of the old methods and bewails the day when Wilson "joined the sorry pack of idiots" and came out for open diplomacy.

LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE ET SES FONDEMENTS. Paris: Colin, 1954, 402 p. Fr. 1000.

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Reports prepared for an international round table conference held in 1953 under the auspices of the Association Française de Science Politique.

RESEARCH FOR PEACE. By Quincy Wright and Others. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co. (for the Institute for Social Research, Oslo), 1954, 296 p. Guilders 12.50.

The three prize-winning essays in a contest sponsored by the Institute for Social Research in Oslo. The question posed was, "To what extent is it possible to establish criteria for the delimitation of research of direct relevance to the problem of peaceful adjustment in international relations?"

POLITISCHE JUSTIZ, DIE KRANKHEIT UNSERER ZEIT. By Friedrich Grimm. Bonn: Scheur, 1953, 184 p.

A prominent defense attorney discusses the growing "politicization" of justice in recent decades, especially in Germany, and the necessity of checking it and returning to the "primacy of law."

THE LIE ABOUT THE WEST. By Douglas Jerrold. New York: Sheed, 1954, 85 p. $1.75.

A vigorous attack, from a Tory and Christian point of view, upon Toynbee's "The World and the West."

A PROGRAM FOR CONSERVATIVES. By Russell Kirk. Chicago: Regnery, 1954, 325 p. $4.00.

The author of "The Conservative Mind" undertakes, with the cheerfully admitted "vehemence of a radical," to work out the principles of a conservatism capable of restoring to our society a sense of community, justice and tradition.

TODAY'S ISMS. By William Ebenstein. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954, 191 p. $3.95.

A discussion, by a professor of politics at Princeton, of Communism, Fascism, democratic capitalism and democratic Socialism as ways of thought and action.

FREEDOM, LOYALTY, DISSENT. By Henry Steele Commager. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, 155 p. $2.50.

In these five essays, written over a period of six years, a leading American historian wades into the troubled and troublesome issues of academic and intellectual freedom, guilt by association and loyalty.

STRUGGLE FOR TOMORROW: MODERN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE. Edited by Basil J. Vlavianos and Feliks Gross. New York: Arts, 1954, 303 p. $6.50.

A symposium of articles concerned with various facets of modern Jewish thought, such as Zionism, Territorialism, Bundism, Assimilationism and Volkism.

THE STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY IN EUROPE, 1848–1918. By A. J. P. Taylor. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955, 638 p. $7.00.

This first volume of a new series, The Oxford History of Modern Europe, deals with the external relations of the European Great Powers from the Revolution of 1848 to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and Wilson's Fourteen Points. Presented in Mr. Taylor's sharp and often epigrammatic style, the book is an exceptionally stimulating review of the heyday of the Balance of Power, though too inclined to reverse all previous interpretations.

STRESEMANN AND THE REVISION OF VERSAILLES. By Henry L. Bretton. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953, 199 p. $3.00.

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This able monograph on Stresemann's foreign policy centers on an analysis of the means and techniques by which the Weimar Foreign Minister achieved a peaceful but very real revision of the Versailles Treaty. Based in part on the unpublished *Nachlass* which were found in the captured German archives.

GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION 1939–1941. By Gerhard L. Weinberg. Leyden: Brill, 1954, 218 p. Guilders 19.

A careful examination, in the form of a chronological survey, of the period of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact. Of particular interest is the author's concluding chapter summarizing the points at which his findings differ from prevalent views of that ambiguous relationship.

WORLD HISTORY FROM 1914 TO 1950. By David Thomson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, 246 p. $1.00.

A concise commonsense survey, overly Europo-centric but happily avoiding the current temptation to take the bard's-eye view of world history.

INTRODUCTION A L'ÉTUDE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PÉNAL. By Stefan Glaser. Brussels: Bruylant, 1954, 207 p.

An able essay, by a professor at the University of Liège, on the relatively recent and undeveloped field of international criminal jurisdiction.

L'ÉPÉE ET LA BALANCE. By Pierre Boissier. Geneva: Éditions Labor et Fides, 1953, 174 p. Swiss Fr. 5.75.

An essay on some of the juridical problems raised by the trial and punishment of "war criminals."

ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES ET POUVOIRS POLITIQUES DES ÉTATS. By Stanley Hoffmann. Paris: Colin, 1954, 427 p. Fr. 1250.

A historical and analytical essay, dealing in turn with the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations and the United Nations, and their relationship to the sovereignty of the nation states involved.

EUROPEAN PEACE TREATIES AFTER WORLD WAR II. Edited by Amelia C. Leiss in Coöperation with Raymond Dennett. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1954, 341 p. $4.75.

A study of the negotiations of treaties of peace with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland, including the texts of the treaties. Originally planned as a supplement to Volumes VIII and IX of Documents on American Foreign Relations.

FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ERNST RABEL. Edited by Hans Dölle and Others. Tübingen: Mohr, 1954, 704 p.

Essays on comparative law and international private law make up the first volume of this *Festschrift*.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Norman S. Buchanan and Howard S. Ellis. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955, 494 p. $5.00.

Two professors of economics at the University of California make an extensive study of the issues relating to economic development of the underdeveloped areas. After analyzing the nature of the problem, they then examine historical patterns of development in England and Western Europe, Japan and the U.S.S.R., and conclude with a survey of the requirements and prospects for achieving economic development in the contemporary world situation. An important contribution to

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the literature in this field.

WORLD TRADE POLICIES. By Henry Chalmers. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953, 546 p. $7.50.

As Chief of the Division of Foreign Tariffs in the Department of Commerce for 20 years and then as the Department's Adviser on Commercial Policy since 1941, Mr. Chalmers has been at the center of a tremendous reporting system that provided him with documentary information, interpretation and analysis of the measures affecting foreign trade taken by governments throughout the world. It has been his great service all these years to reduce this material to fairly brief compass and intelligible, authoritative form. Now all these essays and surveys, covering the period 1920–1953, have been brought together in a sizeable volume that provides the quickest means we have of discovering the main features of world trading arrangements at any given moment during this period.

WORLD POPULATION AND WORLD FOOD SUPPLIES. By Sir E. John Russell. London: Allen and Unwin, 1954, 513 p. (New York: Macmillan, 1955, $8.50.)

The former director of the Rothamsted Experiment Station surveys the principal food producing and consuming countries to get to grips with the problem of feeding the world's population. A valuable contribution, but containing some pretty sombre information especially as regards the prospects for the less advanced countries.

HUNGRY PEOPLE AND EMPTY LANDS. By S. Chandrasekhar. London: Allen and Unwin, 1954, 306 p. 18/. (New York: Macmillan, 1955, $4.25.)

This demographic study, by a professor at the University of Baroda, stresses the argument for the organized migration of Asians in overpopulated areas to more open land in Australia, Africa and Latin America.

MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A STUDY OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE ATLANTIC ECONOMY. By Brinley Thomas. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954, 362 p. $8.00.

A thorough examination, with much statistical material, of the impact of the waves of nineteenth and early twentieth century migration to the United States on the British and American economies.

NEW LIFE IN OLD LANDS. By Kathleen McLaughlin. New York: Dodd, 1954, 272 p. $3.75.

Selected case studies to illustrate the world-wide range and achievements of the technical assistance programs of the various U.N. agencies.

WORKSHOPS FOR THE WORLD: THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By Graham Beckel. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1954, 213 p. $4.00.

A popular description of the organization and functioning of such agencies as the I.L.O., I.T.U., F.A.O. and UNESCO.

THE ECONOMIST IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Lionel Robbins. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954, 224 p. $3.50.

Lectures by a leading British economist dealing chiefly with postwar financial and commercial problems: full employment, the dollar shortage, inflation and international payments, etc.

OXFORD ECONOMIC ATLAS OF THE WORLD. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, 152 p., 113 p. of maps, $7.00.

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A useful reference work comprising maps, statistical tables and some text.

ECONOMIC DOCTRINE AND METHOD: AN HISTORICAL SKETCH. By Joseph Schumpeter. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, 207 p. $3.50.

A translation of the late economist's classic study "Epochen der Dogmen- und Methodengeschichte," first published in 1912.

The Second World War

ASSIGNMENT TO CATASTROPHE. By Major-General Sir Edward Louis Spears. New York: Wyn, 1954–55, 2 v. $10.00.

The first volume of these very valuable and well-written memoirs ("Prelude to Dunkirk, July 1939–May 1940") covers the period from August 1939 to May 1940, with greatest emphasis on the last weeks when the author, a Conservative M.P., was Churchill's personal representative with Reynaud. The second volume ("The Fall of France, June 1940") covers the black weeks in France from June 1 to June 17.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC. LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES. By M. Hamlin Cannon. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1954, 420 p. $6.75.

This volume in the subseries on the war in the Pacific deals with the preparation for the Leyte campaign, the landing on October 20, 1944, and the operations leading to the liberation of the island by the end of the year.

THE RECAPTURE OF GUAM. By Major O. R. Lodge. Washington: U. S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch, 1954, 214 p. $4.25.

This volume in the series of Marine Corps monographs covers the successful American assault on Guam in the summer of 1944.

AMBASSADORS IN ARMS. By Thomas D. Murphy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1954, 315 p. $6.00.

An unofficial but appreciative history of Hawaii's 100th Infantry Battalion, the first U. S. combat unit composed of Americans of Japanese ancestry.

GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. By Paul Leverkuehn. New York: Praeger, 1954, 209 p. $3.50.

Of a more limited scope than the title would suggest, this book is concerned with the wartime activities of the Abwehr under the command of Admiral Canaris. The author was a wartime member of that organization.

THE FIRST AND THE LAST. By Adolf Galland. New York: Holt, 1954, 368 p. $4.95.

A Luftwaffe officer's personal account of the vicissitudes of the German fighter forces in the war. Of particular interest is his account of the delay in getting the jet fighters into production.

THE DEATH OF HITLER'S GERMANY. By Georges Blond. New York: Macmillan, 1954, 302 p. $4.50.

The story of the last nine months of the Third Reich, a translation of "L'Agonie de l'Allemagne," noted here October 1953.

AIR WAR AGAINST GERMANY AND ITALY: 1939–1943. By John Herington. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954, 731 p. 25/.

An extensive account of the Australian contribution to the air fighting against

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Germany and Italy—primarily within the organization of the R.A.F.

JÄÄKÄRIPRIKAATI HYÖKKÄÄ. By VÄINÖ MERIKALLIO. Helsinki: Otava, 1954, 171 p. M. 650.

Shortly before his death in June 1942 the commander of the famed Finnish Jaeger Brigade wrote an account of the unit's spectacular advance on the eastern Ladoga front.

THE UNSEEN AND SILENT. New York: Sheed, 1954, 350 p. $4.50.

Accounts of wartime actions and exploits of members of the Polish Home Army parachuted into their country from Britain.

The United States

POLITICS IN AMERICA. By D. W. BROGAN. New York: Harper, 1955, 467 p. $5.00.

Written in the first instance for his countrymen—"to make the American political system intelligible"—this book by a leading British historian has a great deal of interest for the American reader. Extraordinarily informed on American history and society, Mr. Brogan has the ability, in the tradition of Tocqueville and Bryce, to make us see aspects of ourselves and our political life more clearly than we can do on our own.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By OSCAR HANDLIN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, 244 p. $3.75.

The author, who has already made valuable contributions in his studies of immigrants in American history, here develops this thesis by an able survey of the rôle of immigration in the shifting pattern of our society since 1900.

THE UNITED STATES IN A CHANGING WORLD. By JAMES P. WARBURG. New York: Putnam, 1954, 496 p. $5.75.

Although this new offering by Mr. Warburg—his tenth in the last decade—reviews American foreign policy since the colonial period, it really is another in his series of commentaries on the contemporary conduct of our affairs, about which he remains alarmed and critical.

CALL TO GREATNESS. By ADLAI E. STEVENSON. New York: Harper, 1954, 110 p. $2.25.

In this book, based on the Godkin Lectures delivered in March 1954, Mr. Stevenson presents his views on the requirements and objectives of American foreign policy.

THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954, 2 v. $12.00.

The second and third volumes, entitled "The Inside Struggle" and "The Lowering Clouds," of this extensive, irascible, gossipy but very informative diary of the late Secretary of the Interior run from the 1936 election to Pearl Harbor. The first volume was noted here April 1954.

MY NAME IS TOM CONNALLY. By SENATOR TOM CONNALLY (AS TOLD TO ALFRED STEINBERG). New York: Crowell, 1954, 376 p. $5.00.

A personal and somewhat anecdotal autobiography of the former Senator from Texas, for over a decade Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

THE MAGNIFICENT MITSCHER. By THEODORE TAYLOR. New York: Norton, 1954, 364 p. $5.00.

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A biography of Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, a pioneering figure in naval aviation and wartime commander of Task Force 58.

THE CAPTAINS AND THE KINGS. By Edith Benham Helm. New York: Putnam, 1954, 307 p. $5.00.

Memoirs of a White House social secretary who worked for Mrs. Wilson, Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Truman.

FEAR, THE ACCUSER. By Dan Gillmor. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1954, 308 p. $3.00.

This study of Congressional investigations is, as the title would suggest, an indictment of the committees, based upon selective quotations from the more horrendous features of certain hearings.

AMERICAN DEMAGOGUES: TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Reinhard H. Luthin. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954, 368 p. $5.00.

The term "demagogue" in these biographical essays is stretched to encompass such diverse figures in the American political scene as James M. Curley, Frank Hague, Eugene Talmadge, Vito Marcantonio, Huey Long and Joseph R. McCarthy.

McCARTHY AND THE COMMUNISTS. By James Rorty and Moshe Decter. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954, 163 p. $2.00.

A critique, sponsored by the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, of Senator McCarthy's aims and methods in his anti-Communist campaign, with particular emphasis on the period since 1952. On balance the judgment is unfavorable.

THE STATE OF ALASKA. By Ernest Gruening. New York: Random House, 1954, 606 p. $7.50.

The former Governor and proponent of Alaskan statehood gives a lively account of the history and problems of that vast region, with particular stress on the difficulty of bringing Alaska into the main stream of American politics. A valuable contribution.

ALASKA, 1741–1953. By Clarence C. Hulley. Portland (Oregon): Binfords, 1953, 406 p. $5.00.

A history by a professor at the University of Alaska, with heavy emphasis on the period before the Russian sale to the United States.

Western Europe

LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DE DÉFENSE. By Jean Legaret and E. Martin-Dumesnil. Paris: Vrin, 1953, 275 p. Fr. 700.

An analysis of the E.D.C. treaty and of the differences in French opinion concerning it, prior to its defeat.

HARVEST OF HATE. By Léon Poliakov. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1954, 338 p. $3.00.

An account, based very largely on official German documents, of the Nazi program for the extermination of the Jews of Europe.

HISTOIRE DE VICHY: 1940–1944. By Robert Aron. Paris: Fayard, 1954, 766 p. Fr. 1250.

The years of the Vichy régime, which have been exceptionally fully chronicled personally in memoirs and apologia, are here studied as history in this able, extensive and scholarly work. While not avoiding judgments on the era and its leading figures, M. Aron has done much to put the whole picture in perspective.

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VENI, VIDI VICHY . . . ET LA SUITE. By Raymond Brugère. Paris: Deux-Rives, 1953, 206 p. Fr. 550.

These memoirs of the Vichy régime and the resistance, by the former French Ambassador to Belgrade and Secretary General of the French Foreign Office in 1944, originally appeared in a limited edition in the fall of that year.

LE DEUXIÈME BUREAU AU TRAVAIL (1935–1940). By General Gauché. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1954, 239 p. Fr. 670.

A defense of the French military intelligence against the charge that it failed, in the 1930's and the war, to provide the High Command and the Government with adequate information concerning Hitler's preparations.

THE FRENCH THEORY OF THE NATION IN ARMS 1866–1939. By Richard D. Challener. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955, 305 p. $4.50.

An interesting history of the development of the French theory of "the nation in arms" from Napoleon III to the Second World War, and of the influence of this theory on French military thought.

THE FRENCH LABOR MOVEMENT. By Val R. Lorwin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955, 346 p. $6.00.

An ably prepared and useful study. After sketching the historical background of the French trade unions, Mr. Lorwin stresses the "discontinuities" which have occurred in recent years—such as the Communist seizure of a major segment of the movement. The last part of the book discusses the structure and functioning of the unions and their strengths and weaknesses in the political scene.

PROTESTANTISM AND POLITICS IN FRANCE. By Stuart R. Schram. Alençon: Corbière et Jugain, 1954, 272 p.

A Columbia University dissertation surveying contemporary French Protestantism—the political views of the Protestants and their impact on French political life.

ICELAND, OLD-NEW REPUBLIC. By Amy Elizabeth Jensen. New York: Exposition Press, 1954, 362 p. $5.00.

A popular survey of Icelandic history, culture, society, and economic life.

OCTOBER '43. By Aage Bertelsen. New York: Putnam, 1954, 246 p. $3.00.

The story of the remarkable achievement of the Danes in smuggling nearly all of the 6,000 Jews of occupied Denmark into Sweden in October 1943.

WEST NORWAY AND ITS FJORDS: A HISTORY OF BERGEN AND ITS PROVINCES. By Frank Noel Stagg. London: Allen and Unwin, 1954, 245 p. (New York: Macmillan, $4.25.)

A continuation of the author's series, which began with "North Norway" and "The Heart of Norway," the present volume centers on the history of the city of Bergen.

THE WILHELMSTRASSE. By Paul Seabury. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954, 217 p. $3.00.

This able study of the position of German diplomats and the Foreign Office under the Nazis explores both the anomalous position of the civil service in a totalitarian régime and the broader aspects of the function of the bureaucrat and technician in the modern state.

KRONPRINZ WILHELM: SEINE ROLLE IN DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK. By Paul Herre. Munich: Beck, 1954, 280 p.

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A serious examination of the rôle of the last Hohenzollern Crown Prince in German politics—a small rôle, but one illuminating a number of facets of recent German history, especially in the years of the First World War.

THE YOUNG HITLER I KNEW. By August Kubizek. Boston: Houghton, 1955, 298 p. $4.00.

Personal and relatively intimate recollections of the adolescent Hitler during the years 1904 to 1908. While filling in a gap in the biography, the book is perhaps of most interest in what was not really revealed at that time—the demonic drive of Hitler's later career. (A translation of "Adolf Hitler, Mein Jugendfreund," Graz: Stocker, 1953, 352 p.)

BAYERN UND DAS REICH 1918–1923. By Werner Gabriel Zimmermann. Munich: Pflaum, 1953, 202 p.

A young Swiss constitutional historian analyzes the relations between federalist and separatist Bavaria and the Reich in the troubled early years of the Weimar Republic.

DIE HEIMATVERTRIEBENEN IN DER SOWJETZONE. By Peter-Heinz Seraphim. Berlin: Duncker, 1954, 202 p.

THE TRAGEDY OF SILESIA, 1945–46. Compiled and Edited by Johannes Kaps. Munich: "Christ Unterwegs," 1952–53, 576 p.

DOCUMENTS ON THE EXPULSION OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS. Munich: Association for the Protection of Sudeten German Interests, 1953, 308 p.

DIE VERTREIBUNG DER DEUTSCHEN BEVÖLKERUNG AUS DEN GEBIETEN ÖSTLICH DER ODER-NEISSE. Bonn: Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, 1954, 2 v.

Documents, eyewitness reports and commentary on the postwar vicissitudes of the German population in the Soviet Zone, Sudetenland, Silesia and other areas beyond the Oder-Neisse line.

DIE SUDETENFRAGE. By Hermann Raschhofer. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1953, 310 p.

A German monograph on the Sudeten problem in its international legal aspects since the First World War.

COMMUNIST CLOSE-UP. By Vincent R. Tortora. New York: Exposition Press, 1954, 160 p. $3.00.

Impressions of the Communist-sponsored Peace Festival held in Berlin in 1951.

DER ZWEITE DEUTSCHE BUNDESTAG. By Hans Trossmann. Bonn: Scheur, 1954, 384 p.

A useful handbook on the background, organization and procedure of the West German Bundestag; includes a parliamentary who's who and detailed electoral statistics.

DIE DEUTSCHE INDUSTRIE IM KRIEGE 1939–1945. Berlin: Duncker, 1954, 216 p.

A report on German industries during the Second World War, the material for which was collected about ten years ago.

GERMANY: 1945–1954. Cologne: Boas, 1954, 738 p.

A massive review of Germany's progress since the war, largely in the economic field, and including an extensive list of industrial and financial concerns.

GESCHICHTE DER REPUBLIK ÖSTERREICH. Edited by Heinrich Benedikt. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1954, 632 p.

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Four Viennese historians have collaborated in preparing this substantial survey of Austria between 1918 and 1945. Comprising a historical review and a discussion of the political and economic structure, the book is devoted to the theme of Austrian continuity in the European framework, the effort to transcend Clemenceau's definition: "L'Autriche c'est ce qui reste."

Eastern Europe

THE RED CARPET. By Marshall MacDuffie. New York: Norton, 1955, 330 p. $4.50.

Mr. MacDuffie, former head of the UNRRA mission in the Ukraine, was permitted in the autumn of 1953 to make an extended tour of the U.S.S.R., including a number of areas off the usual circuit. In this lively book he reports his observations, conversations and, rather tentatively, his conclusions. Of primary interest for its reportage.

STALIN'S HEIRS. By Gordon Young. London: Verschoyle, 1953. 156 p. 12/6.

A modest effort to pull together the relatively sparse information about the Soviet leaders of the post-Stalin era.

VORKUTA. By Joseph Scholmer. New York: Holt, 1955, 304 p. $3.75.

A German doctor's account of the Soviet labor camp in the Siberian Far North, including some material on the strike of the Vorkuta miners.

RUSSIA BY THE BACK DOOR. By Leon Maks. New York: Sheed, 1954, 264 p. $3.50.

The story of a member of the Polish underground and his extraordinary secret wartime tour through the U.S.S.R.

THE INTERREGNUM, 1923–1924. By Edward Hallett Carr. New York: Macmillan, 1954, 392 p. $5.00.

In the fourth volume of this important history of Soviet Russia, Mr. Carr covers the confused period of Lenin's final illness and the months following his death, when the struggle for position was most intense and tortuous. In tracing Trotsky's falling star and Stalin's intricate movement toward power, the author demonstrates again his exceptional skill in analysis and exposition.

RITUAL OF LIQUIDATION: THE CASE OF THE MOSCOW TRIALS. By Nathan Leites and Elsa Bernaut. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1954, 515 p. $6.50.

An impressive and searching, if not always persuasive, analysis of the background and proceedings of the great Soviet trials of 1936, 1937 and 1938 in an effort to comprehend the weird phenomenon of political confession. In the course of this analysis the authors bring forth a great deal of illuminating information on Bolshevist doctrine and mentality.

LE DROIT SOVIÉTIQUE. By René David and John N. Hazard. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1954, 2 v. Fr. 4000.

An important work of exposition and analysis. M. David, professor of comparative civil law at Paris, has prepared the first volume: "Les Données Fondamentales du Droit Soviétique." The second volume, by Professor Hazard of Columbia University, is a translation of "Law and Social Change in the U.S.S.R.," noted here April 1954. Contains an extensive bibliography of the literature in Russian, French, English, German, Spanish and Italian.

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DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET SOUVERAINETÉ EN U.R.S.S. By Jean-Yves Calvez. Paris: Colin, 1953, 299 p. Fr. 800.

A study of the development of Soviet theories on international law and the concept of sovereignty from the Revolution through the marked revisions of the 1930's to the present.

SOVIET LAW AND SOVIET SOCIETY. By George C. Guins. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954, 457 p. Guilders 27.50.

A substantial, but contentious and rather extreme development of the thesis that the Soviet system of law does not represent a legal order in any meaningful sense and that the legal code but reflects a régime of "unlimited arbitrariness."

SOVIET NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT, 1940–48. By Abram Bergson and Hans Heymann, Jr. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, 249 p. $5.00.

SOVIET NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT IN 1928. By Oleg Hoeffding. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, 156 p. $3.75.

These two volumes continue the important work of establishing a "statistical frame of reference" for the Soviet economy. Patterned after Professor Bergson's earlier study, "Soviet National Income and Product in 1937," noted here in October 1953.

WAGES, PRICES AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Lief Björk. London: Dobson, 1953, 199 p. 18/.

An account, by an author who visited Moscow as interpreter for the Swedish T.U.C., of Soviet social legislation, primarily as it relates to working conditions.

LOST SPLENDOR. By Prince Felix Youssoupoff. New York: Putnam, 1954, 307 p. $4.50.

Memoirs of old Russia by a man notable chiefly for his rôle in the murder of Rasputin.

THE MEMOIRS OF MARSHAL MANNERHEIM. New York: Dutton, 1954, 540 p. $6.75.

An English translation of memoirs, written by Mannerheim after his retirement in 1946. Finnish edition noted here in April 1952.

VAARAN VUODET, 1944–1948. By Lauri Hyvämäki. Helsinki: Otava, 1954, 192 p. M. 550.

A straightforward and able account of Finnish political developments during the years 1944–1948.

GREEN GOLD AND GRANITE. By Wendy Hall. London: Parrish, 1953, 190 p. 17/6.

A pleasant introduction to Finland and Finnish culture; includes a brief discussion of political and diplomatic affairs.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By Harriet Wanklyn. New York: Praeger, 1954, 445 p. $6.25.

A thorough and conscientious survey, emphasizing the physical and economic geography of Czechoslovakia.

INTRODUCING YUGOSLAVIA. By Lovett F. Edwards. London: Methuen, 1954, 255 p. 18/.

A useful descriptive guide for the tourist; eschews politics.

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THE UNWRITTEN LAW IN ALBANIA. By Margaret Hasluck. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954, 285 p. $6.00.

A posthumously published study in Albanian ethnography dealing with the customary law of the highland tribes.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

OLD MEN FORGET. By Duff Cooper. New York: Dutton, 1954, 399 p. $5.00.

A graceful and revealing autobiography of Alfred Duff Cooper, later Viscount Norwich, whose career included the Foreign Office, the House of Commons, Cabinet membership and the Paris Embassy. His account of the Chamberlain Government, from which he resigned in protest at the time of Munich, throws fresh light on the ineptitudes of those years.

TEMPESTUOUS JOURNEY. By Frank Owen. London: Hutchinson, 1954, 784 p. 25/.

A lengthy biography of Lloyd George based in part on the "vast papers" of the Lloyd George Archives. Not a particularly satisfactory treatment, in part because the new information is obscured by the author's method of presentation which often slides into impressionistic journalese. (An American edition is to be published shortly in New York by McGraw-Hill.)

THE ROYAL FAMILY. By Pierre Berton. New York: Knopf, 1954, 273 p. $3.75.

A lively portrait, by a Canadian journalist, of the British Monarchy since Queen Victoria.

STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SERVICES. By Sheila Ferguson and Hilde Fitzgerald. London: H.M.S.O. and Longmans, 1954, 367 p. 22/6. (New York: British Information Services, $5.25.)

This volume in the official History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series, is a successor to R. M. Titmuss, "Problems of Social Policy," noted here October 1951. Its theme is the family in wartime: emergency maternity services, child welfare, nursing services, etc.

THE REDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN POSTWAR BRITAIN. By Allan Murray Carter. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955, 242 p. $5.00.

A study of the effects of postwar tax and income programs in Britain upon the distribution of incomes grouped by size. While the conclusions are not surprising—there was a substantial redistribution—they are well backed by statistical analysis.

BRITISH PUBLIC FINANCES: THEIR STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT, 1880–1952. By Ursula K. Hicks. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, 225 p. $1.25.

A brief survey for the general reader of the rise and purposes of public spending since the 1880's.

CANADA'S TOMORROW. Edited by G. P. Gilmour. New York: Macmillan, 1954, 324 p. $4.00.

Nine papers dealing with Canada's prospects in various fields over the next half-century. Includes a chapter on Canada's international rôle.

WARTIME AGRICULTURE IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, 1939–50. By J. G. Crawford and Others. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954, 354 p. $7.50.

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This volume, in the useful series of publications of Stanford's Food Research Institute, discusses both the wartime changes in agriculture in the two Dominions and the contributions made to the Allied war effort.

ECONOMIC STABILITY IN NEW ZEALAND. Edited by R. S. Parker. Wellington (N.Z.): New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 1953, 146 p. 13/6. (Washington: New Zealand Government Trade Commissioner, $2.80.)

A symposium of addresses delivered in May 1953.

The Middle East

THE MIDDLE EAST: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SURVEY. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954, 590 p. $6.50.

This revised edition of a useful reference work, which first appeared in 1950, takes account of such subsequent events as the abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Turkey's entry into NATO, and the Iranian oil dispute.

GHOST ON HORSEBACK: THE INCREDIBLE ATATÜRK. By Ray Brock. New York: Duell, and Boston: Little, Brown, 1954, 408 p. $4.75.

A purple prose, romanticized biography: "Kemal heard an urgent feminine whisper as he hit the cobbles outside."

BEN-GURION OF ISRAEL. By Barnet Litvinoff. New York: Praeger, 1954, 273 p. $4.00.

A skillful biography of Israel's first Prime Minister in the setting of the Zionist movement and the emergence of the new state.

LE PARLEMENT IRANIEN. By Djamchid Tavallali. Lausanne: Imprimerie des Arts et Métiers, 1954, 278 p.

A thesis for the University of Lausanne, tracing the history of the Iranian Parliament since 1906 and analyzing its present structure.

South and Southeast Asia

THERE IS NO ASIA. By Dwight Cooke. Garden City: Doubleday, 1954, 320 p. $4.00.

A popular tour, conducted by a radio and television correspondent, of non-Communist Asia from Japan to Pakistan, in search of points of strength and weakness.

ASIA: EAST BY SOUTH. By J. E. Spencer. New York: Wiley, 1954, 453 p. $8.50.

A cultural geography, by a professor of geography at the University of California at Los Angeles, of India, Southeast Asia and the Far East.

MALAYA, INDONESIA, BORNEO, AND THE PHILIPPINES. By Charles Robequain. New York: Longmans, 1955, 456 p. $6.00.

A physical and economic geography, by a professor of colonial geography at the Sorbonne. A large part of the study is devoted to the impact and achievements of European colonial expansion in the area.

THE MEN WHO RULED INDIA: THE GUARDIANS. By Philip Woodruff. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954, 385 p. $5.00.

In his second volume, Mr. Woodruff's admirable narrative runs from the Mutiny to the end of British rule in 1947. As the subtitle indicates, the theme of the book is that of a rule modeled after Plato's Guardians—benevolent despots who had, in their best representatives, a strong sense of duty and responsibility.

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THE TRANSFER OF POWER IN INDIA 1945–7. By E. W. R. Lumby. New York: Praeger, 1954, 274 p. $4.50.

A skillful and wholly detached account of the events leading up to relinquishment of British authority and to the grim violence of the partition which followed.

THE INDIAN YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1953. Edited by Charles Henry Alexandrowicz. Madras: Indian Study Group of International Affairs, University of Madras, 1953, 509 p. Rs. 10.

This second volume in a significant series comprises a number of informative essays on international relations, economics and law as they concern India and Asia in general.

THE SEVENTH YEAR OF FREEDOM: AUGUST 1953–AUGUST 1954. New Delhi: All India Congress Committee, 1954, 372 p. Rs. 3.

The latest volume of an annual survey recording the achievements of the Union and State Governments in India.

GANDHIAN OUTLOOK AND TECHNIQUES. New Delhi: Ministry of Education, 1953, 424 p. Rs. 6/12.

A report of the proceedings of the seminar, held in January 1953, "on the contribution of the Gandhian outlook and techniques to the solution of tensions between and within nations."

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For many years a missionary and educator, Dr. Stuart was appointed United States Ambassador to China in 1946, a post he held until December 1952. The first half of these memoirs deals with his earlier years; the second, with the tangled years after the Second World War. Written calmly and without rancor, it is nonetheless quite critical of several aspects of United States policy, especially the publication of the "White Paper" in 1949.

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A very substantial contribution to the study of Japan's extraordinary economic

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By Ruth Savord

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